

## FOREWORD

Already during the World War 1914-18 I have followed with lively sympathy the attitude of the United States of America toward Europe. In the book "Sveriges öde, "1 which deals with Sweden's relations with the fighting great powers, I devoted two chapters to America under the headings: "America Drops the Mask" and "Anglo-Saxon War Objectives in the Summer and Autumn of 1917." Now, 24 years later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt has followed the example of his predecessor, Woodrow Wilson. The United States has thus proved that it has learned nothing from the experience of the World War and the ill-fated peace. All the frightening images of the past have not been able to prevent the evocation of a war once again, encompassing the entire globe. I have studied the question of why it was not possible to avert this disaster with the closest attention and have set down the development of the war policy of the USA. under Roosevelt in this book.

I have been to the United States several times, not only for fleeting visits, but I have spent almost two years in the country between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

In 1923, 1929, and 1932 I stayed for months in the United States. Lectures on my explorations in Asia brought me into contact with interesting personalities in all parts of the country. I spent unforgettable weeks as a guest of the railroad company of

of Santa Fe on the Gran Canon. In California I became acquainted with the beauties of the Yosemite Valley, the largest reflector in the world on Mount Wilson, and the Lick Observatory. In Boston I was a patient of Dr. Harvey Cushing, one of the greatest and most important surgeons of the Wreld. I also think fondly of my compatriot Vincent Bendix, born in America to Swedish parents. Through a magnificent donation he made it possible for me to make the Ethnographic Museum in Stockholm the richest in Europe in the field of Lamaistic ecclesiastical art.

I met President Theodore Roosevelt on a daily basis during his visit to Stockholm in May 1910. We shared the same interests, and we talked at length about the attractions and difficulties of voyages of discovery. President Franklin D. Roosevelt showed great interest in the automobile expedition I equipped in Peking in the fall of 1933 to drive through Inner Asia to Sinkiang and back to Nanking in the service of the Chinese government. Roosevelt took great interest.

Thus, I am connected with America by many ties. The role played by the President and people of the United States in this war concerns me passionately. For this great conflict will reshape the structure of the world and with it the Asiatic continent, around which the work and thoughts of my whole life revolve.

Stockholm, May 1, 1942

Sven Hedin

## 1. AMERICAN-GERMAN

### RELATIONS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNION

This book deals with the policies of President F. D. Roosevelt. It goes far beyond the boundaries of his country and his continent. Roosevelt and members of the American government have emphasized countless times that the country's chief enemy is Germany. Therefore, I begin with a review of the relations between the United States since its establishment as a separate state after the War of Independence against England and Germany and the German states from which the Reich emerged in 1871. It will become apparent that Germany has always endeavored to live in friendship with the young and great country across the Atlantic Ocean, but that hostile currents have arisen in the United States for centuries.

Frederick the Great, who ruled Prussia, the greatest of the German lands, during the American War of Independence, brought understanding and goodwill to the young American Republic. The friendship with Prussia was sealed a few years after Frederick's death by a treaty that John Quincy Adams, as

American envoy in Berlin, concluded with the Prussian government and maintained during his later presidency. In 1828, the German Hanseatic cities also entered into a firm treaty relationship with the United States. During the difficult years of the American Civil War of 1861–1865, as all American historians testify, the friendship of the German states was of value to the Union and its President Lincoln. During this crisis of the

American Union, France under Napoleon III had the Southern states financially supported and the Western Hemisphere humiliated by sending troops, while England's short-sighted hatred angered Abraham Lincoln. German financial circles, however, with Bismarck's approval, supported the Union cause through bonds.

In the two wars that the Union had to fight for the sake of its formation and later for the sake of its unity, Germans rendered outstanding services to these goals. I mention only those of General Herkimer, who, as leader of the German settlers of the Mohawk Valley, fell in battle against the English and for America, General v. Steuben as organizer of George Washington's army, and Carl Schurz as friend and associate of Lincoln, from the wealth of names which suggest themselves in the study of history.

When the German Empire was founded in 1871, relations between it and the United States were as unclouded as they had seldom been between two countries. Americans who later assumed leading positions in politics and science had spent their student years in Germany, especially in Göttingen and Heidelberg, and had absorbed German spirit and German nature. The cultivation of good understanding was something natural to them.

The first shadow cast on the relationship was the fact that the United States supplied arms to France in the last months of the Franco-Prussian War and that the reclamation of the German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine was sharply criticized publicly by some Americans. It is to be regretted that even then they did not maintain strict neutrality. Nevertheless, Kaiser Wilhelm I. 1872 was asked by the United States for his arbitration in a territorial dispute, which was in their favor. In 1874, the American ambassador in Berlin, George Bancroft, was able to report after a conversation with the

Prince Bismarck, reported that the chancellor had expressed a desire "to preserve the especially friendly relations between the two countries" and that he wished to cultivate them "more than those with any power on the globe."

Economic relations between the two countries subsequently became clouded, however, when the newly developed arable lands of the United States so overwhelmed Europe, and Germany in particular, with their growing production that Germany, in order to protect its own agriculture, had to decide in 1879 to introduce grain duties, and a few years later, like other European countries for that matter, to adopt sanitary measures limiting the hitherto unimpeded importation of American livestock products.

However, there were no serious upsets, as evidenced by a speech by Bismarck on March 13, 1884, in which he announced that he had instructed the German consulates in the U.S. to pay special attention to maintaining friendly relations.

Now, however, the time had already come when, in spite of all good will and all proofs of friendship, the shaping of these relations no longer depended on Germany. The growing continental expansion of the United States, the increase of its population from many heterogeneous elements, the strengthening of its economic power, aroused motive forces which, on the one hand, sought greater independence from Europe, and, on the other, regarded Europe as threatening and tempted it to interfere in European affairs. The clouds were always caused – and this is interesting for the present – by fears of Americans, who even then were promoting the emerging hemispheric policy of the United States and circulating rumors that Germany intended to interfere with it. The suspicion was groundless because the United States officially adhered strictly to the principles established by Monroe, and Germany was predominantly concerned with European problems and approached world and colonial policy only

hesitantly, even with regard to other continents, embarrassingly avoiding getting involved in any way in matters of German settlers on South American soil.

Nevertheless, in 1896 the future president Theodore Roosevelt, then governor of the state of New York, expressed strong distrust of Germany, which he expected to seek land ownership in South America, for which there was absolutely no reason. When Germany acquired Kiautschou from China in 1897, the suspicion arose again in the U.S. that Germany was striving to divide up foreign continents, overlooking the fact that not only England had long since established itself at all important points of the world, but that in 1897 it was pursuing special plans with regard to China, and that Russia, too, was advancing more strongly in the Far East. However, it was not these two imperialist countries but Germany that was held responsible for the failure of the "open door policy" in China proclaimed by the American Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 and 1900.

During the American-Spanish War, in 1898, Germany pursued a policy of non-intervention, except for the participation of the then German ambassador in Washington, disapproved by the imperial government, in a collective march of all European ambassadors, at the suggestion of the British ambassador, Sir J. Pauncefoot. Nor was any action against America planned with the dispatch of German warships to Manila. The fact that there was an exchange of words between the American Admiral Dewey and the German flag officer was played up in the American press, and the little incident went into all American textbooks as an example of how "American determination rejects German insolence. rejects German insolence." The German Chancellor v. Bülow, however, wrote on July 28, 1898, in an instruction to the Foreign Office: "We are sincerely anxious

to eliminate the misunderstandings that have arisen between Germany and America, which are as thorough as they are purposeless, in the interest of both countries. A friendly relationship with America is of great value to us."

Conflict arose in March 1898 when American and British warships shelled the port of Apia on Samoa, damaging the German consulate. The serious tension was settled in December 1899 by the conclusion of a partition treaty between Germany, the United States, and England.

Unfortunately, the Samoa conflict was only the beginning of a chain of events that led to constant suspicions of Germany in the United States. The next was the so-called Venezuela incident. During the civil war in Venezuela between 1898 and 1900, German, American, and British settlers and trading companies had suffered severe damage. The German government therefore decided to blockade at the end of December 1901, after having ascertained through its ambassador von Holleben that a blockade of Venezuela's ports would meet with no resistance on the part of the United States, and after the British government had let it be known that it was prepared to proceed jointly with Germany. Germany and England jointly issued an ultimatum to the Venezuelan government, and German and English ships, after the deadline had expired without success, bombarded a Venezuelan fort and sank some Venezuelan warships. Washington was very disgruntled about this, and this disgruntlement was directed almost exclusively against Germany, seeing in the German - not in the British - action a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. After all, there were at that time

some knowledgeable and reasonable Americans who expressed a clearer view. Ambassador Andrew White, for example, wrote in his autobiography that the Monroe doctrine had not been violated in any way, adding, "The United States was no more threatened than the planet Saturn." Even President Theodore Roosevelt was pleased with the subsequent agreement between Germany, England, and Venezuela. Nevertheless, the expressions which were later to become a daily usage, such as "shameless Huns" and similar terms, had appeared at that time in the American inflammatory press, which also existed at the beginning of this century, and the same press expressed regret, in phrases now particularly familiar to it, that the "land of Kant and Goethe" had sunk so low.

The case of the Danish West Indies led to further unwarranted disgruntlement against Germany in the United States, in addition to the recurring claim that the German settlers in Brazil were merely the shock troops for a later German foothold in South America. In 1866, the American government had wanted to buy the Danish West Indies from Denmark. However, the purchase treaty was not ratified by the Senate in Washington. In 1902, the government made another attempt, and this time the treaty was rejected by the First Chamber in Copenhagen. Immediately, suspicions surfaced in the American press that Germany was scheming in Copenhagen because she herself was seeking possession of the islands in order to control the future Panama Canal from them. This was nothing but a fairy tale, but it was subsequently brought out again and again when it was desired to alarm the American public against Germany. American historian Charles Tansill, in his 1938 book *America Goes to War*, said of it: "This legend was taken for truth by American officials and helped to strengthen America's hostile attitude against Germany."

Kaiser Wilhelm II, like Bismarck, was also a friend of the United States and an enemy of any interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. This is evidenced, among other things, by his marginal comment on a report by Reich Chancellor v. Bülow on a proposal by the President of the Dominican Republic that Germany should establish a naval station in the territory of San Domingo. The characteristic imperial aside read, "I am not falling for the suggestion from Haiti, do not want to divide with the United States." The Kaiser even sent his brother, Prince Henry, to the United States in 1902 with a mission to tell Americans: "Germany wants peace and good friendship with the United States throughout the Western Hemisphere." The mission, unfortunately, remained as unsuccessful as other friendly gestures of the Emperor, because the then President Theodore Roosevelt was filled with a distrust as unfounded as it was profound, which was also particularly evident in the Moroccan crisis. During the latter, Roosevelt had had it officially declared that the United States had no interests in Morocco and that he personally had no desire to choose between France and Germany, but confidentially he had sent an instruction to his Ambassador White which concluded with the words: "While we stand and wish to remain friendly to Germany, we consider it best for the peace of the world, and therefore for the interests of the United States, that the Entente Cordiale between England and France be fortified." The Morocco crisis of 1911 also led to a new press agitation against Germany, although President Taft's term from 1909 to 1913 was generally favorable for U.S.-German relations in general. But the policy unfortunately moved in the line of favoring the alliance between England and France, which was essentially directed against Germany.

This brought us close to the outbreak of the First World War. The war and post-war period will be dealt with in detail in the following chapters. Here I would like to anticipate chronologically and, in order to round out the presentation of the American-German relationship only, immediately follow with a few words about the period between World War I and World War II.

In spite of the participation of the United States in World War I, and in spite of the cruel disappointment of Wilson, on whose promises the German army laid down its arms, a rapid reconciliation took place from Germany's point of view. The main reasons for this were the generous relief efforts of the German-Americans, the Quakers, and other charities for the children and old people in Germany who had been malnourished by the British blockade, and also, with exceptions, the exemplary conduct of the American occupation troops in the Rhineland. That the Americans at Coblenz opposed French intentions not only to keep the Rhineland occupied beyond the period provided for in the treaty, but also to cause it to fall away from the Fatherland through the separatist movement, which they supported by all means, has been forgotten in Germany just as little as America's condemnation of the French invasion of peace. The fact that the American troops withdrew from the Rhineland before the appointed time, while the English and especially the French were reluctant to

negotiate the evacuation, has likewise been gratefully acknowledged. "My Rhineland-Journal," by General Allen, the American commander-in-chief at Coblenz, was soon translated into German and much purchased. It is considered among the source for many a historical account of the difficult occupation and separatist period.

On the other hand, it has also remained unforgotten in Germany that the two reparation plans, the implementation of which would have destroyed the rest of the German national income and stifled any economic reconstruction, bore the names of two Americans, Dawes and Young.

The first relief in reparations obligations, however, is then again linked to the name of American President Herbert Hoover, who already enjoyed great prestige through his aid activities during and after the war. I have also always heard the names of American ambassadors in Berlin, especially Mr. Houghton and Dr. Schurmann, mentioned by Germans with special respect.

When one heard in Germany with what brutality Americans of German descent were treated during the First World War in the country of their choice, even if they remained wholeheartedly loyal to that country, this was regretted but regarded as an internal American affair. The aspiration of all postwar German governments was for the early restoration of good relations. Soon after the end of the World War, exchanges of professors and students between the United States and Germany were resumed; this fostered mutual respect and understanding. When the major German shipping lines replaced their surrendered fleet of ships with a number of newbuildings, Americans preferred to travel on these vessels, which provided them with comfort and safety. Wounds were closing in all areas, and a new relationship of trust seemed to be taking shape.

## 2. THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

At the beginning of the World War, the United States at first held back cautiously, despite the internal sympathy of large segments of the population for one side or the other. The teaching of the first great president, George Washington, that the country must keep aloof from all foreign, especially European, entanglements in order to solve its American task, had become part of the American essence. The final occasion for the outbreak of World War I, the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Serbian student, was no reason for America to feel threatened. Why the matter was not settled peacefully or, if that was not possible, by a short warlike confrontation between the two states involved alone, but Germany came to Austria's aid, Russia and her allies, England and France, but to little Serbia, the majority of Americans did not understand at all. But they did understand that it had now been proven that alliances and agreements between states can lead to countries getting involved in wars for reasons that are quite remote from the individual member state. This realization made Americans appreciate the wisdom of George Washington all the more.

But even after the first events of the war, one group began

to make the case for American intervention. The passage of German troops through neutral Belgium provided the means to do so, and it really succeeded in turning many Americans against Germany. They knew nothing of the secret arrangements that had been made long before the war between Belgium and France and England long before the war, and of which Russia had knowledge. Later one could read all this in the many books of American scientists based on the most exact study of all documents. At that time, however, Americans took at face value what the Allies claimed in their press and through their propaganda travelers. Germany had no possibility of direct news reaching America, for its overseas cables had been cut by the enemy in the first hours of the war, radio did not yet exist, Germans could not travel to America and reconnoiter, and the official German agencies were not believed.

At first, those who fell victim to propaganda for the United States' entry into the war were not aware of

how disastrously it worked. It became clear to them only after the war, when the methods of British and, secondarily, French and Belgian propaganda were exposed. In a scientific study, which appeared only in 1938, they were described in detail by Professor Petersen of the University of Oklahoma. British liberals and peaceniks earned special merit with books exposing this propaganda, such as E. D. Morel in "The Poison That Destroys," Lord Ponsonby in "Lies in Wartime," Sir Philip Gibbs in "Now It Can Be Told."

The secrets of Crew House were revealed, as were those of Sir Gilbert Parker, the English propaganda chief for America. The British General Charteris himself was amused that the whole anti-German world had fallen for his story, actually invented only for the Chinese, of the utilization of German soldier corpses for fat. When they were able to travel to Europe and Belgium again, they found by sight that there were no children without hands anywhere. During the war, the atrocity tales had been atrocity tales without hesitation. The American writer Theodore Dreiser mentions them in his new book "America Is Worth Saving": "Every newspaper told us stories about the 'Hun atrocities' in Belgium that sent shivers down our spines, while the German defense articles were hardly printed, for the simple reason that our newspapers belonged to members of the British Fifth Column. Five eminent American newspapermen, among them Irvin Bobb and Harry Hansen, had jointly sent a telegram to the Associated Press vouching with their professional honor that while following the German army through Belgium they had not seen a single instance of unprovoked reprisals and that they had followed up numerous atrocity reports but had found them all unfounded. It was in vain. The English Fifth Column had to put something in front of us to get our blood boiling and our anger aroused. Whether it bore the slightest resemblance to the truth was entirely unimportant." Dreiser then goes on to mention that John T. Flynn had stated that "the English had spent 150 million dollars to incite us into world war, and that they considered this money well spent."

The propaganda apparatus vigorously supported Allied efforts, begun in the first days after the outbreak of war, to draw the United States into the war. Nevertheless, the re-election of President Wilson could still proceed under the slogan "He kept us out of the war." In April 1917, however, the President and Congress, with the consent of the majority of the American people, declared war on Germany, after the German governmental and military leadership had made some mistakes that deprived them of the remaining sympathy of part of the American people.

deprived. The opponents of the war among the people and the people's representatives were voted down and ostracized in a manner that is surprising in a country that places such a high value on freedom of expression.

President Wilson at the same time endeavored to induce the neutral states also to declare war on the Central Powers. To recall the memory of these efforts to the neutrals is advisable in view of the actions of his successor in the present World War.

On February 6, 1917, it was telegraphed from Washington to Paris that Wilson "would today send a summons to all neutral countries to join in the position taken by the United States against Germany and to break off diplomatic relations.... It is felt that the nations bordering Germany will also follow America's example...". Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Spain answered Wilson's request in the negative. The Swedish government's note, written by Minister of State Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, emphasized Sweden's strict neutrality. The Swedish Government declared its readiness to use every opportunity "to contribute to the achievement of an early, lasting peace.... The proposal which is the subject of this correspondence identifies as its aim the abbreviation of the sufferings of war. But the United States, in order to attain this end, has adopted a means entirely at variance with the principles which have hitherto governed the policy of the Royal Government." The Government is "by no means minded to abandon the path of neutrality and impartiality."

This definite and manly reply to the President's request naturally aroused displeasure in Entente circles and satisfaction among the Central Powers.

When America entered the World War, it was at a moment when her opponents were equally exhausted. Its entry into the war, however, gave one side such a preponderance that the scales tipped in its favor despite valiant opposition from the other. In the end, America decided the outcome of the war. It is remembered in the United States that participation in the Great War was anything but a quick-fire adventure. Walter Millis, author of the widely read book "The Road To War," said in an essay published in Life in 1939: "How many of the members of Congress who voted to enter the war guessed at the time that by the end of the war there would be two million American troops in Europe and another two million on the way?" In the question lies already the answer that those responsible for entering the war did not suspect the necessary magnitude of the sacrifices and arms aid to be made. In any case, America's intervention brought about the decision.

But America wanted more and was right in its demand to play a decisive role in shaping the peace so that its sacrifices of blood and property would not remain useless. The peace that was discussed at Versailles did not become an American peace, despite President Wilson's participation in the conferences, and the United States, deeply disappointed, withdrew from Europe for the next few years. What was the balance of the war for America? I do not mean the balance sheet that can be seen in the accounts of some armament factories and big banks. Nothing is recorded in the profit account; the loss account was drawn up by an American and World War II fighter, Air Force Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, in the following words: "The outcome of the World War and subsequent events have brought about the sobering realization that the war was over.

The outcome of the world war and subsequent events have brought home the sobering realization that in the event of such a clash, winners and losers alike will suffer the consequences. Millions are still unemployed, billions of dollars in additional taxes are paid, hospitals are filled with thousands of mentally and physically ruined war veterans who were once the flower of American youth. The cost of the World War approached \$250 billion. With this staggering sum, a homestead could have been built for every family in Russia, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, England, Australia, Holland, and the United States: a house at \$2 500 on five acres of land at \$100 each, and with furniture for \$1000. Further, in these countries, any city with a population of more than 70000 could have received a library for two million, a hospital for three million, and a university for ten million dollars. The remainder, invested at 5 per cent interest, would have yielded enough to employ 125000 teachers and as many nurses at an annual salary of \$1000. Of the total cost of the world war, America has borne nearly one-fifth."

With what jubilation, then, was the armistice greeted, especially in the United States! How many who had stayed at home and returned from the battlefields unwounded might have cradled themselves in the hope that a great upswing would now have to begin immediately! Was it so? The opposite occurred. It is true that in some areas of economic life, which had been neglected during the war, there was a good economic upswing. But the workers in the armaments industries, which could now be restricted again, did not all find employment in the peacetime economy. Many soldiers saw their jobs occupied, and their bitterness was great. Agriculture had not been able to grow enough food for export to Europe, even in the vast areas, and had gone over to converting pasture land into arable land, even cutting down the last forests in the Midwest for the same purpose. Now there was no market for the overproduction, prices fell, and grain could no longer be sold even at knockdown prices. In many cases it was burned to make room in the barns for the next harvest, which was then treated in the same way after all the effort had been made. The farmers, who had taken out loans for the expansion, could not pay the interest and fell into deeper and deeper dependence on the land companies; many had to

vacate the soil, which perhaps their grandfathers had wrested from the wilderness, only a few years after the years of war, which were so brilliant for them. The depletion of the soil and the loss of the forests did the rest. Dust storms drove out another section

of the once independent farmers, turning them and their families into restless and hapless migrant workers. All over the world, however, it is the same, and the United States is no exception: when the farmer is badly off, the whole economy of the country suffers. Thus, after an artificial prosperity during a few years, the country drifted toward the Great Depression, which many of my American friends remember with the same horror as the Civil War sixty-five years before.

Politically, too, the end of the World War had been a great disappointment to the United States. At first, it had filled Americans with understandable pride that the effort of their troops and the war materiel they had provided to their allies had decided the victory. They were equally proud that the 14 points set by President

Wilson were to form the basis of the armistice, and that the governments of the opponents asked the President for his cooperation. To complete the work of peace, the President himself went to Europe with a large staff. It is said that even on the crossing he was filled with anxious concern as to whether everything would go according to his wishes and those of the American people. One evening on board the "George Washington" he confessed to his companion George Creel: "What I think I see in my mind—and I hope very much that I am wrong—is a tragedy of disappointments."

The concern was all too justified. The President of the United States was no match for the European diplomats who were constructing the so-called work of peace in Paris after countless negotiations and intrigues. Horrified, he had to watch his dreams being smashed to pieces. At one point, disgust at the treachery being wrought on himself and on the vanquished who had laid down their arms in reliance on his promises gripped him so strongly that he ordered the "George Washington" to return to the United States. This would have exposed the foul play. Clemenceau, who played the leading role in Paris, used all his powers of persuasion, and succeeded in persuading Wilson to stay. — The points of President Wilson were destroyed in Paris, and thus the foundations were laid for the war raging today.

Point I had called for open negotiations leading to freely accepted treaties under the eyes of the public. But already in the letter of November 29, 1918, from the French Government to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, delivered to President Wilson two days before his departure for Europe, it was stated that "the arrival of President Wilson in Paris will place the four great

Powers to agree among themselves on the terms of the peace preliminaries to be imposed upon the enemy, without any discussion with him." In fact, in the entire six months between the opening of the conference and the publication of the draft peace treaty, not a single German representative was ever heard.

Point II proclaimed freedom of the seas, and this was a demand to which President Wilson attached the greatest importance. To know what has become of it, it is not necessary today to read all that has been written about freedom of the seas since 1918 and all that has leaked out of the negotiating rooms in Paris and Versailles. The fact alone that immediately after declaring war on Germany in September 1918, England declared the blockade against the enemy and introduced the surveillance and navigator system against the neutrals as well, is the proof that one power alone, England, considers the world's oceans as her property to be used only with her permission. Even food for the starving in now unoccupied France, donated by American humanitarian organizations, cannot be brought across the sea which England keeps closed. The German counter-blockade is only a response to the English challenge, just as submarine warfare was the response to the English blockade in the World War in 1917, and it is directed solely against the enemy of war. President Roosevelt, in his fireside address on May 27, 1941,



placed freedom of the seas at the center of contemporary American foreign policy, and he is perfectly justified in doing so. But he should, before he did so, have studied the whole question in its development through the centuries and especially its treatment at Paris and Versailles, and then addressed the demand to England, not to Germany.

Securing freedom of the seas has been an important point in American policy since that desire clashed with that of the English to retain naval supremacy several times in the 19th century. But when Wilson dispatched his adviser, Colonel House, to London before the peace negotiations began, he was forced to conclude that nothing had changed in the English claim to dominion. Lloyd George would not hear of the American demand for freedom of the seas, even when Colonel House threatened the possibility of an American separate peace. The English set up committees to study, but in fact to justify, the refusal, the Americans backed down step by step, and nothing of this main demand was set down in the Versailles Treaty. Winston Churchill, in one of his books, later gave special praise to his predecessor Lloyd George for his steadfast refusal.

It is an empty, demagogic figure of speech on the part of the President to refer to British naval supremacy as a line of defense for the United States, and for the sake of truth it is gratifying to see that this is being seen through by some Americans.

Point III reads, "Removal, if possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality in the terms of trade among all nations adhering to the peace and applying themselves to its maintenance." I am not an economist and cannot judge as an expert. But this much I know, that this point was not considered at all in the final Versailles Treaty. And like almost every person on the whole earth who wants to buy or sell something, whether a factory owner, a farmer, a merchant or even an unemployed person, I know the following: Indescribable misery has arisen in almost the whole world through the closing off of markets, through the height of tariff walls and by the boycott of goods, by the currency economy, which let the one producer suffocate in goods, especially food, for which hungry people in other countries, which they could not buy with their devalued money, desperately longed. Wise men have repeatedly sat down at economic conferences, even world economic conferences, and yet, despite all their expertise, have found no way out of the entanglement, because their governments, out of self-interest, did not even want an end to the state of affairs. But when, many years after Versailles, some European states went their own way and began to exchange goods not for money, which they did not have, but for other goods, a great protest arose against the troublemakers of the old economic order.

General disarmament was the content of Point IV of Wilson's 14 Points announced on January 8, 1918.

It is sad to realize today, in the new war and with the enormous sums required for the rearmament of the states not yet at war, the tragedy of disarmament. It began with the acceptance of disarmament clauses in the German armistice request; followed by disarmament demands in the armistice treaty, including surrender of the fleet; going beyond these demands in the peace treaties as far as Germany and her former allies were concerned, but without disarmament conditions for Germany's enemies; Establishment of interallied disarmament commissions in Germany and the states of her allies to supervise and order the surrender of arms, the grinding of forts, the destruction of munitions and arms factories, the destruction of machinery which could have been converted to peaceful production; transfer of the German fleet to Scapa Flow, where it was later sunk by the Germans; struggle to obtain a grant of increased

of German police forces, which was urgently needed to restore order after the revolution that had broken out in Germany as a result of the lost war; finally convening a preparatory conference, under pressure from the neutrals and also from the people's representatives in the victorious states, very much against the will of the governments concerned; Washington agreement fixing the naval strengths of

America, England, France, and Japan; Conference on disarmament in Geneva without result in many repetitions; Kellogg Pact; proposal of Germany to increase the army granted her from 100000 to 300000 men and to be allowed to produce some modern weapons which all her continental neighbors possessed, and rejection; reintroduction of conscription in Germany; German proposal to declare air war illegal, and rejection; last conference on disarmament.

Point V, which called for an impartial settlement of colonial claims, had a different but similar fate. The wishes of the native population were to be taken into account. In theory, the German colonies were handed over to the victorious states as a mandate; in practice, they became their colonies. This happened partly against the explicit will of the native population.

An English expert on the colonial question, William Harbutt Dawson of Oxford, has repeatedly pointed out in many essays and books that the treatment of the colonial question at Versailles, contrary to Wilson's principles, that the robbery of the German colonies under the pretext that Germany had proved her incapacity to colonize, were both an injustice and a fatal mistake. He deplores the fact that England has injured her honor by this wrong, and that by the mistake she has created a danger to her own future destiny. He writes in the preface to the English edition of the "Colonial Lie of Guilt" by Dr. Heinrich Schnee, the last Governor of German East Africa: "I, who have never been anything but an imperialist - though of the sort for whom the eighth commandment still exists - and though I look as confidently as

ever upon the British Empire as a great and powerful instrument of civilization and - in spite of all its faults past and present - an unparalleled blessing to mankind, I am of the opinion for my own person that England's good name has suffered through these shabby acquisitions. The fault, of course, lies not with the Empire itself, but with the men who have been unfaithful to its true tradition.... The clever men who imposed the Treaty of Versailles on Germany, thus sacrificing the moral gains of war, simply wanted to make history, and make it quickly. They did so, and it has turned out that it was very bad history, so bad that quite a considerable part of it must be made anew.... As for me, anxiously concerned for the preservation of our good English name, I shall never cease to call these territorial increments shabbily and dishonestly effected, and their seizure of possession the lowest act ever done in the name of the English Crown, Government and people. If our Allies were determined to plunder Germany at the moment of her collapse, our representatives should have seen to it that those alone did so and alone assumed the risk. Their first duty to England would have been to keep England's given word and to keep England's hands clean ... Not content with the fact that the taking away of the German

' The English edition appeared under the title German Colonization, Past and Future, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1926.

colonies will inevitably lead to a new war, the Allies, by their action in this matter, have also endorsed the evil principle, conquest and retaliation, more formally, thoughtfully, and definitely than it had ever been endorsed before, and thereby given the victors in future wars the right to carry conquest and oppression to extremes.... I am no alarmist, but I openly admit that after the Treaty of Versailles Germany is much more to be feared politically and economically than ever before. Every statesman worthy of the name suspects this, but since the danger is not immediate and may not become acute for some decades yet, it is considered wise policy to conceal the truth from the people; for in England it is considered a greater crime to destroy a popular delusion than to transgress one of the Ten

Commandments.... We British, to whatever part of the island kingdom we may belong, are on the average self-confident people, and in foreign affairs seldom take the trouble to look at things from any other point of view than our own; indeed, we decidedly refuse to take the long view.... Hardly any of the statesmen who were responsible for the conduct of British foreign policy cared then, and for years afterwards, for Germany or possessed any knowledge of Germany; indeed few statesmen today know

much about Germany, even now after the war. Then, as later, we persistently closed our eyes to all foreign problems except those belonging to the immediate present, did not think of tomorrow, faced difficulties only when they could no longer be avoided, and occasionally accepted with a light heart liabilities whose significance we did not realize.... In this colonial question, which short-sighted men have

must we adopt the same old policy of blindness, indifference and inactivity in this colonial question, which short-sighted men have conjured up without need, and which cannot possibly be solved by simply ignoring it and letting the matter come to us? Shall we once more, when entanglements arise, count on our luck - and entanglements there will be sooner or later if we do not act quickly and judiciously - and once more hope to bungle our way through successfully one way or another?"

About the fact that, as was asserted at Versailles, Germany was incapable of colonization and must therefore give up her colonies to more capable states, Englishmen and also Americans before the World War had quite a different opinion. Some such voices may stand here for many:

Two English officials from Northern Rhodesia, Frank H. Melland and Edward H. Cholmely, toured German East Africa, published their impressions in a book, *Through the Heart of Africa* (London 1912), and concluded, "We saw much to be admired, and the general final verdict must, we think, be one of congratulation to our neighbors.... Taking into account how new colonial work is to the German nation, the Germans have every reason to be proud of what they are accomplishing in the East African protectorate."

A man like Theodore Roosevelt, who was no friend of the Germans, in his book *African Game Trails* (1910), judged of his experiences with planters, officials, and officers in Africa: "They are great class, these English and Germans; both are doing work in East Africa of value to the whole world; there is ample room for both, and no apparent reason for other than thoroughly friendly competition."

German science has done great things for the natives and the whites living in Africa. Robert Koch, the  
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great German scholar, has spent several times in English and German colonies. He laid the foundations for the eradication of previously incurable diseases and thus earned immortal merit. With his collaborators he fought against cholera, sleeping sickness and rinderpest. The cure for sleeping sickness - Germanin- was found by Germans after the German colonies were lost due to the Treaty of Versailles. Under the impression of these achievements, Dr. Frank Lenwood, a leading official of the "London Missionary Society," was able to write in a letter to "The Challenge" of May 10, 1918: "The conclusion suggests itself to me that the charges against Germany are based on suspicions which are understandable in time of war, but have no real foundation- The great and unselfish service of the German missions under the British flag calls for impartial verification of every statement made against them."

These impartial voices, however, remained unheard. The German colonies were taken over by the powers that already had too many such possessions. The result was appalling. The *Manchester Guardian* of August 3, 1921, wrote of the German colonies given as a mandate to Australia: "The inevitable has happened. The best of the native workers who had long been on these plantations refused to renew their contract and went back to their villages to await developments. They had known the German boss for years, but had no confidence in the young Australian boss who replaced him. So it came about that the plantations quickly decayed.... The right thing would have been for the Australian government to find some way to keep the experienced German planters in New Guinea. Instead, in its eagerness to acquire valuable plantations for nothing, it has driven away the men who not only had had not only made the plantations valuable, but who could have maintained their earning capacity ... Instead of pursuing such a wholesome policy, the Government has deprived all Germans of their property, and is carrying out a policy which must rapidly ruin the whole colony."

Statements made by Englishmen in official positions carry special weight. Therefore, I conclude the discussion of how Germany's colonial activity was recognized after the colonies had been taken from Germany on the pretext that she was incapable of colonizing, with two statements by men who are still in leading positions in the British Empire. Ormsby Gore, then British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated in the House of Commons on July 25, 1923, with regard to German East Africa: "The mere fact that propaganda in Germany is not yet silent imposes upon us an absolute duty to give this great territory, which is larger in extent than Nigeria and contains a population of something over four million, at least as good and comprehensive an administration as the Germans gave them before the war."

Two years earlier, on June 21, 1921, Winston Churchill himself, then British Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the Imperial Conference about the same colony, now Tanganyika: "We have endeavored to furnish it with a government not inferior to the German administration which it replaced.... I fear that for a year or two conditions in the Tanganyika Territory will contrast unfavorably with the progress and prosperity of the country during the time it was in the hands of our former adversary." All this proves that what happened to the German colonies at Versailles was not only contrary to Wilson's points, but was injurious to the people and detrimental to their economic prosperity 32 meant. Moreover, it was an injustice done to Germany.

In the treatment of two points, irreconcilable contrasts arose in Paris between how America had conceived of peace as proclaimed by its President and what the Allies made of it.

Point X read: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among nations we desire to see protected and secured, should be allowed the freest opportunity for autonomous development." The French note to Lansing, delivered to President Wilson two days before his departure for Europe, said of the "settlement of the principal territorial restorations": "... the provisional acceptance of the constitution of independent new states from the territory of the former Russian and the former Austro-Hungarian empires.... The question of peace preliminaries with the other two enemy powers appears from a different point of view. As far as Austria-Hungary is concerned, it does not exist at all, since this power has disappeared. The same applies, of course, to Turkey from the outset..." That, in the opinion of the Allies, Turkey had already ceased to exist and no longer deserved consideration seems remarkable in the light of current events, since, surprisingly quickly rebuilt by a towering leader, it is being particularly courted by the British and Americans.

Greater antagonism between the opinions of the American President and European diplomacy than in the case

of Austria-Hungary cannot be imagined. President Wilson had promised the peoples of Austria-Hungary "a place among nations" and "the freest opportunity for autonomous development." On October 30, 1918, the German sections of the people of the hitherto Dual Monarchy, when

When they realized that the former double monarchy could no longer be saved in its present form, they formed a National Council, which decided on November 12 to join the German Reich and at the same time to proclaim a democratic republic. This decision was not made in a certain psychosis only at the moment of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The overwhelming majority of the duly elected National Assembly in Vienna voted on March 2, 1919, that German Austria should be considered part of the German Reich. The Entente intervened, however, and even the name Deutsch-Österreich was banned, although it was enshrined in the new Austrian constitution. In September 1919, the National Assembly of German Austria intervened against this objection and underlined the fact that the Treaty of St. Germain, under the pretext of alleged independence, would deprive Austria of its right to self-determination, which had been granted to all non-German peoples of the successor states of the former Habsburg monarchy.

In 1922, when Austria's situation was desperate, it received loans from the Western powers on the condition that it would not enter into any economic or financial ties that might in any way affect its position as an "independent state". During these years, a number of spontaneous votes of the Germans took place in various parts of Austria. They were practically inconclusive, but made it perfectly clear that the overwhelming majority of the population desired the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich. In Tyrol, on April 24, 1921, a referendum was held on the question, "Do you demand unification with the German Reich?" The result was 144,324 votes in favor and only 1794 against annexation. One month later, the province of Salzburg held a referendum on the question: "Do you demand annexation to Germany?"

land?" with the result of 103,000 votes for, only 800 against the Anschluss. The referendum scheduled for the same day in Styria could not take place as a result of pressure from the Entente powers, and all further referendums in the other Austrian provinces were forbidden, including an overall referendum already scheduled by the Austrian Parliament.

The economic situation in Austria became increasingly uncertain. To solve these difficulties, Austria under the late Chancellor Schober and Germany under Chancellor Dr. Brüning planned a customs union. At that time, the responsible French statesman was Mr. Briand, who himself once held the view that regional treaties were the only means to tear down the customs walls and establish a new economic order in Europe. Nevertheless, France protested against the German-Austrian customs union; at its insistence, the League of Nations asked the International Court of Justice at the Hague for a decision. It consisted in the prohibition of the customs union.

In 1938, the Anschluss was carried out under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. This was not only the fulfillment of the people's wish, as expressed by the first National Assembly and the later referendums, but also of a much older longing. Already ninety years before the Anschluss, in 1848, the cry: "One people, one empire" resounded from the North Sea to the Carinthian Alps, and in the first German parliament at Frankfurt in 1848, 120 deputies from German Austria and German Bohemia were represented. - It is interesting to recall an article in the leading English newspaper "The Times". It wrote on February 17, 1938, a few days after the agreement between Adolf Hitler and Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden: "None of these details can truly cause much surprise when set against the known background of Austrian-German relations. Basically, a close understanding between the two German states is the most natural thing. One of the most unreasonable, fragile, and challenging of the peace terms was the ban on the unification of Austria with the Reich. One of the grossest blunders of European policy since peace was concluded was the judicial strangulation of the proposed customs union between the two states. These mistakes are taking revenge today."

Subsequently, everything connected with Point XIII, in which President Wilson had declared: "An independent Polish state should be established, which would have to include all territories inhabited by undisputed Polish population." The most bitter fight broke out over the fact that in Paris Poland was to be assigned additional territories over Wilson's "undisputedly Polish" territories, which had a strong German majority or were purely German. It was completely forgotten that in 1917 first Germany and Austria had re-established the state of Poland. The outcome of this struggle was a complete denial of the principle of the right of self-determination of peoples - unfortunately also by Wilson himself, whom Winston Churchill in his book "The World Crisis, The Aftermath" describes as "biased in favor of Poland". The result was a particularly deep bitterness of the German people and a poisoning of the relations of the European peoples. It led to the outbreak of the present war after many failed attempts on the part of Germany to bring about a revision by peaceful means.

Why Great Britain and France unleashed the present war precisely by guaranteeing Poland its *acquis* in May 1919 will always remain incomprehensible to me. For although France was the main agitator for

the unlawful enlargement of Poland, there had been ge36

There were enough insightful Frenchmen who saw the great danger in the formation of this state. Thus even the French army commander in the World War, Marshal Foch, pointing to the northern tip of the Polish corridor on the Baltic Sea in the map, had said: "There lie the roots of a new war."

The English, however, had never been friends of Poland, and their chief delegate in Paris and Versailles, Lloyd George, had denied him much that his insatiability demanded. There was also understanding in England of the untenability of the German-Polish settlement, the revision of which even Winston Churchill, in his reply to the king's message on 23. November 1932 in the House of Commons with these words: "It would be safer to take up questions like that of the Gdansk Corridor and Transylvania, in all their difficulty and intricacy, with cold blood, in a calm atmosphere, and while the victorious states still have sufficient superiority, than to wait and be driven on inch by inch and step by step until once more vast combinations of powers, equally well armed, stand face to face."

And the famous English weekly "Economist," which reads particularly strangely in the light of the May 1939 British-French guarantee of Poland, wrote on November 11, 1931, "English minds instinctively recoil from any suggestion that Britain should guarantee the conditions in Eastern Europe created by the peace treaty," and on October 8, 1938, seven months before the guarantee, "How long will the Poles have to wait for the fourth partition which they are now so foolishly conjuring up, and where will they find friends then?"

Already the Armistice Treaty had gone far beyond what the Central Powers could have imagined in their worst dreams. The Versailles Treaty, however, as well

as well as the treaties of Trianon and St-Germain concluded with Germany's allies, dashed the last hopes of the "peace without victory" once proclaimed by Wilson. It is not even possible to list in this book everything that was demanded of Germany at Versailles, which she could not be prepared for according to the preliminaries: Dismemberment in the East with the taking away of its main agricultural and, in Upper Silesia, of an important industrial supply area, the robbery of Memel, the dismemberment of Schleswig-Holstein, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, which had already been threatened by Wilson, and Eupen-Malmedy, of which no one spoke earlier, the transfer of the Saar region to French usufruct, the occupation and demilitarization of the Rhineland, robbery of all colonies, surrender of large livestock, and yet maintenance of the blockade beyond the signing of the treaty, so that there were still some 100,000 German war casualties, especially women and children, in the "peace," reparations which not only destroyed the economy of Germany but thereby crippled the economies of other countries, including that of the United States.

In any case, the Allies had achieved with iron consistency what the French government's note to Lansing of November 28, 1918, had openly stated: "The test will extend first to Germany, with whom it is in our interest to negotiate immediately in order to promote the division into the countries of which she is composed." Britain has the same objective in this war.

One of the most shameful paragraphs of the Treaty of Versailles was number 231 - this high number alone shows what had become of Wilson's points. Article 231 claimed that Germany had deliberately brought about the world war and was solely to blame for it. That this

assertion was completely false and made only to give a semblance of justification to the devastating conditions has been exhaustively demonstrated by international war guilt research in the postwar years; American researchers have played an outstanding part in uncovering the truth.

When President Wilson returned to Washington, the disappointment in the United States over the falsification of the peace plan at Versailles was so great that he was not accorded a friendly reception.

The people's representatives refused to ratify this peace, which was contrary to American ideas. Even the plan that was particularly dear to the President, the

establishment of the League of Nations, was rejected. America never joined it as a member. Wilson died a broken man.

Above all, however, in Europe, except for a part of the French and for those nations which had been gifted or enlarged with states of their own at Versailles, there has been only disappointment over peace on the part of the victors and despair on the part of the vanquished. Once Wilson had proclaimed that after this war there should be neither victors nor vanquished. That was long forgotten, and never before had the gulf between victors and vanquished been so deeply torn open as after this war. The neutrals, who had suffered greatly from the war due to the loss of men and ships, the collapse of their economy, and the severing of old ties, were denied the opportunity to play a reconciliatory and balancing role in bringing about peace from an impartial standpoint. We Swedes felt this deeply and always believed that our cooperation could have prevented many things that would have led to a repetition of the misfortune. But the note of the French government said: "The neutrals will only in exceptional cases be invited to take part in the meetings in which the belligerents determine the conditions of peace. belligerents determine the terms of peace."

One cannot talk about the present war without looking at the past. I hope no one will skim over this chapter by saying, "Oh, Versailles, what does it matter except that the Germans are using the treaty and its reparations as a pretext for their old aggressiveness!" No, at Versailles the seeds were sown for this new world conflagration. Nor did the League of Nations, Wilson's favorite plan, rejected by America itself, bring about any change in the treaties which proved untenable, for Article XIX of the League of Nations Statute was never applied. The victorious powers authoritative in Geneva nipped all attempts in the bud.

John Foster Dulles wrote in his book "War, Peace and Change" (Harper Brothers, New York, 1939) that he strongly condemned the fact that Article XIX was never applied. It was basically the first attempt to create an international body that would have been empowered to examine international treaties for their fitness to promote world peace, to designate those that no longer met this requirement in each case, and to make proposals for their reform. In this article he sees the heart of the League of Nations, even if it had never beaten, for from it could have emerged the international authority which, in responsibility for the common good, could have given to the totality of the treaty structure of the world of nations the elasticity which was the indispensable counterpart of the sanctity of treaties and the renunciation of the use of force. Dulles clearly states that the blame for the non-application of Article XIX lies first and foremost with France, which seeks security in rigidity rather than in elasticity, where alone it can be found. Moreover, the

Moreover, America's absence from the League of Nations had had a disastrous effect here.

When the United States entered the war in 1917, it believed that it was fulfilling a mission and that the war had to be fought to make war impossible for all time to come. They trusted that the nations with which they allied themselves had the same goal. They believed all the accusations made against the enemy, who had to be neutralized once and for all.

Only during the Paris and Versailles negotiations did it become clear to the Americans that the war had not been waged by the Entente for idealistic reasons and that very material and selfish, imperialistic and nationalistic reasons, hatred and Icelandic envy, had been decisive. The later investigations in the United States, for example those of the Nye Committee, proved that such reasons had not been free even in one's own country.

### 3. HOW DID THE SECOND WORLD WAR COME ABOUT?

No question is more understandable than that of why the new catastrophe occurred so soon after the First World War.

Some were very quick with the answer: The troublemaker was once again Germany. This "once again"

alone shows that in the short span from 1919 to 1939, people forgot the lesson of history that they themselves had witnessed. Independent researchers, including eminent Americans, had demonstrated over the past twenty years that Germany was not the troublemaker that plunged Europe into world war in 1914, and that, moreover, Germany lags far behind other nations in the sober statistics of wars unleashed and fought. Another answer was that the insatiable rapacity, the broken promises – and whatever else the accusations were called – of the German leader brought on the war.

I have treated the Versailles Treaty and its contradictions to Wilson's fourteen points so thoroughly in order to show that other statesmen were also guided in their policy by the requirements of the hour when they began a different policy than they themselves had recently intended. Just as in a game of chess an opponent's move overturns a prepared plan, so it often happens in politics. One can and may regret this. But we are still far from the state of perfection.

Immediately after the collapse of Germany in November 1918, and despite its complete disarmament and dismemberment, fear of Germany rose again, especially in France. It was a strange show play: On the one hand, Germany and her former allies, defeated, crippled in territory, population and national wealth, the inhabitants half-starved by the blockade, which was maintained even after the end of the war, sucked dry by tributes, the full amount of which was not even announced at first, torn apart by internal unrest and civil war, their honor severely wounded by false accusations – on the other side, the victorious states, also weakened by blood sacrifices, but not only in full possession of their territory, but enriched by an immense territorial increase in Europe and on colonial soil. To their armies and fleets had flowed all that in arms and ships which had been taken from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey by the provisions of the peace treaties.

Reparation payments flowed into their coffers, their trade tonnage was increased by German tonnage, German fishing boats brought in the catch for them, the giant German steamers handled overseas traffic under foreign flags. German cattle stood in French, Belgian and Polish stables, even German bees now collected honey for foreign tables. German children were kept alive largely by welfare donations from the northern European peoples, namely the Swedes, and the Americans. The German birth rate, already weakened during the war, sank even lower after the war, because the German people no longer had the courage to place children in the misery that seemed to have become the German destiny.

The territorial provisions of the peace treaties had the purpose of depriving Germany of breathing room within its narrow borders, surrounded almost on all sides by enemies who still strengthened each other through alliances. And yet there was fear of Germany. Why? Did one suspect deep down that it was precisely from the humiliation

the will to resist the oppressions had to come, when the first state of paralysis would be overcome? Did the conscience stir that by the severity of the regulations one had overstepped the mark and summoned the danger one wanted to invoke? Or was there perhaps among these haughty victors, who had proved themselves for time and eternity to be the most short-sighted statesmen in history, one or the other who realized that by such a policy of peace the very danger they were trying to prevent was being evoked? In the processions that marched on solemn occasions to the grave of the Unknown Soldier under florid flags to the sound of funeral hymns and parade marches, was there a single one who thought that such a brave people as the German should not be maimed, insulted, and trampled under foot with impunity, a people who in their impotence might well await their time, but who would one day demand an account for the insults to their honor that they had suffered?

"You hold the future of the world in your hands!" the President of the French Republic, Poincaré, had said in his welcoming speech to the representatives of 27 nations when he opened the Peace Conference on January 18, 1919. Truly, a terrible responsibility for the future of the world was placed in the hands of the few statesmen who were to bring peace to exhausted humanity after the bloodiest conflict in



history to date. The future, however, which the "Big Four" of Paris created with the support of a few representatives of smaller states, was a distortion. Nothing was left of the promises that humanity had believed. No future can be built on the desire for revenge and power. Only under duress, and in order to escape the threat of continuing the war against those who had in the meantime been disarmed, did the vanquished sign the

the defeated put their signatures to the verdict that seemed to bar them from any future.

Now it was done. Germany had also decided on the demanded change in the form of government; the defeated adversary of the 27 states, against which it had held out for four years, had become a republic and had received an electoral law much more democratic than that in the old democracies. The German governments, no matter how often they changed because they were forced to do so by internal discord and party strife, all strove to meet the demands of the victors. But once they fell a few weeks behind with the delivery of a few hundred wagons of coal and a few thousand telegraph poles, the French occupied the most important industrial center on the right bank of the Rhine, the Ruhr, and established the same tyranny there that already existed on the entire left bank of the Rhine, which – another broken promise, for the armistice

agreement did not provide for it – had already been occupied for years by a mass of troops many times the size of the garrisons that the supposedly militaristic Germany had maintained there in peacetime. With the occupation of the Ruhr, the devaluation of German money began to take on unimaginable forms. Inflation tore into the economic abyss everything that until then had still shown a reasonably secure structure, despite taxes for reparations.

No hand was raised in the democracies to put a stop to the disaster. It is true that there were sensible and insightful people there who recognized that all this must one day have terrible consequences for the whole world, but the responsible statesmen did not have the courage to change their policy. The hopeless word "too late" stood over their entire policy, which was a policy of the moment and had nothing to do with statesmanship. They disdained to make even one step

German democracy even one step and thus spoiled the Germans' taste for democracy forever.

But when the great turn in Germany's destiny had come, the democracies fell upon Germany again; they did not see that they themselves had brought about the turn by their shortsightedness. They had not kept their promises and accused the new German leadership of breach of contract, because it is always easier to shift the blame onto others than to admit it oneself. All proposals Germany made to secure peace were rejected or remained unheeded until Germany tired of seeking trusting cooperation with the other powers. It began to throw off the shackles itself and to create for itself an armament equal to that long possessed by its neighbors, who had never fulfilled their disarmament obligations.

All the solemn assurances of the Fuehrer that he wanted peace despite the resurgence were not believed. Adolf Hitler said in the Reichstag on May 21, 1935, "Every war first consumes the selection of the best . . . A healthy social policy, with an increase in the birth rate, can give a nation in a few years more children of its own people than could be conquered and thus subjugated by a war of foreign people. No! National Socialist Germany wants peace out of profoundly poor ideological convictions. No one can deny that this is a real and convincing peace program.

Had the victors of the World War at that time, 1935, Adolf Hitler's proposals and his in public speeches proclaimed-

- This and the quotations from the Führer on pages 72ff. and 157 with the permission of the Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher Nachf. GmbH, Munich.

If the Nazis had taken their offers seriously or at least deigned to negotiate with them, the new world war could have been avoided. A generation of men in their prime, countless innocent civilians would have been saved, and hundreds of millions in the World could have been used for a better purpose than

trying to destroy Western culture for the unforeseeable future. But one did not want to listen to voices of peace that sounded from this place, one preferred the death bells, whose ominous sound announced again and again a hopeless "Too late" to the great peoples, the same peoples who also now as in the first world war – as if bewitched by evil powers – gladly sacrificed everything for the one goal: Germany's destruction, *Germaniam esse delendam*.

The real cause of this unfortunate development lies in the fact that the heirs of the Treaty of Versailles never realized that the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP, was something fundamentally different than one of the usual changes of government. It was not a strong party that replaced a weaker one, but a revolutionary movement with a total claim to power that took over. Born of the experience that Germany could never count on outside help to recover, but only on its own will, determined to carry out the resurgence at all costs, Adolf Hitler's government took the place of a weak, internally disunited parliament torn into 32 parties and an equally weak government dependent on this fickle parliament and rootless in the people themselves.

If this revolutionary new situation had been recognized and efforts had been made to enter into negotiations with the National Socialist government, it would certainly have been willing to do so. Adolf Hitler's various offers prove this. During these years, he had so much to do with the enforcement of his

He had so much to do in these years with the implementation of his ideas in the internal political sphere, with the unification of the whole people, that he would certainly have been prepared to make a reconciliation with the German people, which the others were also striving for, the basis of his foreign policy. The sacrifices that the others would have had to make were ridiculously small compared to a warlike conflict.

France would only have had to renounce the vote in the Saar region, the outcome of which was undoubted, in order to eliminate a great deal of conflict. Furthermore, a willingness to return the German colonies that had come under French mandate would have been a great step toward clearing the atmosphere. France, with its steadily declining birth rate and partisan bickering, was in any case unfit to manage all its vast colonial possessions for the good of the natives and the general public. Adolf Hitler was even willing to give up Alsace-Lorraine if a *modus vivendi* with France could be achieved. Instead, France was not willing to make any concessions, and on the contrary, it constantly strengthened the iron ring that it had put around Germany through alliances since Versailles.

The naval agreement was concluded with England. But on the question of armaments and colonies, England remained as rigid as France, although there were more reasonable people in Britain who favored a revision, especially on the colonial question.

All of Adolf Hitler's offers were haughtily rejected and considered dishonest from the outset. They were always regarded as a threat against themselves, never as the attempt of a long humiliated great nation to re-enter the circle of other great nations as an equal. People took offense at some of the measures of the German government and deliberately overlooked the great and good things in the new Germany.

Instead of making unfruitful criticisms that were of no use to anyone, it would have been better to try a reconciliation

which Germany herself was striving for, then many things would have been solved in Germany's internal life as well.

It is by no means the case that the present struggle between England and Germany is only the result of the last nine years, fostered by envy of the rich Empire on the one hand, indolence of the ruling classes on the other, or by the opposition of the two world views. There have been too many honest attempts at friendship during these nine years, on both sides as well. The contrasts lie deeper, and it is not without interest to pick up a few books that expose them and are written by people of both countries who

cannot be counted among the imperialists.

The German I would like to quote is the Social Democrat Paul Lensch, a deputy of the former Reichstag, so certainly not someone who can be called a forerunner of Adolf Hitler. He already saw the world war as a revolutionary event, an outworking of the antagonisms between the propertied and the propertyless, and, as a representative of the former German working class, he also hoped for a democratization of England. In his view – and it is shared by many today, including in America and in England itself – England is not a democracy at all, and to save old England means not a struggle for democracy but a struggle against it. Lensch called his little book "Three Years of World Revolution" (Berlin, S. Fischer, 1918). It said: "The so-called 'balance of powers', which was built on a weak Central Europe, collapsed. It cannot be denied that the old powers, especially England, had tried everything to maintain this balance of power. At every attempt of German finance capital to open up new areas for the increased energies of the German national economy, England opposed it. It was, after all, a matter of maintaining the 'existing condition'.

And the more Germany's economic forces shook their chains, the more – Marxistically speaking – the gigantically developed productive forces of organized German capitalism rebelled against the existing relations of production or, what is only a legal expression for it, against the property relations in the world, the more vigorously England forged these fetters, the more tenaciously it sought to hold on to and expand the existing "property relations" in the world. It turned a quarter of the whole earth into English "property", half of this country mass became English only in the last fifty years. And besides it invited the other economically also backward countries, France and Russia, to provide themselves rapidly with "property". Thus, at the beginning of the war, a quarter of the world was English, a sixth Russian, a twelfth French. Germany, including her colonies, owned one fortieth. The more German capitalism had to seek an external field of activity, because its overflowing economic forces had long demanded it, the more fiercely the other powers, scarcely able to satisfy the needs of their own market and to relieve the working classes of the compulsion to emigrate by providing work opportunities at home, sought to annex the rest of the world for themselves. By these annexations the field of activity for German capitalism was more and more restricted; for it is well known what a preponderant role the colonies always play only for the capital of the mother country, by always placing more or less great obstacles in the way of foreign capital. Even English trade on neutral ground, where the favor of colonial ownership fell away, was already very considerably inferior to German

trade before the war. Thus the countries stagnating in their economy, England as a big-bourgeois, France as a petty-bourgeois pensioner state, lay down like fat cats on their "property" and let and did not let the forward-driving German element arrive anywhere. It was the surest means of driving the existing antagonisms to violent discharge. The result was the revolution of the World War....

"Now what did the slow German rise mean for the other peoples? Primarily for the two great peoples of the West, the French and the English? It meant that the passive basis on which both nations had built their world position suddenly became active and began to move. Sooner or later this had to lead to collapse. The French as well as the English world position could only be maintained with a politically impotent and economically weak Germany, both powers were clear about that. Long and bitter as they had fought each other, a powerless Germany was the common condition for both....

"It must be realized that the exceptional position of England had its historical counterpart in the exceptional position of Germany. The one had the other as its precondition. The difference was only that the exceptional position of England consisted in its world domination, the exceptional position of Germany in its world servitude. As soon as the one ceased, the other must also collapse....

"England will not overcome this war without serious social unrest; the shock to the throne of the old sea queen is too great for that. For the first time English blood is flowing in an English war, and for the first

time since the apostasy of the American colonies, England is discovering that there are wars which are not merely merry raids and opportunities for the fantastic enrichment of her mercenaries and the conquest of defenseless colonial territories. For the first time it is getting a glimmer of what war actually is, which it has hitherto regarded as its most important and most profitable industry and into the misery of which plunging other peoples has been one of the oldest traditions of its glorious policy."

These are passages from the book of a leftist politician. It is almost more interesting when the author develops his conviction that England would be forced by the world war to carry out a thoroughgoing reform of her social system. This would transform it from a purely imperialist state, which must subjugate all competitors, into a member of the democratic family of nations hoped for after the war. We know that these hopes were not fulfilled, because the world war had a different outcome due to the help of the United States. The imperialist-capitalist system of England emerged from it strengthened, the beginnings of a better social order were nipped in the bud; the fact that the Labour Party today sits in the wartime government of England does not change this.

The Irishman C. I. O'Donnell has long represented an Irish constituency in the House of Commons. His book "The Lordship of the World" (London 192(4)) throws some significant light on England's policy before and during the First World War, which also exposes British policy before the present war, since it has not changed in its principles. O'Donnell writes: "The camarilla, which secretly dominated British foreign policy without the English people being aware of it, had made 'Delenda est Germania' (Germany must be destroyed) the general political guideline and worked ceaselessly and with never flagging energy towards this goal. The Times of December 1914 says: "The maintenance of our naval supremacy and the balance of power are among the basic facts of our political tradition. We have always fought for the balance of powers, and we shall always fight for it." There you have the imperialist will-o'-the-wisp! I am not saying that it would be a bad policy,

but a supremacy, the best the world has ever seen, has broken down over it, never, I fear, to be re-established: the worldwide supremacy of the British Empire. When a nation makes it its policy, against any other nation, to show signs of strength. to intrigue and make alliances, it is drifting toward war with absolute certainty.... England can never again become the greatest power in the world unless by renewing her former friendship with Germany. . This is the full truth. England, as a colonial power, owes her greatest overseas conquests to Prussian aid. Even Waterloo would have become a Fontenoy had not Blücher's brave battalions fought through the night to come to Wellington's aid.... Even immediately before the war, the average German could not believe that England was his enemy.... There can be no shadow of doubt that it was primarily trade envy which turned the feeling of the English against Germany. The great anti-free trade newspaper, the Morning Post, let the cat out of the bag on May 15, 1916, with the words, /Before the war England sank into a position of industrial and commercial dependence on Germany.' British trade before the war in decline! This is either economic idiocy or deliberate lying. Before the war, British trade flourished and prospered most splendidly, largely as a result of the development of our trade with Germany and the United States. Lord Rothermere stated in the Sunday Pictorial of November 2 5, 1923: 'In the last 20 years before the war British trade has been propelled forward not so much by its own gravity as by the rapidly increasing prosperity of the world in general.' This statement means, if it means anything at all, that. so far as Europe was concerned, British trade was helped by German trade.... If

we destroy German trade, we cut our own throats. The second "justification" for England's policy of general hostility toward Germany in the early years of our century was undoubtedly a sincere belief that the German Empire was building a large navy with the intention of using it against the British fleet.... But there was another and much more urgent reason for Germany's fleet building than the desire to

challenge England's naval omnipotence. There were still France and Russia in the world, both preparing to pounce on Germany, and both had large fleets and programs for their expansion.... Was not Germany's fleet-building program justified to protect the Baltic trade of Danzig and Memel against Russia and to secure the even more extensive Atlantic trade of Hamburg and Bremen against France?... The Asquith-Grey policy had committed England to war years before the ostensible parliamentary referendum on August 1914. The inimitable Winston Churchill tells us in his book, "World Crisis" that he ordered the mobilization of the fleet without consulting the Cabinet. Just as Mr. Asquith declared war without consulting the House of Lords and the House of Commons, which were assembled in Parliament at the time. The manifest contempt of the "Morning Post" for so-called representative and democratic institutions was fully justified by the acts and secret intrigues of two Liberal Prime Ministers."

The question of why the new world war came about cannot be answered merely by saying that the foundation was laid in the peace treaties of 1919, or in the holding down of Germany and her allies after World War I, or in the continuation of the age-old policy of Great Britain and France. The decisive impetus came from across the Atlantic Ocean.

#### 4. SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

The United States also experienced economic difficulties and social distress after World War I, which had added \$22 billion to the national debt. It was the time of the Depression, unemployment, and the New Deal.

Wilson's successors, especially Harding, were weak and unimaginative; even Hoover could not stop the fall. Since sales of goods to non-American countries also faltered as a result of the general impoverishment caused by World War I, the whole world, like the United States, raced toward the Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1932 the national income of the United States, so far as it can be expressed in terms of dollars in circulation, fell from \$80.1 to 40 billion, the value of total output from \$66.3 to \$40.7 billion. Workers fell victim to the labor shortage, first employed on short-time work with falling wages, soon after simply laid off. The number of unemployed has never been precisely ascertained; Charles R. Beard and George H. E. Smith estimate that it rose from about 2 million in 1929 to 13 to 14 million in 1932. Labor income in industry fell by 41 percent at the same time, from \$50 billion to \$29 billion.

Agriculture suffered similarly. The value of total farm products, i.e., those which the farmer sells as well as those which he uses for his own consumption, fell, according to the same American source, from \$12094 to \$5284 million between 1929 and 1932, the prices which the farmer realized fell from index figure 146 to index

65, while the prices of industrial products, which the farmer had to purchase for his own needs, also fell, but their corresponding index figures - 153 to 107 - were still more favorable for the industry, but thereby imposed new burdens on the farmer.

Mr. Roosevelt's first term in office was filled with energetic actions to arrest this fall of the American economy and, through the New Deal, to build up a system that would make it healthy again. Since Roosevelt came to power almost simultaneously with Adolf Hitler, whose first tasks were likewise to revive the economy and remedy unemployment, the paths Roosevelt took were observed in Germany and Europe with special understanding and interest. To describe all these paths in detail is beyond the scope of this book. We are interested here only in the results of the in itself difficult struggle against banks, industrial concerns, against agricultural overproduction as well as for the recovery of agriculture, against unemployment with the

initiation of public works, labor camps, etc., and for social security and welfare.

The results, however, are not worth the great effort. Economically, the New Deal accomplished little or nothing because it could not or would not curb the greed for profit of private interests. The U.S. federal government, by its intrusion with subsidies and holdings, only entangled itself in all the happy and unhappy adventures of the banks and industrial concerns. The national debt assumed enormous proportions even before the arms buildup. The farmers were no better off than before; on the contrary, about one farmer in four had to have his property auctioned off because of economic collapse, or they became unemployed. Subsidies to farmers were measured by the amount of what they did not grow, while outside the Western Hemisphere millions starved because they could not sell anything to them because of the high tariff walls with which the United States surrounded itself, and therefore could not buy the agricultural surplus from them. Unemployment had only fallen to nine million people by September 2, 1940, of whom, according to a New York Times estimate, even the rearmament program could absorb only three million.

Roosevelt's New Deal initially produced a large number of bills and legislative proposals that the country adopted, surprised by the new president's activity and thrilled that anything at all looked like a turn from depression to prosperity had emerged from the White House, which had been mired in lethargy. Resistance immediately arose in the circles of the big businessmen and corporations because they saw their unscrupulously exploited privileges in danger. All of Roosevelt's measures were based on the doctrine of increasing purchasing power. This was the origin of the great public works, which provided for a whole number of individual measures, for example, in the case of the Tennessee Valley Project, river regulation, dike construction, generation of electricity by exploiting water power, elimination of erosion damage on the river banks and thus improvement of the arable land and raising of livestock. The constructions did indeed provide work for many people, and a smaller number of farmers experienced an improvement in their situation. After a short time, however, the large private companies seized control of the project, which was intended to be a non-profit plan.

of parts of the government project.

The social legislation of the New Deal, of which Roosevelt was particularly proud because it was the first social policy measure ever introduced in the United States by the government, also falls far short of the benefits provided by the state and the insured in European countries such as ours in Sweden, Switzerland or Germany. The work of job creation and the production of public works in the "Works Progress Administration" and the "Public Works Administration," also carried on with much publicity, has remained piecemeal, because the workers were accommodated there only for a limited time, were poorly paid (\$55 per capita per month), and must do the work of an unskilled laborer without regard to their vocational training, so that any further training or even maintenance of their skills is hindered.

Another New Deal institution was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) work camps, where unemployed young men were used to carry out public works, such as combating erosion caused by soil neglect and improper cultivation, planting national parks, establishing nature reserves, etc. The very fact that the CCC is limited to young unemployed people shows the difference between this institution and the labor service in Germany and other European countries. The CCCs are an emergency measure, not an organization for the upliftment and national education of all youth. The New Deal started with great momentum and then quickly petered out and petered out.

Just a few more words about social inequality in the country that, under its Constitution, is supposed to provide equal opportunity for everyone. A great divide separates the southern states of the Union from the northern ones. \ or the 58

Civil Wars of 1861-1865 they broke up into the states where slaves were kept and those where slavery

was rejected. Slavery has been abolished, but economic hardships still condemn whites and coloreds in the southern states to a slave existence—unless whites came from the northern states to set up factories down here, where wages are low and living conditions favorable, and reap even greater profits than they could in the north. The New Deal and its social legislation also draw the line.

The Works Progress Administration (WPA) reported in 1986 that the wages it paid for New Deal emergency work were \$54.87 per capita per month for the entire states. Looking only at the southern states, however, the average rate for the state of Mississippi is \$30.54, for Arkansas \$31.54, for Georgia \$32.34, South Carolina \$33.19, Alabama \$33.31.

The Social Security Bulletin showed in July 1989 that \$19.47 per capita per month was paid in old-age pensions by the Social Security Board in the United States. But in Alabama the rate was only \$9.43, in South Carolina \$8.18, in Georgia \$8.12, in Mississippi \$7.37, and in Arkansas only \$6.00.

I feel justified in mentioning these internal affairs of America, for they, too, prove that Roosevelt, in spite of all his fine assurances, has been unable to secure to every inhabitant in that immensely rich country "freedom from want," which he promised as one of the war aims of the whole world. Those in America who saw the bitter truth behind the buzzwords pointed to Roosevelt's failure in the domestic field, and many recognized that this was one of the main reasons for the diversion to foreign policy adventures.

## 5. ROOSEVELT AND THE FIRST WAR YEAR IN EUROPE.

In studying the history of the new era, it is seldom possible to say with certainty that a war between two countries or two groups of powers began on the day and at the hour of the declaration of war or of the first hostilities. Even in the case of the two world wars that the generation now living has to endure, the events that finally made war inevitable go back a long way. The shots of Sarajevo did not fall by chance, but tore with their sound the dark clouds that had been brewing over Europe for a long time.

Even less did the Second World War begin on September 1, 1939, at the moment when German troops crossed the Polish border. It was born out of the First World War, at least in the hour when the representatives of thirty-two nations in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles signed a document that was called a peace treaty without being one.

Before September 1, 1989, lay the days and years of the armistice which began on November 11, 1918, and was renewed in a modified form on June 28, 1919, lay the German-Polish treaty of January 26, 1934, the Munich agreement of September 30, 1938, the British-French promise of guarantee to Poland which made that deluded country take the gamble of ignoring Hitler's generous offer of August 29, 1989, of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish disputes. This offer was so important and its rejection so incomprehensible that I will let the 16 points follow here verbatim:

1. the Free City of Danzig, on the basis of its purely German character as well as the unanimous will of its population, shall immediately return to the German Reich.

2. the territory of the so-called Corridor, extending from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (these cities included) and then approximately westward to Schönlanke, will decide for itself whether to belong to Germany or to Poland.

- 3 To this end, this area will hold a vote. All Germans who were resident in this area on January 1, 1918, or who were born there up to that date, and likewise all Poles, Kashubians, etc. who were resident in this area on that date or who were born there up to that date, are entitled to vote. The Germans expelled from this area shall return to fulfill their vote. In order to secure an objective vote as well as to guarantee the extensive preliminary work necessary for it, this area, similar to the Saar area, shall be placed under the control of an international commission to be formed immediately by the four Great Powers, Italy, Soviet Union, France, England. This commission will exercise all sovereign rights in this area. To this end, this territory shall be vacated by the Polish military, police and authorities within a

short period of time to be agreed upon.

4. the Polish port of Gdynia, which is Polish territory, is excluded from this area, as far as it is territorially limited to the Polish settlement. The closer boundaries of this Polish port city would have to be determined between Germany and Poland and, if necessary, fixed by an international arbitration court.

(5) In order to ensure the necessary time for the extensive work required to carry out an equitable reconciliation

This vote will not take place before twelve months have elapsed. 6.

6. in order to guarantee during this period to Germany its connection with East Prussia and to Poland its connection with the sea without restriction, roads and railroads shall be established to permit free transit. In this connection, only those charges may be levied which are necessary for the maintenance of the traffic routes or for the execution of the transports, respectively.

7. the affiliation of the territory shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast.

8. in order to guarantee, after the vote – whatever the outcome – the security of free traffic between Germany and its province of Gdansk–East Prussia and Poland its connection with the sea, Germany will be given an extraterritorial traffic zone, approximately in the direction of Bütow–Gdansk and Dirschau respectively, for the construction of a Reichsautobahn and a four-track railroad line, if the voting area falls to Poland. The construction of the roads and the railroad will be carried out in such a way that the Polish lines of communication will not be affected, i.e. either over- or under-run. The width of this zone is set at one kilometer and is German territory.

If the vote is in favor of Germany, Poland shall be granted the same rights to free and unrestricted traffic to its port of Gdynia as would be granted to Germany, by means of an equally extraterritorial road or rail connection. 9.

9. in the event of the reversion of the corridor to the German Reich, the latter declares its readiness to carry out an exchange of population with Poland to the extent that the corridor is suitable for this purpose.

10. any special rights desired by Poland in the port of Danzig would be negotiated on an equal footing with Germany's equal rights in the port of Gdynia.

11) In order to eliminate any feeling of threat on either side in this area, Gdansk and Gdynia would be given the character of pure trading cities, that is, without military installations and military fortifications.

(12) The peninsula of Heia, which, according to the vote, would belong either to Poland or to Germany, would in any case also be demilitarized.

(13) Since the German Government has the most serious complaints to make against the Polish treatment of minorities, and the Polish Government, for its part, believes that it must also make complaints against Germany, both parties agree that these complaints shall be submitted to an internationally composed commission of inquiry, which shall have the task of investigating all complaints of economic and physical injury and other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good all economic and other damage done to the minorities on both sides since 1918, and to cancel all expropriations or to pay full compensation to those affected for these and other interventions in economic life. 14.

(14) In order to relieve the Germans remaining in Poland and the Poles remaining in Germany of the feeling of international lawlessness and, above all, to grant them the security of not being called upon to perform acts or services incompatible with their national feeling, Germany and Poland agree to secure the rights of the minorities on both sides by the most comprehensive and binding agreements, in order to guarantee to these minorities the preservation, free development, and activity of their



nationality, and in particular to permit them to organize for this purpose as they deem necessary. Both parts undertake not to call up the members of the minority for military service.

In the event of an agreement on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland agree to order and carry out the immediate demobilization of their armed forces.

(16) The further measures necessary to expedite the above arrangements will be mutually agreed upon between Germany and Poland.

The diplomatic records of recent history will scarcely contain a document equal to this proposal in moderation, in accommodation and understanding of the needs of another country. That Poland nevertheless did not consider it worthy even of an acknowledgement of receipt can only be explained by the fact, now known, that she relied not only on her European friends Great Britain and France, but above all on the support of the United States. Roosevelt had had it promised to him through his ambassadors in Warsaw and Paris.

It has been claimed in London that the German proposal was sent so late that the Warsaw government could not even respond to it. The German invasion of Poland had taken place so quickly that the whole proposal was probably not meant seriously.

This assertion is untrue. The London "Daily Telegraph," a newspaper close to the Foreign Office, published in its evening edition of August 31, 1939, a report on deliberations in the British Cabinet. In these, it was said, it came up that the British ambassador in

Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, had received from the German Foreign Minister the

German proposals for a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict. He had immediately forwarded them to London, since the British government had agreed to mediate in a note to the German government dated August 28, 1939. The London Cabinet had forwarded the German memorandum to Warsaw, and the Polish government had ordered general mobilization after receiving it.

In London, the Daily Telegraph report caused great consternation, for they were determined - with Roosevelt's approval - to blame Germany for the outbreak of war along the lines of 1914. In the British Blue Book on the outbreak of war and in Sir Neville Henderson's memoirs, "The Failure of a Mission," this determination has been carried out.

The unintentional truthfulness of the Daily Telegraph was sought to be covered up by confiscating the evening edition referred to and causing the editors to publish a second late edition in whose report of the Cabinet deliberations the sentence so embarrassing to the British Government about the Polish general mobilization after receipt of the German proposal was removed. The Foreign Office, however, was unable to prevent the first issue of the Daily Telegraph, with the notice, from having already come into the hands of some people who were interested in the true circumstances.

The unprecedented rapidity of the German campaign against Poland is in everyone's memory. The promised assistance in troops and arms from the powers that had encouraged Poland to resist Germany by their guarantee never materialized. Poland has been betrayed by England, France and Roosevelt's America.

The American people have been deceived by their press and government about this Polish campaign as well as the other stages of the war. Friends who lived in America during the first months of the war have told me that in the days before the fall of Warsaw and when the Polish army had already been destroyed, it was reported in American newspapers that the German army had been routed and that the Poles were not far from Berlin. It sounded similar from the American radio. For readers and listeners who believed this, the rapid and complete collapse of Poland had an alarming effect that was to be repeated many times in the further course of the war. One wonders, therefore, what news the American reading and broadcasting public might be fed now that American land, sea, and air forces were

themselves in action against a victorious enemy? After the conclusion of the Polish campaign, a prolonged hiatus in direct combat operations occurred.

During the winter of 1939/40 certain circles in the United States were quite dissatisfied with the progress of the war. They invented the expression of the lazy war (phoney war), which did not provide thick headlines for the American sensational press every day. In Germany, little notice was taken of this attitude of America, but in Great Britain, people were very upset about it – and rightly so. Sharp words came from English mouths about the Americans who sat in their well-heated New York and Washington writing rooms, undisturbed by evening blackouts and nightly air raid alarms, undisturbed by worries about the preservation of their empire, their food supply, and unburdened by unrest about the fate of their sons and brothers, and yet wanted to advise other nations how to wage war faster, bloodier, more sacrificially. That this justified indignation was also interwoven with the admonition to finally take up arms themselves

It is not surprising that this justified indignation was also interwoven with the admonition to finally take up arms and turn the rotten war into a brilliant victory.

Nor was it to take long for events to precipitate in breathtaking succession. In April 1940 German troops occupied Denmark and Norway. This measure had to be taken because the laying of British minefields off the Norwegian coast and the reported approach of British naval forces toward Scandinavia had made a British-French attack on Germany from the north a certainty. That the Norwegian Government was not hostile to these intentions and therefore could not be regarded as neutral has been proved. The German action, regrettable as it seemed to many, was justified as a defense against a life-threatening attack. Denmark, which remained neutral, maintained its independence despite minor German occupation.

The British troops, who had succeeded in landing on Norwegian soil in some places, had to retreat before the superior warfare of the Germans. A direct attack on Germany from the British Isles, i.e., on the northern coast of Germany, seemed too dangerous to Great Britain and would have required the use of the entire British fleet, which it did not dare to make. France, too, left it at relatively minor incursions into the Saar region and entrenched itself behind the Maginot Line, which was thought to be insurmountable – a tactic that was to lead to its undoing, for out of the Maginot Line came the Maginot spirit, which stifled all initiative.

For both Allies, marching through territory officially regarded as neutral, through Holland and Belgium, seemed less dangerous than the frontal attack, especially because both countries had shown themselves docile to their insistence by making concessions and had already mobilized their troops, not to maintain strict neutrality, but for unilateral defense against Germany.

unilateral defense against Germany. A passage of Allied troops favored by both countries, however, would have made possible their advance on the most important German industrial center, the Ruhr. Against this Germany defended itself by invading Luxembourg, Holland, and Belgium in May 1940. The indignation which Germany's attack on "neutral" countries caused in Roosevelt's country was tremendous. But it is probably subject to no doubt, after all the experiences of later times, that the participation in the fate of these "neutrals" would have been very small if Great Britain and France had been quicker in acting and had made these countries their base of operations against Germany. Thus the way was cleared for the decisive and hopefully final clash of arms between the two continental adversaries who, through centuries, had been forced by fate to settle their differences on the battlefield: Germany and France. There was no lack of efforts, even without such a decision, to settle the Franco-German relationship, but they did not go deep enough.

In the post-war period, I was always very impressed by how little hatred there was for France among the German people, even though it was precisely the French statesmen who had inflicted humiliation

upon humiliation on Germany since the armistice in November 1918. From the contempt with which Marshal Foch received the German negotiators in the forest of Compiègne, to the confinement of the German peace delegation behind iron bars at Versailles, to Clemenceau's triumphant attitude at the peace conference, to the tightening of the armistice and peace conditions, mostly forced by France, and to the often extremely grievous and petty measures that French military and political leaders have taken in the course of the armistice.

s military and politicians in the occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr as a deliberate torture of German men and women, to the French Saar policy, the expulsion of Germans from Alsace-Lorraine, to the ignominious treatment of German prisoners of war in French camps in Europe and Africa, to the demand for reparations and to the great policy of France in its interplay with Poland and the countries of the Little Entente with the goal of eternal disenfranchisement of Germany. Perhaps this came from the unconscious feeling that the French were also just pieces in a chess game played by the Anglo-Saxon countries.

The struggle in France was as short as it was hard. The Maginot Line, as an obstacle to the advancing armies, was finished before it had justified even a tiny fraction of the cost put into its construction. The French Wehrmacht with its glorious history collapsed. Its members were worn down because they did not see the sense of the sacrifice that this new war demanded of them.

After only a few weeks, French and Germans were once again facing each other in a saloon car in the forest of Compiègne, but the defeated of 1918 had become the victors of 1960, the victors of then the defeated of today. The tone and the conditions under which the negotiations were conducted were also different.

The fate of France is not devoid of tragic greatness; I need say nothing about it. But I will turn to America, which until now knew little more of France than that Paris had the most beautiful clothes and the most expensive and amusing night clubs. The Americans complained as if the best of their own soul had been destroyed with the fall of France, as if they too had lost a homeland with France. Certainly, some of them may have meant it sincerely, but in the masses they were probably more that now, as so many said, only England stood between them and the victorious Germany. The United States thus moved closer to deciding whether to tie its own fate to that of imperiled Britain or to fulfill the great task of exhorting to peace, indeed of preparing for it. In so doing, they could fulfill a mission such as was offered only to the country which, uniting within itself people of all European tribes, was called upon to unravel the world. - The president did not seize the opportunity that fate had placed in his hands.

## 6. ROOSEVELT AND THE TOTALITARIAN STATES

When, in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the helm of state in Germany in January 1933 almost simultaneously with Adolf Hitler, the National Socialists at first found in his social policy measures so many affinities with their own social ideas that this alone seemed to give hope for friendly cooperation between the two

peoples. But all too soon the Germans had to recognize that this very president, with his modern ideas for domestic policy, was caught up in the same ideas in the foreign policy field as only one diplomat ever was in old Europe.

It is true that his imperialist dreams were not yet openly revealed during the first and the beginning of the second term. He was concerned, at least apparently, with maintaining the old American policy, characterized by the catchwords: security of the Western Hemisphere and Monroe doctrine. At the same time, he wanted to protect democracy and the "American way of life" and believed that the best way to do this was through close cooperation with the other states of the American continent and the democracies of Europe, although among them there were by no means purely democratic states. He

rejected the states that had given themselves a totalitarian regime for internal reasons, and did so so vehemently that he came into ever stronger opposition to them in terms of power and trade policy. The speech in which Roosevelt's attitude toward the rest of the world was expressed strongly for the first time was delivered in Chicago on October 5, 1937. He divided the world into so-called "peace-loving" nations, on whose ropes the United States also stood, and such nations as the United States, the United States, and those which, in his opinion, disturbed the peace. He did not name any country, but made it clear that he considered Japan, Italy, and Germany to be disturbers of the peace. This speech was the prelude to an increasingly hostile policy emanating from the White House.

A year later, on October 16, 1938, very shortly after the Munich Conference, after the conclusion of which Neville Chamberlain had expressed that he was bringing home an "honorable peace" and "peace in our time," Roosevelt addressed a message to Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in which he urged the two statesmen to remove mankind's fear of a new war and to provide guarantees through non-aggression pacts for at least ten years with almost all states outside the American continent. This message, before it reached the addressees, had already been published in the press.

More significant than Mussolini's reply was that of the German leader in his Reichstag speech on April 28, 1939. After a review of the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler recalled that he had already expressed his intentions for peace by his offer to France. He again emphasized his admiration for the deeds of Great Britain and stressed that he had concluded the agreement with Chamberlain in Munich in full earnest to secure peace between these two countries as well, but that doubts had come to him about the value of the agreement when, immediately after Munich, a feverish rearmament began in England. He said verbatim: "The only demand I made and will always make of England is for the return of our colonies. But I left no ambiguity about the fact that this would never be the cause of a warlike confrontation. I have always believed that England, for whom these colonies are of no value, will one day understand would one day come to understand the German situation and would then have to value German friendship more highly than objects which yield no real benefit to England, while they are vital to Germany. But, apart from this, I have never made any demand which would have in any way touched British interest or which could have been dangerous to the world empire and consequently could have meant any harm to England."

In direct reply to Roosevelt, Adolf Hitler then said, among other things, that he shared his desire to solve problems peacefully, without an appeal to arms, and had already proved this many times. As a politician, he had for twenty years supported Roosevelt's conviction that in the event of war, victorious, defeated, and neutral nations would suffer, but that unfortunately the American statesmen responsible for their participation in a world war and for its outcome had not been able to come to the same understanding. Adolf Hitler went on to say that if Roosevelt believed "that the peoples of the earth could not be convinced that any governmental power had any right or any compelling reason to bring down upon its own or upon other peoples the consequences of war, except on the ground of unambiguous self-defense." then he believes, "this is the view of all reasonable men, only it seems to me that' the case of unambiguous self-defense is invoked by both ropes in almost every war, and that that institution is not present in the world, including the person of Roosevelt, to settle this problem unequivocally. There can be no doubt, I think, that America, for example, did not enter the World War in any case for unequivocal self-defense." A committee of inquiry appointed by President Roosevelt himself has made a detailed investigation of the causes of America's entry into the world war. America's entry into the world war and came to the conclusion that this entry was essentially due to exclusively capitalist considerations. Nevertheless, no practical consequences have been drawn from this. Let us hope, therefore, that at least the North American Union will finally uphold this noble principle itself in the future and will go to war against one nation or another only when the case of unequivocal

self-defense is really made out."

Adolf Hitler then went through the other questions of the Roosevelt Appeal one by one, discussing in particular detail how the peoples of the world could most effectively and quickly be freed from the crushing burden of armaments: He said, "Mr. Roosevelt may not know that this problem, so far as Germany is concerned, has already been completely solved once. The German Reich, and the Allied commissions expressly confirmed this, had already completely disarmed in the year 1919 to 1923," then gave a precise enumeration of the number of weapons, equipment, factories destroyed and continued: "I myself, Mr. Roosevelt, put forward a whole series of practical proposals for discussion and tried to initiate a discussion on them in order to make possible at least a general limitation of armaments at the lowest level. I proposed a maximum strength for all armies of 200,000 men, likewise the abolition of all weapons suitable for attack, abolition of all bomber aircraft, poison gas warfare, etc., etc. Unfortunately, it was not possible to implement these proposals to the rest of the world, although Germany itself had already been completely disarmed. I then put the proposals about a 300,000 man army up for discussion with the same negative result. I then made a whole number of detailed disarmament proposals, always before the forum of the German Reichstag and thus before the whole world public. It no one thought of even entering into a discussion about it. On the other hand, the rest of the world began to increase its already enormous armaments even more. And only when in 1934 the last of my comprehensive German proposals, concerning an army of 300,000 men, had been finally rejected, did I give the order for a German, but now thorough, rearmament. Nevertheless, I do not wish to be an obstacle to the discussion of disarmament questions in which you, Mr. Roosevelt, yourself intend to participate. Only I ask you to turn first not to me and Germany, but to the others. I see behind me the sum total of practical experience and am therefore of a skeptical disposition so long as I am not taught better by reality." Despite the willingness thus again declared by the German Führer to negotiate disarmament, no one on the other side has responded.

I have not yet been able to find anywhere a satisfactory discussion of the change of mind between President Roosevelt and Adolf Hitler from an American pen. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that a well-known Englishman, Charles Roden Buxton, published an article in the "Manchester Guardian" on May 30, 1939, which he sent as a reprint to many friends of peace in other countries. This article deals with Adolf Hitler's speech and with the encirclement of Germany which had begun with vigor immediately after it.

Buxton entitled his article "Public Opinion in Germany Convinced of Reality of Encirclement" and said, among other things, "Belief in encirclement leads to another conclusion – that Britain intends war against Germany. Herr Hitler referred to the fact that he had formerly been convinced that war would never again be possible between Germany and England, and then went on to say: 'I am convinced that Britain is planning war against Germany.

and then continued: But I must now state that the policy of England, both unofficially and officially, leaves no doubt that London no longer shares this conviction, but on the contrary is of the opinion that, no matter what conflict Germany might one day become involved in, Great Britain would always have to take a stand against Germany. So war against Germany is seen there as something self-evident.' This is probably the most serious factor in the present grave situation, for it means that the German people may be persuaded to go to war with Britain – reluctantly, of course, but with the same conviction of the justice of their cause as in 1914. The Germans seem to feel that the case lies convincingly clear, they believe that the British Empire, out of jealousy and fear, is denying Germany the necessary living space which every great nation demands for itself, although Britain has acquired that living space by means no more and no less decent than those which the Germans are now applying in their turn. They are not conscious of envying the British Empire its living space or of threatening it, and they consider it an

unjustified interference if the British Empire should wish to dispute theirs.

"What does the word encirclement really mean to the German? To answer this, we must look more closely at the term Lebensraum. Each of Adolf Hitler's major speeches represents a step forward in the definition of the term. It consists of three components: a) unity, b) prosperity, c) security. More and more emphasis has been placed in the last year or two on the second component, the economic side....

The economic difficulties have become much more serious. This side of the situation has not been given enough attention in England. The

economic difficulties which overshadowed everything during the world economic crisis which began in 1930 and which were, in fact, the main factor which brought the Nazi regime to power, have increased, admittedly to some extent through Germany's own fault, since she has developed a rigid form of autarky, but in the main they follow from geographical position. Germany is a country whose natural auxiliary sources of raw materials and food are insufficient to support its large population and ever-growing industries. It is much more dependent on the outside world than the British Empire or other great powers, with the exception of Italy and Japan. But as a result of the prevailing economic nationalism, it finds the outside world closed. Today it is also subject to an economic and financial boycott. Senator Pittman is reported to have said: 'We don't need to fight the Germans, we can starve them out.' Underlying all German individual political measures is the contention that Germany has never been able to obtain even the most modest relief or the least concession by way of conferences and negotiations. To the suggestion that conference methods should be tried, the popular reply is: 'That may be, but the only example we know of is that of recent history, and that speaks entirely to the contrary.'

The attempt to escape from the shackles of reparations was met with the occupation of the Ruhr by France. The customs union between Germany and Austria was made impossible by French financial pressure. We have never yet been able to satisfy our needs except by the application of our own power.'" Roosevelt, unfortunately, did not come to a view similar to that of this Englishman. And remarks such as those here quoted by the late Senator Pittman were not to improve the relations of the United States with Germany.

Toward Italy, President Roosevelt has almost always taken the same attitude as toward Germany. He had no sympathy for Italy's aspirations to consolidate its possessions, as he did for the cultural, economic, and social issues resolved by fascism. Italy had been an ally of the Allies in World War I and therefore associated with the United States since 1917. The concessions of a territorial nature that had been made to Italy by its allies were forgotten after the end of the war, insofar as they were not made at the expense of Germany and Austria. Thus, even before Mussolini seized power, Italy was alienated from its World War II allies. In the Mediterranean, Italy still found itself hemmed in by British strongholds at its entrances and exits, from Gibraltar to the Suez Canal, and by British bases such as Malta just off Italy's coasts. "Freedom of the seas," this purported goal of American policy, became an empty slogan to the strongest Mediterranean state, Italy. During the Abyssinia War, English and French sanctions policies found American support. The American press struck a friendlier note only when it seemed right to strengthen British efforts to draw Italy to the side of Germany's adversaries, as when Chamberlain and Eden visited Rome. Italy's occupation of Albania provoked indignation in America. Roosevelt's so-called quarantine speech in Chicago in October 1937 was also directed against Italy; likewise, Roosevelt's message in April 1939 was addressed not only to Hitler but also to Mussolini.

Italy's entry into World War II in June 1940 particularly upset those circles in the United States that were

pursued the intervention of their own country, in great anger. The warmongers and the interventionist press reviled the Duce and the Italian people in statements and cartoons, and Roosevelt's fight was directed with equal ferocity against Italy as against Germany.

The third country Roosevelt had in mind in his Chicago speech "against the aggressors" was Japan. In describing America's relationship with Japan, I must elaborate somewhat, not only because the Japanese declaration of war on the United States resulted in its ultimate involvement in the present war, but because Japanese-American tension has shown the increasing imperialistic aspirations of American foreign policy for decades.

Barely a year after the American Declaration of Independence, in August 1784, the young republic sent its first ship to China, and merchants were soon followed by American missionaries. Politically, these peaceful expansion efforts initially remained under the protection of the British, who had already gained a consolidated position in East Asia. In 1843, the United States sought to enter into a firm treaty relationship with China and instructed its commissioner, Caleb Cushing, to explain to the Emperor of China that the United States would find it impossible to live in friendship with China unless it was granted the same privileges and trading rights enjoyed by other states. Cushing obtained a favorable treaty in 1844, which subsequently brought about new treaties with extensions of American rights. The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands (1893, final in 1897) and the Philippines (1898) made the United States a power factor in the Pacific Ocean outside the Americas, and America's policy of the "Open Door" was later confirmed in the so-called Nine-Power Pact.

Japan was a signatory to this Nine-Power Pact, and until then relations between the United States and Japan had been satisfactory, all the more so because trade between the two countries was steadily increasing. However, correct relations had not prevented the United States from making discriminations against Japanese immigration.

However, with the Japanese occupation of the city of Mukden in 1931, and subsequently of all of Manchuria, serious tensions arose and increased steadily from then on. The United States did not feel strong enough to protest alone and began to seek the support of the League of Nations, although it was not a member. They sent a representative to the Lytton Commission, which was to investigate the Manchurian matter on the spot and later report to the League of Nations. There was a strong current in the United States for economic reprisals, but it found no support among England and France, and this "failure" of the English was reproached to them in America until the last weeks.

The reluctance among the mass of the American people to become involved in a new war was still so strong at the time of the Neutrality Act of 1937 that East Asian tensions had no significant influence on it. Secretary of State Hull therefore found it necessary to issue a statement of American foreign policy in June 1937, after the outbreak of the Japanese-Chinese "incident," with the purpose of instructing the people that a "war breaking out anywhere would affect all peoples." Following the occupation of parts of the international office in Shanghai, Hull announced a reinforcement of the naval forces stationed there and at the same time issued a more strident statement on the rights of the United States in China, in which he described those rights as threatened by Japan. It remained, however, for the time being a policy of diplomatic protest that led in a direct line to President Roosevelt's Chicago quarantine speech. The reception of this speech in peace-loving American circles by no means encouraged the President to adopt a more active policy, but it did encourage the League of Nations to issue reports on Japan's violation of the Nine-Power Pact and an invitation to a conference of representatives of these nine powers in Brussels. Japan refused to participate in the conference because the drafting of the invitation already contained a condemnation of its actions in China. The conference, which took place nevertheless, did not then have the success Roosevelt had hoped for of joint pressure on Japan, and the American government decided to accelerate the evacuation of American citizens from the ports of China threatened by Japan, which had been ordered earlier.

During this action, an American gunboat, the "Panay," was sunk by Japanese bombs. The interventionist press protested vigorously at the direction of Roosevelt and Hull. The American people, though alarmed

at the incident, responded by demanding the opposite of what Roosevelt expected, namely, the withdrawal of American forces from China to avoid further incidents; they did not consider trade with China and treaty rights there so valuable as to risk war with Japan on that account. I read in an American's book that the "man in the street" at the time of the sinking of the "Panay" had asked, "What is an American gunboat doing on the Yangtze at all?" Roosevelt nevertheless pursued his policy. In December 1937, he tried to go over the heads of the Japanese government to address the Emperor of Japan directly, an unusual step that he repeated in December 1941–retrieved. Many Americans, however, favored a more conciliatory policy toward Japan because it was a good customer and could become an even better one. In any case, the majority of the American people wanted above all not to be involved in another war. Japan supported the reluctance to consider the "Panay Incident" as a *casus belli* by making official apologies and paying compensation of about \$2.2 million.

The Roosevelt administration, apart from various protests of a more serious or lighter degree for violation of American rights or American property in China, was forced to a more cautious plan until, just before the outbreak of war in

Europe, it suddenly informed the Japanese government that it did not wish to renew the trade agreement concluded in 1911. This decision had been preceded by loans to China by the Export and Import Bank and support for China in its war against Japan by American arms supplies, as well as a great many wholly or semi-official statements on the part of the Americans which demonstrated a failure to understand Japanese claims to a reorganization of East Asia. In the meantime, the mood of the American people had also changed to such an extent that the intention to terminate the trade treaty was not only not resisted, but was even welcomed, as was an embargo on certain supplies of goods which Japan could use for the manufacture of weapons.

After all, a harsher policy against Japan was held back because of the European war, and many also seemed to entertain the hope that the Japanese government might be induced to change its policy. This wish is contained in a speech by the American ambassador to Tokyo, Grew, who had just returned from a vacation in America during which he had conferred with Roosevelt 82 and Hull had conferred. In his speech to the American-Japanese Society in Tokyo on October 19, 1939, he emphasized that the democratic form of government in the United States compelled the government to be considerate of public opinion. If the Japanese Government were forced to adopt the same attitude, Japanese public opinion would probably disagree with a continuation of the China policy supported only by a minority group. Mr. Grew also asserted that the American government and people understood as clearly what Japan was seeking to accomplish by the reorganization of Asia as did the Japanese people themselves. Like Japan, he said, America was striving for security, steadfastness, and progress not only for itself but for all peoples. But America did not wish to see its ancient rights in China threatened by Japan's new order, and would oppose such policies.

The speech was followed by Grew's various conversations with Japanese statesmen, and in one such Grew threatened on behalf of his administration that it would have to resort to sanctions if Japan did not change its China policy. In fact, in December 1939, Washington extended the "moral" embargo to further supplies of raw materials to Japan, while virtually such supplies continued in barely diminished strength after the trade treaty expired in January 1960 – a testament to business acumen in America. When a Chinese national government was established in Nanking in March 1940, the U.S. Government, through Secretary of State Hull, immediately declared that it would not recognize it—a few days after granting a new \$20 million bond to Tschungking China. This nonrecognition was followed two weeks later by Hull's declaration that a policy of extending the Japanese sphere of influence



sphere over the Dutch Indies would meet with opposition from the United States.

The flight of the Dutch Government to England, the fall of France, and the increasingly direct threat to England from Germany led the Japanese to demand that Britain close the Indochina and Yunnan Railroad and the Burma Straits for the supply of Tschungking China. Mr. Churchill declared his willingness to give up British special rights after peace was concluded, and a similar statement was made by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles for the United States. Meanwhile, a change of government occurred in Japan. While Japan thought to see in a White House statement on the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the Western Hemisphere an intimation that a similar policy by Japan with respect to Greater East Asia would find understanding in the United States, at about the same time President Roosevelt had been given such broad powers by the defense legislation of the U.S. Congress that he could cut off any export of goods that became necessary for the national defense of the United States. He immediately exploited this authority to ban the export of fuel for aircraft and ships and of scrap metal, a ban directed primarily against Japan.

The intention of the United States to reinforce American troops after the withdrawal of all British troops from China in August 1940 caused such a sharp protest from Tokyo that it remained unimplemented. The tension was not relieved because in the meantime the Japanese government reached an agreement with France on Indochina.

The three-power agreement between Japan, Italy, and Germany of September 28, 1940 was preceded on September 20 by a new American \$25-million loan to Tschungking-China and, on September 26, a further embargo on American exports to Japan.

The three-power agreement was accompanied in Germany and Italy by press comments from which can be read a warning to the United States to move to a more cautious East Asian policy, a warning which unfortunately had the opposite effect. That the United States was at least aware of the perilous situation is shown by the instruction to American citizens in the Far East to depart immediately for America on October 17, 1940, and the reinforcement of the occupation of Hawaii.

How the situation in Japan was regarded is evident from the statement of Sumita, leader of the Japanese military mission in Indochina, who said in November 1940: "If the United States would only understand Japan's situation, every question between our two countries could and should be settled easily. This involves only recognition of the principle that Japan is the stabilizing factor in the Far East." A month later, then Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka outlined his government's foreign policy as loyalty to the Three-Power Pact on the one hand, and the desire for friendship also with the Anglo-Saxon powers on the other. He described at the same time what a disaster a Japanese-American war in the Pacific would be for both countries. In January 1941, the entire Japanese press pointed out that, despite the invocations by Japanese statesmen just quoted, Roosevelt's attitude was becoming more and more hostile, and that Japan must neither be intimidated nor provoked by him, and must answer the veiled and undisguised attacks on Japan during the stirring of sentiment for the British Relief Act with unswerving adherence to its policy. In Secretary of State Hull's January 1941 speech, Japan saw a threat and an announcement that the

United States intended to impose its laws on the Pacific area.

Throughout 1941, Roosevelt steadily escalated tensions between the United States and Japan. Japan, seeking a way out of them, sent another special ambassador, Mr. Kurusu, to Washington, who had numerous meetings at the State Department with the accredited ambassador, Mr. Nomura. On November 26, Roosevelt made his demands and addressed them directly to the Tenno. He demanded the immediate cessation of the Japanese campaign in China and the recognition of Tschungking China as the only legitimate government of all China. Even those who, like myself, desire a speedy termination of the Japanese-Chinese war and have personal relations with Tschungking must admit that the

problem can only be solved by the parties concerned. The dictatorial interference of a statesman so jealously guarding the freedom of the resolutions of the inhabitants of another continent as Roosevelt is doing was an insult to the great Asiatic power which could not be accepted in silence. One wonders whether Roosevelt nevertheless hoped for Japan's acceptance of his demands and therefore concealed the November 26 note from his own people and their lawful representatives. Even the head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Senate, Senator Connally, did not see the note until three weeks after it was sent and ten days after the destruction of the American fleet by Japan at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt must have known that his note meant war against Japan, and gave Congress, the Senate, and the people no notice of his intentions. At the same time, his silence prevented defensive measures by keeping the Army and Fleet on constant alert at American outposts in the Pacific. The admirals and generals, who did not even know how close their country was to war with Japan, were court-martialed after defeat, for which they could not have been prepared because their commander-in-chief withheld vital information from them.

This sober list of milestones on Roosevelt's road to war with Japan becomes somewhat more vivid when one reads American statements made in recent months. Roosevelt's press organs claimed that Japan was dealing a mortal blow to American commerce by occupying Manchuria. But the United States Department of Commerce itself has shown in Bulletin 839 that American trade with Manchukuo averaged only \$7.5 million in the four years preceding the occupation, but six years after the occupation, in 1937, it averaged over \$16.1938 \$15.5 million. The widely read magazine "Look" stated in a May 1941 issue that America had been living in antagonism to Germany and Japan for years and had been using the invocation of the Nine-Power Pact and the Washington Conference only as a subterfuge to cloud its resolve to come to a final settlement with Japan. Since 1937, at least, this has become clear to Germany and Japan, and the merger of these two states is the inevitable consequence of this realization. The impending confrontation with Japan has occupied an increasingly wide space in American publicity since the outbreak of war in Europe. It was believed, however, that the United States could choose the time for it.

The United States' weightiest foreign policy journal, the quarterly Foreign Affairs, published two essays in October 1941. Professor Nathaniel Peffer of Columbia University hoped that the "anticipated confrontation" with Japan could still be postponed

could be postponed until the United States had completed its rearmament. If

the Chinese army were then also intact, Japan could be "finished off in one fell swoop." Boycott and blockade of the Japanese islands would complete what American fleet and air force left to economic arms. The result would be unrest in Japan, especially when a defeated and impoverished Japan still had war debts to pay. For the United States, then, in the long run, Japan's joining the Axis would prove fortunate, for if the democratic countries inflicted defeat on Germany, they would at the same time settle the Japanese threat as a mere by-play.

Equally indicative of American perceptions of a confrontation with Japan was the essay by Eugene Staley of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which appeared in the same number of Foreign Affairs. He claimed that Japan had made a bad choice in joining the Axis, for even in the event of a victorious outcome of the war for the Axis, Japan had nothing to hope for. If Britain then ceased to be Japan's trading partner, she would find no substitute in Germany's and Italy's markets because they were far too distant and the cost of transporting her cheap goods left no profit. The United States should therefore immediately present Japan with a choice between two paths. One would be rapprochement with Great Britain and the United States, abandoning both its Axis affiliation and its policy of reorganizing East Asia, in which case the two democracies would provide it with markets and supplies of raw materials and could offer participation in the industrial development of China and in the trade of

South America. The second path for Japan would be rejection of this generous offer, and in that case the pressure on Japan would have to be increased by continued and increasing aid to China, by strengthening fortifications in Manila, Singapore, and the Dutch Indies, and Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, and finally by Japan's economic blockade, severance of relations, and impediment of Japanese trade with Latin America. The consequence of such economic isolation, which a coalition of the U.S. with Great Britain and Soviet Russia could carry out without sending so much as an airplane or a ship into Japanese-controlled waters, would be devastating to Japan.

For the writers of these two articles and their devout readers, the destruction of the U.S. and British fleets in the Pacific, the occupation of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila, and the Japanese landings on Borneo, Celebes, Java, Sumatra, and New Guinea within weeks of the outbreak of war must have been a rude awakening.

Ralph Ingersoll, a journalist close to Roosevelt, as a result of a just-completed trip around the world, published essays in his New York newspaper "P. M." as well as in the London "Daily Express" on the same day, November 28, 1941, exactly ten days before the Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor, with the headline "America Must Destroy Japan." In them, he demanded that the United States, in cooperation with Britain, Soviet Russia, and China, eliminate the Japanese threat by "immediate smiting." Within twenty-four hours of the joint declaration of war by the four powers, the British would launch their fleet from Singapore to drive the Japanese out of the China Sea, the Americans would launch their bomb squadrons from Manila, and destroy the cities of Japan built of "highly inflammable wood and paper." The "victorious British and Americans" would then meet a few days later "in Hong Kong.... The cleansing of the Pacific Ocean of the Japanese from the west is the sole task of America." This cleansing would not even necessitate the sinking of the Japanese fleet, he said, because if all four countries struck simultaneously, the collapse of Japan would be swift, "and all this nonsense about little supermen would be over." He then again stresses the need for swift action, for only then can "the United States gain everything and lose nothing."

These voices refute the claim that Roosevelt was surprised by Japan's "treachery." The standard bearer of democracy fought against totalitarian states from the beginning of his term. Only against one totalitarian state, Soviet Russia, he soon stopped his fight and welcomed it as a partner.

## 7. ROOSEVELT ~ DICTATOR OF DEMOCRACY

On September 5, 1939, two days after the British-French declaration of war on Germany, the President issued two proclamations. In the first, which borrowed heavily in wording from Wilson's Declaration of Neutrality in 1914, he outlined the role the United States would have to play as a neutral country, reminded citizens of their obligations as members of a neutral state, and warned belligerents against violating the rights of neutral America. The second proclamation built on the Neutrality Act of 1937 and placed an embargo on the export of all arms, munitions, and other war materials. The U.S. Congress was not in session at the time, and the president therefore declared a national state of emergency on September 8, 1939, invoking the rights granted during World War I to the then president under the National Defense Act. He announced at the same time a reinforcement of the regular army, the National Guard and the Marine Corps, as well as of the personnel of the Justice Department for the better protection of the country against "foreign underground actions."

The President had never left any doubt that the Arms Embargo Act was inconvenient to him. But since he could not overturn it even under the special powers that had fallen to him, he had first to prohibit the export of arms and aircraft for which orders and export licenses had already been issued. France thus lost 58 million dollars worth of ordered supplies, Great Britain 15 million, Australia 5 million, Germany-according to the State Department bulletin of October 28, 1939-of 49 dollars! Between

January 1 and September 5, 1939, Germany had purchased war material from the USA for 23000, Great Britain for 21000000, France for 16000000 dollars. From this it was concluded in the circles around Roosevelt that the arms embargo was a measure directed unilaterally against the Allies. This is reminiscent of the experience of World War I, in which the United States entered on the side of the Allies because it had already made large arms deals with them beforehand.

To amend the Neutrality Act so that more arms could be supplied to the Allies, Roosevelt convened Congress on September 21, 1939. In his message to Congress, he said that the Neutrality Act's ban on the shipment of war materiel of any kind was "extremely dangerous to the neutrality, security, and peace of America." It would be going too far to go into Roosevelt's proposals in detail; it can only be said that to connoisseurs of international law they were composed of all sorts of contradictions. The majority of the people, however, were less interested in legal quibbles; for them the only question was whether America would be involved in the war or not. With this sane popular attitude, it is important for the viewer to see that only 37 percent of those polled agreed to an amendment to the Neutrality Act, even though, according to the now famous Gallup Institute and Fortune magazine polls, some 84 percent hoped for an Allied victory. The battle of opinion between the isolationist and interventionist camps flared up in full force for the first time over the question of the Neutrality Act. Nevertheless, the interest of the American people quickly waned; the struggle was mainly over special interests such as the

merchant shipowners, who felt their earnings were threatened by the prohibition on sailing in the war zones, and – at the end of the debates – personal attacks by opposing sides. After six weeks, the amendment to the bill had been adopted in substantially the form in which Roosevelt and Hull wanted it. The length of the debate in perilous times was sharply criticized by the public. It was regarded as a plus that not all members of the Democratic, that is, Roosevelt party, had voted for it and that Republicans had also been among those in favor, from which it was inferred that independent judgment had been exercised in the legislative bodies. The main points of the revised Neutrality Act were the lifting of the arms embargo, the obligation of belligerent principals to pay for supplies and transport them to their destination (cash-and-carry clause), and the tightened prohibition on American ships sailing in precisely designated war zone waters.

On February 9, 1940, President Roosevelt dispatched Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe to confer with German, Italian, British, and French statesmen and report to him on the prospects for peace. The mission was inconclusive.

In June 1940 the Hours of Service Act was introduced in Congress, and was not adopted until September, after a great deal of propaganda preparation.

In July Roosevelt requested \$4.5 billion for national defense.

That same month, a Pan-American Conference was held in Havana. At the outbreak of the war, all South American states had declared themselves neutral. From the first days of the war, however, the levers of the machine had been set in motion in the United States to convert the neutrality of these states into unilateral partisanship for the Allies, commonality

with the policy of Anglo-Saxon America, and hostility to the Axis powers. The Pan-American Conference of September 1939 in Panama City had already served this purpose. In Havana, the pressure was intensified. Secretary of State Hull won over most of the states represented to his plan, which was that any one of them – practically, of course, only the United States – should be authorized to take over any European possession within the Western Hemisphere which was in "danger of changing hands." On the day the conference began, President Roosevelt had asked Congress in Washington to authorize an additional \$500 million for the

Export-Import Bank and at the same time to give it a free hand to issue bonds to South America out of that amount. This ringing argument was not resisted by Uruguay, which was otherwise happy to join with Argentina in pursuing a policy contrary to Washington's, while Argentina did not sell its far more hostile principles for borrowing, nor did it submit to ratification of the Hull Plan.

In September 1940 Roosevelt traded British bases in the western hemisphere for fifty old American destroyers. He so increased his prestige that, despite strong opposition and against all tradition, he was reelected for a third time in November 1940.

In a semi-official American handbook "The United States in World Affairs in 1939" by W. H. Shepardson and W. O. Scroggs I found the sentences: "If the presidential election follows the usual pattern, the American people will again be treated for six months as if they were composed of imbeciles. Party platforms will be drawn up under the single slogan of catching as many votes as possible. Domestic policy will be attacked or defended without regard to the truth. The conduct of foreign policy will be praised or damned in terms that are out of all proportion.

damned in terms that bear no relation to reality. But in any case there will be a great deal of talk about the preservation of democracy and how a totalitarian regime can and must be avoided."

Roosevelt's third term began in January 1961. The first month is marked by the following actions:

Message to Congress declaring that the American people would never submit to a peace dictated by the Axis powers and proclaiming the "four freedoms"-freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear-as the basis of an American world order; establishment of the Production Directorate as a summary of the defense effort ; introduction of the Lend-Lease Act; and sending defeated presidential candidate Wendell Willkie to England.

Willkie's trip encouraged the British partner, and upon his return he emerged as a spokesman for Roosevelt's policies, proving right all those who had placed doubts in his person and the sincerity of his intentions during the campaign in the first place.

The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the Senate and Congress in March 1941. Officially, this bill is called Bill H. R. 1776 - a reminder of a crucial year in the liberation struggle of the thirteen British colonies on American soil against the United Kingdom! It was to this United Kingdom that all grants under the Lend-Lease Act initially accrued exclusively; only later did Roosevelt order such grants also to Russia, China, and a few other states. Even the amended Neutrality Act, with its cash-and-carry clause, had not brought Britain the full measure of aid it had hoped for, after the funds in the United States to pay for supplies had been exhausted, and even

the "carry" became more and more difficult as British naval supremacy was shaken by German successes on sea and land. Almost all European sea coasts came into German hands, the waters around the British Isles were threatened by mines and submarines, the air spaces above them by aircraft, the shipping lanes to and on the world sea by the small but powerful German fleet. The cumbersome and far from secure convoy system tied up part of the British fleet and delayed the import of food and war materiel.

The struggle for British aid was long and bitter. The most powerful advertising slogan was that, in the event of England's collapse, the American continent would be immediately threatened, an enemy invasion by sea and air was possible, and that England would therefore have to be rescued and supported at all costs. England was the bulwark protecting America, and the British fleet was America's first line of defense.

Even before the adoption of the Act, the supply of war material to Britain by the U.S. had assumed enormous proportions. When the British had fled Dunkirk, leaving behind almost all their weapons, including rifles, the United States again stepped in with the replacements.

Much American Army aircraft was delivered to Canada for training purposes for British and Canadian aviators. It is interesting to note that on November 8, 1940, the American government prohibited the

delivery to Sweden of Vultee fighter planes that the Swedish government had ordered in America and ordered their delivery to Canada. Ship deliveries to Britain and Canada also increased.

It seems interesting to me for European readers to hear voices from Americans of various professions about the poli-

tic of Roosevelt with regard to neutrality legislation, the Lend-Lease Act, and peacetime conscription, but especially the promises Roosevelt made before his re-election to keep the country out of the war in spite of all the aid given to the Allies. Nothing can better prove that it was Roosevelt and his immediate entourage alone who led the United States into war, while the people resisted passionately, just as they did in 1917, but ultimately in vain. Let us first give the floor to Roosevelt himself:

In the famous speech of October 5, 1937, in Chicago, directed against Italy, Japan, and Germany, Roosevelt repeatedly spoke of the states opposed to these countries as the "peace-loving states," and concluded by saying, "I am determined to pursue the policy of peace and to take every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war.... Positive efforts must be made to maintain peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. America, therefore, is taking an active part in the effort for peace."

Addressing the "Pan-American Union" on April 14, 1939, the President said, "We are also interested in what is happening in the world, and our will for peace can be as powerful as our will for defense."

On Oct. 23, 1940, Roosevelt said in Philadelphia, "To every man, woman and child among the people I say this: Your President and your Secretary of State are taking the road to peace. We are not arming ourselves for some foreign war. We are not arming ourselves for any conquest or any interference in foreign quarrels. I repeat again that I stand on the ground of our Party: 'We will not participate in any foreign wars and will not commit our army, naval or air forces to fighting in foreign lands outside America unless we are attacked.'"

In very similar terms he expressed himself in Boston on October 30, 1940, and in New York on October 28, 1940: "The Government has undertaken to eliminate all possibilities which have led to war in the past. We have declared that no American-flagged vessel shall carry munitions to the belligerents and must keep out of the sphere of war." On November 3, 1940, he said, "I am fighting to preserve happiness and peace for our people. I am fighting to keep our country out of war." In Brooklyn and in Cleveland, he proclaimed, "The first principle of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war." The Republican presidential candidate of 1940, Wendell L. Willkie, made the same promises in his October 2, 1940 election speech in Cleveland, Ohio: "The American people do not want war. It has no desire to be involved in the conflict, either on the Atlantic Ocean side or on the Pacific Ocean side. It is determined to preserve peace for America. In this

resolve I am one with the people. I am for keeping out of war. I am for peace for America." It

is deeply to be regretted that Willkie did not, in contrast with

his opponent, Roosevelt, to his word given to the people. A year later, in an inflammatory speech that was anything but peaceful, he proclaimed, among other things, that the president was not to carry out the will of the people, but to lead the people according to his own will. That is, in other words, that if the President wants war, he should have the power and the right to lead the people into war.

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt also spoke out against war earlier, saying as early as 1935: "The world conflagration,

which began in 1914 and ended in 1918, and in which the great states of Europe as well as the United States and Japan were involved, proved for the first time in our history that the idea of war is obsolete so far as the settlement of disputes between states is concerned. It has not achieved its objectives. We have been told that the world war was fought, at least by our country, to preserve democracy, to prevent the people of Europe from coming under the rule of a despotic government that had no respect for treaties or the rights of neutral states, and above all to put an end to all future wars. Judging by the actual result,

these years have been utterly useless. Far from preventing future wars, the arrangement made has simply fed hostilities. It doesn't matter much which side you fight on in any war. Win or lose, the effects are the same. In the World War we suffered less here in America than the peoples of the European nations, but at least some of our families can share the feelings of those across the ocean whose sons did not return, and today we recognize as a country that economic waste in one part of the world produces economic consequences in other parts. We have benefited economically for a time, but as the rest of the world suffers, so do we."

When peace was spoken of far and wide in the first year of the war, little confidence seemed to be placed in these statements. The elected representatives of the people and representatives of the people outside the legislative bodies repeatedly noted in concern and disquiet that America was after all, and without coercion from without, allowing itself to be driven into war only by the policies of the government, supported by a small minority.

Senator Bennet Champ Clark warned in Kansas City on May 2, 1941, that the present campaign to keep America out of the war was also a last ditch struggle for democracy in U.S.. At the same meeting, Alf M. Landon urged

that opponents of the war should not be subjected to accusations and taunts from the government. Ex-President Hoover wrote in the New York Times on March 29, 1941: "Experience teaches that freedom, independence, and democracy cannot be forced upon peoples by battles. All over Europe, peoples came to the sin-bank and wanted to be converted, but soon relapsed. Here in America, how are we to hold down the intolerance at this time which renders free speech and a free press powerless to right the wrong and develop constructive debate? With the much greater difficulties than last time, how are we to demobilize our war socialism and fascism in America and restore freedom to the people? How are we to provide for the employment of our men and for the economic recovery after this war with the means of relief much more depleted than last time?... If our economic resources are still partly intact after the war, we may be able to contribute something to the building of another and better world. If our faith in democracy is held high amid the storms, may we keep the light of freedom still shining. Our common purpose is that our country may move along the moral, spiritual, and social paths that will leave it unimpaired, powerful, and unconquerable in its freedom."

Senator Gerald P. Nye expressed on April 27, 1941, "We are being fooled by the same powers that fooled us in the World War. We are being

deception into believing that we can bring order to the chaos that is Europe. Our people must pay now or pay later, and pay dearly for the help we give England and for our own defense. Washington knows that we will have to pay some day, and it must create a real war to justify all this expenditure. If we ever get involved in this war, it will be called by future historians by only one name, 'the President's war,' because his every move since his speech at Chicago has been toward war."

A speech by Representative John G. Alexander of Minnesota on December 18, 1940, stated, "I am in favor of helping democracy and, if necessary to do so, of helping the British, but I am convinced that we must strain our brains and avoid using the same means we used in the last war. The rise of Hitler after a war to save democracy obviously teaches that, in my opinion, we used the wrong means.

"Too many men who banded together to save democracy in the last war are now unable to advise us whether they believe we should use the same procedure this time. Many lie on the battlefields of Europe, and others are now only human wrecks in our war hospitals. Unfortunately, we do not ask them for advice....

"It is my opinion that this time we should help the European peoples to come to a lasting and just peace now, instead of trying to build the future on more years of war and deprivation. There is a great campaign in the newspapers to make the American people feel like a flock of sheep huddled in a corner

waiting to be herded into the slaughterhouse. We are told told we can't stay out and won't succeed with any reconstruction plan. This propaganda is one of the worst campaigns in history to make the American people feel inferior and to subordinate them to the will of a small group of foreign leaders bent on plunging us into war."

Senator Hiram Johnson stated on June 1, 1941, "If ever there was a time in the history of this country when it was the duty of Americans to be steadfast and to remain manly, it is the present time. It may very soon be too late to do so, and then the outstretched hands of freedom will not reach ours...."

Congressman Martin L. Sweeney said in a May 1941 radio address, "Our frontiers are not the chalk cliffs of Dover or the Burma Straits of China. Our frontiers are the slum roads of the 'tobacco roads' of America.... I would rather see the whole \$7 billion claimed for war armament sink to the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean than see even one of our American boys go to a watery grave.... We are determined to see that an association of mothers of fallen soldiers (Gold Star Mothers) need not be formed in America again."

Senator Taft (presidential candidate during the last election): "The bill authorizes the President to declare war on any nation in the world and to enter the present war if he so desires, as seems to be the case. No Congress except perhaps a rubber-stamp Congress would adopt such a bill."

Senator La Follette: "This is not a bill to give the President plenary powers. It is a bill for the ab102 thanks of Congress. It is a request that the Congress be given vital and important rights."

Senator Shipstead: "Does anyone believe that in such a situation the executive branch of the Government would for a moment relinquish the powers which H. R. 1776 bill confers upon it? Any conceivable regime would fight desperately to retain all its powers, thus choking off the discontented criticism of a people irritated to the limit of revolutionary rejection. Franklin D. Roosevelt is as mistaken and as weak as other rulers who are dissatisfied with the evolutionary process of constitutional government."

Senator Lodge: "The Lend-Lease Act would establish an internal dictatorship and weaken the national defense force. The bill not only increases the danger of foreign wars and the danger of totalitarian rule in the country, but it enables the President to enter into such alliances with such States as he pleases, at his discretion. Our country has been subjected to a propaganda campaign which has no equal in history and is destined to involve it in war."

Senator Walter F. George, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote in a letter to the "Augusta Herald" on May 4, 1941, "The establishment of convoys would probably lead to war. For this reason, and mindful of my strong warnings against sending our troops to Europe to fight, I do not see myself in a position to approve convoys."

Congressman Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota elaborated on February 16, 1941: "Along the East Coast a steadily increasing pressure is making itself felt upon the people to advocate American interference in the European war ... The time has come to be on guard against the pseudo-patriots who are to be on guard against the pseudo-patriots who would like to lure our country into war. Entry into war or maintenance of peace is a decision that must be made in the interest of the boys on Main Street, not in the interest of the bankers on Wall Street. It must be made to protect the mothers of men, but not the hucksters of death."

Senator D. Worth Clark spoke the prophetic word on February 24, 1941: "When the democracy you seek to save outside our borders will be gone from our own land, when the freedoms of today will be but misty memories, when the government will have taken over the railroads and other means of transportation, the radio and the newspapers, when labor will have become forced labor and the farmers will be regimented, then, people of America, you will get a faint glimpse, in blood and tears, of what modern war means."



Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. wrote on September 5, 1940, "The newspapers are full of stories that another pact is intended under which our Navy is to obtain bases in the Far East. Singapore and a port in Borneo are mentioned. Everyone knows that a base in the American hemisphere of the earth is one thing and a base on the opposite side is another thing.... It is no wonder that American citizens wonder, if executive power can do such things without congressional involvement, can it not declare war without Congress?"

Now for some more voices from Americans outside the Senate and Congress:

American Federation of Labor "Chronicle," January 19, 1941: "Month by month we are getting closer to war, not because the belligerent countries are getting closer to us, but by the actions of our own Government."

Dr. John A. O'Brien, Notre Dame University, January 28, 1941: "American youth would be drawn into the flames of European strife unless the goprocent majority against our entry into this foreign war abandons its silence and helplessness and thunders its opposition into the ears of Congress and President. The United States would commit national suicide if it repeated the mistake of 1917 and entered the European war."

"The Lutheran Companion," official newspaper of the Augustana Lutheran Synod of North America, January 25, 1941: "The day of decision for America has arrived. A fateful hour is at hand. The American Congress now stands alone between the American people and the betrayal of their liberties."

Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Riverside Church, New York, said in a sermon on June 1, 1941: "I myself am convinced that the millions of ordinary Americans are right who still say: 'Keep away from active participation in the war.' To plunge us actively into this war, three things would suffice: 1. great extension of the war zone, 2. incalculable prolongation of the duration of the war, 3. great magnification of the economic and moral damage of the war. And after a war so extended in space and time and destroying so much, I see no final victor except social revolution, economic chaos, dictatorship and communism. I myself cannot imagine that a new war is an ideal means of making the world ripe for democracy."

"Chicago Daily Tribune," June 3, 1941: "The nationwide anti-war committee of pastors sent out 95000 appeals to clergymen of 36 denominations requesting immediate intervention against the country's drift toward war. The letters state that it is inconceivable that our government take us to war when 83 percent of the population opposes it, and a referendum is demanded."

Rev. John Hayes, The Community Church, New York,

February 17, 1941: "We have before us at this moment two possibilities of action. If we go to war, let us realize what we are doing - that we are adding ourselves, our beloved country America to the total sum of the world's ruin.

And what will so surely guarantee the continuance of the struggle to the last bitter end of consumption and exhaustion as our entrance into this turmoil? What we would do means spreading the war, 'lengthening its duration, increasing its horror. If you like this prospect, go ahead. I do not like it, and I would therefore, to save America - not to mention the world - fight to the end to keep our country out of war."

The Most Rev. John J. McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati, in January "Ten percent of our people are forcing- the United States wisely and skillfully into world conflict, while the majority of ninety percent, who are for peace, stand by silently and helplessly."

Cardinal William O'Connell, Dean of the National Catholic Church: "It is difficult for me to understand why some of these propagandists are allowed to shout down the normal desire of the

American people for peace. What is their purpose? They cannot be real Americans because real Americans think of their own country first. There are certain expatriates – I think you know whom I mean – who are raising their voices in loud tones to the proposition that America should drop her individuality and become a sort of appendage of a foreign world empire. If this is not an example of exalted hysteria, I do not know what could be. Despite the excessive propaganda from all sides, it is the hope and prayer of the American people today that we will be spared the horrors of war. It has taken it as certain that the authorities in Washington meant what they said and said what they meant when they promised to keep us from war."

The same Cardinal O'Connell on April 4, 1941: "There is a definite feeling that things are going on behind the scene, unknown to the people. This is the kind of distrust that produced revolutions in Europe – the distrust of the people toward their government. I hope that our people will stay out of the war. I know the people want to stay out, but the government seems to disregard their wishes while still talking about democracy. Certain secret maneuvers are constantly bringing us closer to war. Everyone wants to know where we stand now. It is not fair of a government that calls itself democratic to act in this way."

Dr. Morrison, editor of Christian Century, in April 1941: "This is not America's war.... How did it happen that the idea has taken root in the minds of many Americans that this war is America's war, or that it is America's duty to enter Europe's battles for the second time? My answer must be very frank. My answer is that the President of the United States, by a long series of utterances and an accumulation of acts, has brought the nation into a position where public opinion is no longer free to express its deepest convictions against participation in this war. The nation has been fixed step by step, through a period of three years of official propaganda and official action, more and more upon a policy of war, until now the final and desperate argument for war is that we have already gone too far to be able to withdraw.

be able to withdraw. The American people, however, do not believe that this is their war. Public opinion research polls show a steady, overwhelming majority against our participation. Far from being 'America's war,' this is the President's war. President Roosevelt began to engage in this war, the President's War, at the dedication of the bridge at Chicago in 1937. Step by step he has pushed his war into the consciousness of the American people. The President himself has in effect already declared war. He has designated the enemy and speaks of victory. Congress no longer represents the people." Dr. Morrison concluded that he wanted to help support the President. By this, however, he meant the President whom the people elected last November, not "the other President who disgraces his great office by besmirching a patriotic American like Col. Lindbergh."

Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, expressed, according to the Tablet of February 1, 1941, "We must all agree with the President's desire for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and fear everywhere." Millions of Americans have supported the President because they felt that he wanted to achieve these four freedoms for America.... How can the United States better serve suffering humanity everywhere by joining the war or by staying out?... But can we stay out? We are told it is too late. The house is on fire... The answer is that the house is not on fire. It is the next house that is on fire. If the next house is on fire, you don't put fire to your own house.... We know that until recently we had nine million unemployed, and without our military preparations we would still have them now. When our military preparations stop, we will, as far as we know we know, we will have nine million unemployed again . . . We have hardship and fear today. We will have hardship and fear when the present needs of our defense are over.... The road to war is a false road to freedom. A new moral order for America is the true way to freedom. A new moral order for America means new strength for America and new hope for the moral restoration of mankind. We are turning

away from the right road to freedom because it is easier to blame Hitler for our troubles than to fight for democracy at home."

On March 20, 1941, 55 American citizens, including well-known figures such as Oswald Garrison Villard, Igor Sikorsky, Felix Morley, John Haynes Holmes, and others, sent an open letter to Roosevelt demanding that his pledge not to send American land, sea, or air forces to fight in foreign countries not be degraded to an election slogan. The letter goes on to say, "We, the undersigned, earnestly protest against various statements recently made by you.... We proceed from the position you took in your speech of March 15.... We believe that such a position on the part of the President of the United States includes a willingness to send our Army and Navy overseas. We believe that you could not have made such a statement unless you presented yourself and our country as already at war. However, no declaration of war has been made by Congress, and every poll shows that more than 80 percent of the American people are opposed to entering the conflict. We regret this content of your statement not only in the interest of the American people, but also in the interest of Great Britain itself. If you think that the British must fight until victory is won, then you are measuring victory is won, you presume to dictate the policy of another country."

Vincent Sheean in *Life*, May 20, 1941: "Neither is it reasonable to cite freedom and democracy as dominant ideals of the American and British governments. Our partisanship in this conflict has been based on our entire policy since 1916, and the world situation is in part a result of that choice. All these half measures and evasions did not change the fact that America took upon herself a tremendous responsibility in 1917. Our attempt to shirk it only destroyed the best of Wilson's work without eliminating the worst. Germany has never forgotten that she made peace on the basis of Wilson's promises, which have never been fulfilled. The germ of the present war was contained in the settlement of the last, which was made chiefly under American influence, and then abandoned by America at the moment of practical application."

"Saturday Evening Post," March 1, 1941: "Twenty-four years ago this romantic land entered the sign of Mars amid the singing of peace hymns. Both the analogies and the disparities are startling."

Nor would I refrain from naming among the denouncers of Roosevelt policy William Randolph Hearst, though today he has become a rallying cry for war. He wrote on

April 8 in *the News*, "Democracy is the most expensive and ineffective government there is," and on April 10, 1941, "After ten years of war there will not be a shred of democracy left anywhere in the world. Already there is very little of it left in this country and even less in England."

Like Mr. Hearst, the isolationist leader, Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, now seems to have gone over to Mr. Roosevelt's camp. For the declarations of war

of December 1941, at any rate, he voted. But his earlier views sound different ("New York Journal and American," Dec. 31, 1940): "It is this satanically clever propaganda, appealing to Christianity, to idealism, to humanity, to the loyalty of the American people, that is leading us to war. To it we must give resistance.... We have reached a strange situation in America where those who speak for peace, who do not follow the party line, are branded as peacemakers at all costs or ignorant tools of the dictators. However, we still live in a democracy.... The free speech is still entitled to the whole people.... I do not believe that the great majority of our people have an urgent desire for war, and I call upon you not to be afraid to say so. I, for one, believe that the policy advocated by the interventionists is insane because it leads to total war, and war is insanity.... Americans. Do not let yourselves be carried away by mass hysteria. Do not go back to the way you went in 1917."

On April 15, 1961, according to a report in *The New York Times*, Senator Wheeler stated in Denver, Colo. that "thousands have been sacrificed in the bloodbaths of Europe and Africa because of the assurances President Roosevelt's envoys and representatives have given their governments." America's

promises of military aid to Yugoslavia and Greece could not be fulfilled, but they led those states down the bloody road to war. Our guarantees to the Balkans have not been realized any more than those of England and France to Poland."

The courage to stand up for one's convictions against a ruling class has been demonstrated by many Americans. Among them stands out by his personality Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, in whose veins flows the blood of Swedish ancestors.

ancestors. When he was the first to fly across the Atlantic alone in a bad plane, he was cheered immensely in the United States and received so many letters of homage that it would have taken 36 years to read them. It was with admiration and pride that people in Sweden heard the news of his deed. Lindbergh, out of his deep expertise, was absolutely right in predicting military events in a new European theater of war. According to many Americans and in my opinion, he was also right when, as a campaigner against America's entry into the war, he said what the "New York Times" reported on April 24, 1941: "War is not inevitable for our country. The contrary assertion is defeatism in the true sense. No one can force us to fight abroad unless we are willing to do so ourselves. No one will try to fight us here if we arm as we should as a great nation, over a hundred million people of this country are opposed to going to war. If the principles of democracy have anything to say, that is reason enough for us to stay out. If we are forced into the war against the wishes of an overwhelming majority of our people, it has been proved that democracy is such a failure at home that there will be little use in fighting for it abroad.

"The time has come when those of us who believe in an independent American destiny must unite and organize forces. We have been led toward war by a minority of our people. This minority has power. It has influence. It has a loud voice. But it does not represent the American people. In recent years, I have traveled across this country from one end to the other. I have talked to many hundreds of men and women, and I have received

letters from tens of thousands more who feel the same way you and I do.

"Most of these people have no influence or power. Most of them do not have the opportunity to express their beliefs except through their voice, which has always been against the war. They are the citizens who have to work too hard for their daily bread to organize political meetings. Until now, they have relied on their voices as the means of expressing their feelings. But now they find that it is hardly thought of except in the speech battle of an election campaign. These people, the majority of hardworking American citizens, are with us. They are the true strength of our country. And they are beginning to realize - as you and I do - that there are times when we must sacrifice our normal interests in life to secure the safety and welfare of our people."

Lindbergh has proven himself a good citizen of his country now that it is at war, which he warned against in the first place. He has volunteered for the duties for which he is called, although he resigned his position as Air Force advisor a few months ago in response to the vituperation inflicted upon him by Roosevelt, just as voluntarily.

One should be careful in Europe not to condemn the change of heart of such men as Hearst, Wheeler, and other Congressmen and Senators who voted for the declaration of war on Japan, Germany, Italy, and their allies, after having earlier opposed entry into the war. One must know under what incomprehensible pressure they were in the "freest democracy in the world." Roosevelt, aided by the interventionist press, certain agitating organizations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B. I.) and the Dies Committee of Congress, did everything in his power to label those who, by their own conviction and knowledge, disagreed with him as "non-Americans".

opinion, as "non-Americans," Hitler agents, and members of the Fifth Column, that is, as traitors. It takes great courage to hold one's convictions, no matter how firm. In an undemocratic manner, all who

find a good word to say for Germany, its government, its leader, its form of government and its institutions are slandered, persecuted, dismissed from their positions, excluded from the job market, abandoned to misery. Even men who have brought high honors to the name of America in science, technology, and business, and by their fair, fearless character, do not escape this fate.

Long before the last sharp measures of the U.S. government, magazines such as "Living Age" dealt with the question of whom among the Americans who have preserved their own opinion and who warned against America's entry into the war, not out of inclination to Germany, but out of love for America, should be interned and locked up in concentration camps! Does this correspond to the proclamation of the famous freedoms from Roosevelt's speech? In Washington's America, Lincoln's and Jefferson's "freedom of speech" is already dead? They were the true patriots who wanted to save their country from great misfortune.

In recent years, Americans have accused totalitarian states that freedom of speech no longer exists in their countries, that opponents of the regime are muzzled, even taken to concentration camps. As a citizen of a free and independent country, I am well aware of the high value of freedom of expression and deplore it wherever it is suppressed. But in the European states, impoverished by the world war and the peace treaties with their consequences, internally disunited and divided into dozens of political parties, it had a

statesmanlike sense if the population first had to be educated to unity again, and if the people had to be educated to unity again.

had to be educated to unity and if disintegrating and seditious elements were temporarily eliminated.

In the United States it is different. They are a rich, immensely large country, blessed with natural resources, a young country without the infirmities of old Europe, a country to which the people of Europe migrated believingly, fed up with poverty and destitution in their old European home, and longing for the great freedom. The states have known only two major parties and a few splinter parties that have always come together on the big issues. At all times and in every situation, everyone was allowed to speak his mind, in elections or on other occasions, without having to fear that anything would happen to him other than that he would be defeated with his opinion, because those who had a different one were in the majority and were therefore, according to the democratic view, right, or at least had their way with their view.

For millions, America was the land of dreamed-of freedom, the fairy-tale land of unlimited possibilities, where one could become filthy rich just by putting a spade in California's soil or a few blasting shots into the rocks of Klondike. Never was one more perceptive and inventive than when looking for faults and shortcomings in one's own country, while adorning America with an abundance of all things that made life beautiful and happy. I still remember how, during the Swedish defense controversy of 1913 and 1914, immature boys railed at conscription and stood there with their hats on their heads and their hands in their pockets when the Swedish flag was raised. Many then shook the dust from their feet and watched the coast of Bohuslän disappear with superior smiles as they steered westward over the waves on their way to the first million. And proud as turkey cocks the young heroes greeted the world embracing torch of the goddess of liberty to take possession of their new home, just as the Vikings did on the coast of Vinland in earlier times. And then, when they gathered on Minnesota's meadows on ceremonial occasions, they stood as good fellow Americans in strapping posture, hat in hand, when the star-spangled banner was raised.

And what do the emigrants and their sons say now? Where are the beautiful dreams and the immense freedom? Does it not seem strange to them that one may not speak with impunity that America is forcing its free sons into a war in the other hemisphere? Does it not seem inconceivable to them that they should suddenly be called traitors when they ask in their innocence what their President actually

meant when, a few months ago, he called himself the greatest isolationist in America and promised to save his people from the horrors of war? As they stand in the meadows of Minnesota, bound hand and foot with invisible chains, listening to the diatribes of a Willkie, Knox, Stimson and La Guardia, must they not wonder and ask if this is freedom and democracy? With melancholy, bitterness and sadness they will listen in memory to the sound of the eternal rolling surf on the coast of Bohuslän.

Probably they have already learned, like all other Americans, that talk is silver and silence is gold. And if they continue to ask questions in silence, the American vocabulary is rich with answers. When they and the young alumni who unite in the students pass a resolution "No entry into Europe's war," are expelled from their universities and like-minded professors are dismissed on the grounds that they are not fit to be youth leaders, they know the score and keep silent as a wall. They prepare themselves for the fact that one day they, too, will join the legions on the battlefields of Europe, in the graves on the bottom of the the bottom of the Atlantic and to the immense, silent, dark churchyard of the transport ships.

On the problem "Hie Democracy - Hie President of Democracy" I leave as last an essay from the "Saturday Evening Post" of December 5, 1940. As is well known, it is an illustrated weekly paper with a circulation of millions:

"We speak here neither of war nor of peace.

As we write, news is circulating that the President has asked the United States Congress to abdicate. In the news, this is tamely expressed. The headline in the New York Times reads: "Bill Grants President Unlimited Authority to Lend War Equipment and Supplies. An ingenious move to make it seem beside the point. The official title of the bill is even tamer, reading, A bill to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes."

Then let's look at the bill. Keep in mind, it is the President's own bill. It is what he wants it to be. It is, therefore, the authentic revelation of his mind. Judging from the template, this is what he wants: Power at his own choice, on his own terms, and as he sees fit, to wage undeclared wars all over the world.

Power according to his own choice to make other nations his friends and enemies.

Power according to his own choice to use all the resources of the country for these purposes.

Power, at its own choice, to make military alliances with other governments, and to lend, lease, or transfer to other governments all the military instrumentalities of the United States, with the sole exception of men, and that only because they are not expressly mentioned.

Power to make by ordinance such laws as he may deem necessary to carry out his purposes.

Power to dispose of money in any amount.

Power to confer upon himself all such powers as he may desire to have.

Significantly, and for the first time in the eight-year history of Congress' progressive recession, there is no time limit in the bill.

It can be forever.

These are the normal powers of a dictator.

It is always said that Congress can take back what it gives. This forgets, first, that it is the nature of power to fortify and extend itself; second, that the hook with which the executive principle draws out the tame Leviathan has a sting. It is much easier for Congress to distribute power than to take it back. Distributing it requires only a simple majority. To take it back, if the President does not want to give it up, requires a two-thirds majority....

In the last great temple of liberty, the image of absolute government has been unveiled, and drilled-in masses have shouted hurrah. To be spared the scourge of totalitarian principle, sinful democracy must now embrace the anointed image of it. As a brazen serpent it has been held up to the people by their leader, and among those who have said, 'Behold, this shall save us,' are many who only recently feared

the very same thing and who exhorted others to harden their minds before it.

History may say that people were carried away by one of the great leaders of modern times, by one who knew how to play on their fears and passions as on strings. It is not so simple. They were a believing people. They believed in words...

Why not? Because during the election campaign both parties and both candidates stuck rigidly to the formula of helping democracies through 'measures, except war'. The people believed in these words. Literally, they believed in them.

Immediately after the election, the President treated that formula for what it was - a buzzword. Never after his reelection did he use it again.

During the campaign, the president's words were: 'We will not participate in foreign wars and will not send our army, naval and air forces to fight in foreign countries outside America unless we are attacked.... The fundamental aim of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war.'

Had he said then, 'If I am re-elected, we will all go out for England. If I am re-elected, I will demand that Congress confer upon me the power, at my discretion, to make war anywhere in the world, without declaration of war, for the defense of democracies, and to use for that purpose all arms, munitions, aircraft, ships, goods, and merchandise of every kind; further, the power, at my own discretion, to make such laws as may be necessary. And then, my friends, we need not waste your time and mine in debates as to whether or not the Neutrality Act or the Johnson Act should be repealed. Congress may frame it and keep it.'

Had he said these things-had he told the people what he intended to do-would there have been no response to this before the American election?

We did not believe that this could be done to the American people; we were wrong. We did not believe that the people could be induced by suggestion to jeopardize their birthrights.

to jeopardize their birthrights. The President told them that America must exert its forces to save Britain, to save China, to defend democracies of all kinds throughout the world and to destroy permanently the principle of aggression in them, because 'in times like the present it is a sign of immaturity - and at the same time untrue - for anyone to boast that an unprepared America, with one hand tied behind its back, could with the other alone repel the whole world'. All this in one speech.

The image of a country with one hand tied behind its back is obviously an allusion to the way in which the parliamentary principle, namely Congress, constrains the ruler. The dictator, who does not need to worry about Congress, has both hands free. And that is what the President wants.

Whither now, America?"

To the anxious question, "Whither, America?" the answer has been given. It was "to war."

## 8. ROOSEVELT AND THE SECOND YEAR OF WAR.

A year had passed since the British declaration of war on Germany when the island nation itself felt the blows of the enemy through the fierce air raids on its capital. While in the United States every attack on Germany, no matter how small and unsuccessful, was played up even by many of those who detested the war, or even damage

done was regarded as just punishment, the undoubted sufferings of England, especially London, set off a huge wave of propaganda for British aid. But mixed in with all the helpfulness was an ever-increasing concern for the fate of America if England should now also succumb. "If England falls" - these words recurred countless times in speeches, essays and books.

Great Britain, as in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, again sought to escape her fate by creating new theaters of war in more distant parts of Europe and by harnessing other peoples to her own war chariot by guarantees whose unfulfillability was a foregone conclusion. In the case of Romania it was in vain, for that country, after the overthrow of its corrupt government, allied itself with the Axis powers.

Greece and Yugoslavia became easier prey for the British and Roosevelts. Britain's main intention was to establish itself in Greece and the Greek islands so that from this base it could halt the further advance of the Germans and Italians on their way to the British possessions on the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. From Yugoslavia, however, it was hoped that the traditional trouble spot of the Balkans, in order to include the states of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, which in the meantime had changed over to a new order and alliance with the Axis powers, in the intrigue. Likewise, it was hoped to bring Turkey out of its valiantly held neutrality and onto the side of Great Britain, and to provide Russia with a springboard for its activity.

I will deal less with British-Russian policy and only briefly examine the extent to which President Roosevelt supported it. All the guilt of Great Britain in the extension of the war, heavy as it may be, weighs more lightly than that of the United States, for Great Britain stands my fight for the life and death of the island nation and the Empire. The United States, however, was still a neutral country by the end of 1941, and Roosevelt's policy in Southeastern Europe was an inexcusable intrusion.

First, Roosevelt again sent one of his special envoys to reconnoiter the mood and possibilities. I have spoken before of the mission of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and of Wendell Willkie's trip to England. To the Balkans went Mr. William "Bill" Donovan. He had the peculiarity of gathering his information chiefly in the amusement places of the Balkan cities, and one morning forgot his wallet together with his passport and interesting notes in a night club.

Colonel Donovan, a special friend of the American Secretary of the Navy, Knox, first got an outright rebuff in Sofia. In Belgrade he hoped for an easy match, not with the regent of the time, Prince Paul, but with the group of Serbian officers and politicians who saw a field of activity in resisting Axis reorganization efforts and were not averse to the lure of the dollar. As is now known, 122 conveyed to the Belgrade government in February 1941 an American offer of a guarantee, which was later disavowed by the White House. Some American radio stations also boasted in late March that they had given daily special broadcasts in Serbian and Croatian during the previous weeks to incite the population of Yugoslavia to revolt and war against the Axis powers. The extent to which Roosevelt was playing with the fate of peoples to whom he had as little to offer as Churchill was evident from an Associated Press report. It writes that the Yugoslavs would have to wait until the spring of 1942 for supplies from the U.S. because transportation difficulties and America's own shortage of war materiel did not permit earlier assistance.

In the Saturday Evening Post (mid-May 1941), Demaree Bess, an American war correspondent, dealt with America's role in the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1941, saying that the U.S. government had interfered directly in it. A small group of Americans, he says, was responsible for causing an explosion that tore Yugoslavia to pieces in less than two weeks. The government had made commitments that effectively created a new American border on the Danube. The Americans should have known the German strength and should have foreseen that Yugoslavia would be overrun. However, they would have wanted to play war policy. America was far too far from the Balkans to be able to help actively, and there had been no shipping space for troop transports. Donovan had stated in Belgrade that if an agreement were made with Germany the U.S. would. Yugoslavia as an enemy before and after the war. The U.S. Ambassador Lane had worked tirelessly in the same spirit. In this way, he had made himself popular in Washington, because American diplomats who reported favorably on the Axis powers and Germany's strength fell in love with him.

Germany's strength attracted unpleasant attention in Washington.

Although I am getting ahead of myself, I would like to let the reporter Demaree Bess speak with an article in "Saturday Evening Post" from November 1941, which he published after his return from



Europe. He wonders about his countrymen and above all his government, who lulled themselves into the belief that they could commit one act of war after the other and thereby avoid entering the war. Literally, he continued, "No nation can make a business out of war, as we did, without one day being forced also to draw the consequence of the risk of victory or defeat." The policy that could be pursued in 1938 and 1940 without any particular danger was quite out of place in 1941, he said. Now one was already involved in the war in Europe, and this fact could not be "spirited away by any political mumbo-jumbo."

That Yugoslavia was encouraged to resist Germany, however, became known not only through newspaper reporters, but through the announcement of the exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the Belgrade government – shortly thereafter the same thing happened with Athens – and through the reports of Colonel Donovan himself, published by the "Washington Post" in March 1941, in which he pronounced that Germany would not forget all this.

The activity of Donovan and the former ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, whose interference in European affairs from the beginning of the war is ominously remembered, recalls a narrative by the French minister Hanotaux in his great work on the World War. It says that France was already close to making a peace offer to Germany in the fall of 1914. However, the American ambassador at the time appeared before the French government and implored them to continue the war,

to continue the war. He promised that the USA would enter the war. At the moment only 50000 influential people in the USA were in favor of the war, but soon there would be 100 million.

But not only the small states were misled with promises of American help, also Great Britain already had to atone for the interference of the United States and will do it even more in the future. W. R. Hearst stated in one of his editorials in May 1941 that the whole war would be over by now if Roosevelt did not keep fomenting it. England, without Roosevelt's encouragement, would certainly have accepted the terms of the Axis powers, which guaranteed the Empire and demanded only that England refrain from future interference on the Continent.

Hearst was not alone in his view in America either. At the end of 1941, Freda Utey, an Englishwoman by birth, married to an American close to the Council on Foreign Relations, who from her journalistic work knew Russia and East Asia well, Germany somewhat, published an article in an American magazine which was reprinted by the Reader's Digest, read by millions. The gist of her remarks was that it was high time for Britain to come to a negotiated peace with Germany. If the war continued, Britain would be putting both the motherland and the empire at risk, for it could not win militarily and materially on its own, and American aid would in no way be sufficient. The friends of England in the U.S. did not view the situation realistically and incited England to continue the fight, although it had long been clear that England could never reconquer the European continent. The so-called friends of England in America were therefore in truth her worst enemies. An early conclusion of peace between England and

and Germany would also be the most favorable for America, for it would be much easier for England and the United States then to remain two of the four great Western powers than to try to destroy Germany and Japan and make themselves masters of the world. The best security for America would lie in a peace which preserved England's sovereignty and that of the dominions, and to such a peace England could yet attain. The Americans, refusing to recognize the bitter reality of the situation, were doing unimaginable harm to England and to their own country. If, however, England were determined by her so-called friends in the United States to reject any thought of peace and to risk defeat without any certain hope of victory, she would one day find herself forced into the position of France, that is, she would have to take up a front against her friends in order to continue to exist at all.

Roosevelt was far from such in truth realistic considerations. He wanted "his war" and set everything in

motion to finally achieve his goal. A few days after the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, victims of the unfulfilled American promises of aid, American troops occupied Greenland on Roosevelt's orders, thus advancing from the western hemisphere to the eastern. Greenland became a base for the American escort of British shipping. A month later, Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited state of national emergency. Three weeks later, under the pretext of stopping alleged Axis propaganda, he forced

all German and Italian consulates and travel agencies in the United States to close and expelled their personnel.

On June 6, the President ordered all German, Italian, French, Romanian, Spanish, and Baltic ships, that were in North American ports. They were immediately placed in service under the Star-Spangled Banner. This action violated international law, under which no neutral state may take such action. Nor did U.S. legislation itself provide any legal authority for this step.

This was not enough. On June 25, mankind received a geographical lecture from the government in Washington quite unexpectedly. It declared that the United States reckoned Iceland as part of the western hemisphere – a strange example of Dr. Alfred Wegener's well-known theory of "continental drift" !

In early July 1961, Roosevelt ordered the entire USA.fleet to attack German warships in the Atlantic without warning. The commentator Alsop, a relative of Roosevelt, had already pointed out at the beginning of June that "Roosevelt was only waiting for the first shot to be fired from the German side and hoped to provoke Germany to do so by fleet patrols of the U.S. Navy". The issuance of the so-called order to fire was confirmed by his close collaborator Wendell Willkie. Even in the face of this provocation, Germany remained calm.

These last acts of Roosevelt were done in support of the new ally of the democracies, Soviet Russia. Of the goodwill with which Roosevelt accompanied British action in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, I have already spoken. But Britain has long since ceased to be helped by goodwill alone; it wants practical support. Roosevelt promised it practical support in the Middle East and Africa. When he returned from the Atlantic Conference with Churchill in August 1961, he decided to set up an American "air ferry service" via Brazil and West Africa to the Middle East. By this route

American airmen were to bring bombers to Khartoum and other places in the Near East. The decision was four months before the United States declared war. British airfields in Africa were to be manned by American bomber crews, that is, developed into American air bases. Airports named were Bathurst in Brit'ish Gambia, Monrovia in the Free State of Liberia; Koforidua on the British Gold Coast; and Lagos in Nigeria. All these places are near Dakar, which has long been the focus of Roosevelt's attention. Supposedly, a German threat to the Western Hemisphere could come from there, since Dakar would be "very close to Brazil," meaning there is "only" the Atlantic Ocean in between! The port of Freetown in the British colony of Sierra Leone was also chosen as an American base on the west coast of Africa after the British had hastily developed it.

In a special way, Roosevelt supported the British in North Africa in the offensive against Italian and German forces in Cyrenaica and Libya that began in November 1941. The British probably undertook this offensive primarily in response to the increasingly urgent request of the Russians to finally create a second front to relieve them. But it also seemed necessary to them and Roosevelt to keep the whole Middle East in turmoil. Further, they hoped that a decisive victory in North Africa would impress the Japanese and banish, at least for a time, the danger looming from the Far East. This offensive was celebrated with victory jubilation in the first days, and Churchill even claimed on its eve that in these battles they would prepare a Waterloo for the Axis nights! It did not come to that. After only ten days, the Italian-German troops, under the brilliant leadership of Colonel General Rommel, won the battle.

which also had to be recognized by the British, gained the upper hand.

The war material used by the British was largely of American origin. A New York radio announcer said at the beginning of the fighting, "This battle will be the first real testing ground for American war material, planes and tanks." It proved in no way as capable of war as had been assumed.

To the Americans, a British victory in North Africa also seemed crucial to their own policy. "New York Herald Tribune" of November 20, 1961, proclaimed that Tunis, French Morocco, and Bizerta would be "saved from the Nazis" if the Germans and Italians could be thrown out of North Africa. Ever since Rooseveltian policy directed its desire to Dakar and other French possessions, and ever since the English made a complete break with France by attacking the French fleet at Oran, the specter of a German occupation of the French colonies has been constantly painted on the wall.

American newspapers have also divulged that the ultimate consequence of a success in Libya would be an occupation of Sicily, that is, an invasion of Italy. A blow-up of the axis is an old dream of the two democracies. The fact that an occupation of Sicily was expected to fulfill this dream shows once again that neither London nor Washington understood the spirit of the Italian-German alliance. In London's Daily Mail on January 23, 1942, military expert Liddell Hart wrote after the Italian-German counteroffensive: "We have been repeatedly assured that Rommel's armored forces were on the verge of exhaustion, but in fact they proved to be a very modern variety of the widow's oil jug."

In North Africa, too, the British-American strategy has

suffered a decisive setback, although the struggle there, according to the British, was the final struggle for complete domination of the Mediterranean, which forms part of the "organic Asia-Caucasus-Africa front related to military events in Soviet Russia." We can add today that the collapse of this struggle can also be linked to current events in East Asia, especially if Australia carries out its threat to withdraw its forces from North Africa, since it needs them itself for defense against Japan. In recent weeks the Americans have been contemplating the possibilities which the whole African west coast may offer as a base of operations, securing the support not only of the British but also of Smuts' government in the Union of South Africa, and directing their speculation to the circles around de Gaulle. France's closer alignment with Germany was a thorn in their side, especially because of their plans for Africa.

In early May 1942, the British occupied the French island of Madagascar. This theft of French property, which was greeted with the greatest joy in the Anglo-Saxon countries, would also not have taken place without the help of the Roosevelt administration. Secretary of State Hull, in a statement of May 7, 1962, admitted that U.S. warships were covering the Madagascar venture. At the same time, following the words "not the murderer, the murdered is guilty," he declared that any military resistance by the rightful owner of Madagascar, i.e., the French national government in Vichy, must be regarded as directed against the United States. One need only recall, too, to fully appreciate the view of Roosevelt and Hull, the outrage of both when Japan occupied French Indochina with the consent of the French government.

## 9. ROOSEVELT AND THE SOVIET UNION

Roosevelt became particularly active after the war between Germany and Soviet Russia began. The present friendship stands in striking contrast to previous relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

During World War I, tsarist Russia and the democratic United States were common enemies of the Central Powers. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Entente, with the cooperation of the United States, imposed the blockade on Russia. Through a relief effort for Russian children, the United States sought to alleviate the misery that had been brought on, primarily by the civil war and revolution, but secondarily by the isolation and blockade. When England, France, and Italy lifted the blockade at the urgent request of Chicherin, then Foreign Commissioner, the United States persisted in this punitive

measure.

In the war of intervention waged by the Allies against the Bolsheviks in support of the Whites under Denikin and Kolchak after the revolution, United States troops had advanced furthest, as far as Lake Baikal in eastern Siberia. After their final victory, the Reds tried to come to an understanding with their former allies, even promising to take on the financial obligations of the tsarist regime to the Allies in return. It is not entirely clear whether Wilson was ready for this understanding, which had to find expression in a recognition of the Soviet Union, as claimed by his special envoy William Christian Bullitt, now considered a confidant of Roosevelt's

. The Soviets seemed to believe it, for they appointed their own appointee in Washington, Ludwig Martens, as ambassador; but his credentials were not confirmed by the State Department. In the years that followed, the Soviet Union made further offers to establish normal state relations, but it was not until October 1933 that Roosevelt extended an invitation to Kalinin to do so.

The official state relations, which the United States thus established much later than any of the other great powers, had been preceded by economic ones. The Soviets could only rely on the occasional support of American chambers of commerce for their business dealings. American business circles, in turn, had an interest in not completely neglecting the Soviet Union's large market. They did not want to let European competitors skim off the cream, and the economic depression in America made them look for new markets. Building up Soviet industry with the Five-Year Plan gave them the opportunities to do so. When Roosevelt finally invited the Soviet Union to negotiate state relations in 1933, the reason was apparently the sudden decline in U.S.-Russian trade, which until then had been large in volume. It was partly a result of the antidumping law, which required importers to prove that

goods shipped from Soviet Russia were not made by convicts or forced laborers, and partly a result of the low prices of Russian lumber, which were depressing the American lumber market. As a countermeasure, the Russians restricted their orders to American goods.

After the recognition of Soviet Russia, W. C. Bullitt went to Moscow as the first American ambassador. However, even he could not create friendly relations. They soon deteriorated anew because the Americans owed some

hundreds of millions in claims by private donors, as well as the \$187 million they had given the Kerensky government as a loan. Negotiations failed, trade continued to decline, and was revived only by the July 1935 economic agreement.

State relations continued to be cool, and on August 1, 1940, in a major speech, Foreign Minister Molotov said only the one sentence about relations with the United States: "I will not go into our relations with the United States, if only because nothing good can be said about them." By this he meant the sharp American rejection of the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states and especially of Finland, which enjoyed great sympathy in America during the Russo-Finnish War; further, he alluded to the "moral embargo" with which the United States had threatened Soviet Russia since 1939.

Everything connected with Soviet Russia was sharply rejected in the United States. Only in the winter of 1936/37, when Stalin had introduced a kind of "constitution," had some Americans believed that the Soviet Union was about to undergo a transformation toward democracy. The error was soon realized. Communist tendencies in labor and in salons were opposed. The leader of a small communist party was imprisoned, ostensibly for a minor tax offense, in reality for having ties to the Soviet Union. In religious circles, people condemned what is now forgotten, the godless propaganda and the murder of uncounted clergymen.

The conclusion of the German-Russian non-aggression pact in the summer of 1939 was received differently in the United States. In part, it was seen as a joint betrayal of the ideals of democracy by two totalitarian states; in part, it was feared that America would now be pushed out of the Russian business.

out of Russian business. In no case did this make Soviet Russia more popular in the United States. All at once, however, the attitude of the United States changed when Germany declared war on Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941.

Before I speak of my attitude toward the Soviet Union, first a few words from my first personal acquaintance with the old Russian Empire. I am no stranger to the largest continent on earth, in whose western borderlands the incalculable hordes gathered at the beginning of the summer of 1941 to descend upon Europe and scourge its peoples with the curse that would be the lot of the Russian intelligentsia, the Ingles, the Karelians, the Balts, the Poles, and countless other unfortunate peoples if Germany were sufficiently exhausted by the war with the Western powers.

On August 17, 1885, I stepped through the Redeemer's Gate, Vorota Spasitelja, for the first time, roamed the narrow streets of the Kremlin and listened to the divine sound of Ivan the Great's silver bells. On April 10, 1935 I was for the last time in the glorious city of Grand Princes and Tsars. In the half-century between, I have been there many times and could not travel through Moscow without repeatedly visiting the historical collections, the interior of the Uspensi Cathedral, the Palace of the Tsars, where Ivan the Terrible stabbed his son and where the echo of countless acts of inhuman cruelty and bestial torture echoed. I saw the sparks fly from the bumpy pavement of the Kremlin as Budjennij's handsome Cossacks roared along on their steel-shod steeds, and I sat among the audience in the "Great Theater" at the invitation of the People's Commissar Chitscherin when Field Marshal Budjennij delivered a thunderous speech from the stage about the terrible doom that would befall any enemy who dared to attack the Kremlin.

who would dare to set foot across Soviet Russia's border.

In Red Square, in the shadow of the bizarre but magnificent Cathedral of Vasily Blashenny, Tsar Peter saw the heads of the rebellious strelits roll into the sand under the axes of the executioners. And on the same square he, Pyotr Veliky, Peter the Great, after the battle at Poltava at the head of his victorious army held the entry into his capital. The Imperial Councilor and Field Marshal, the victor of Fraustadt, Count Carl Gustaf Rhenskiöld, walked in the triumphal procession at the head of the prisoners.

From Petersburg to Vladivostok, from Irkutsk to Tashkent, from Ekaterinburg to Sevastopol, I must have crisscrossed the Russian Empire fifteen times. Eight months, 1885/86, I was in Balakhanij near Baku. I traveled through the East Siberian forests in a sled, six years before the Trans-Siberian Railway was finished, and slept wonderfully in poor peasant dwellings in Siberia, in the Kyrgyz steppe between Orenburg and the Aral Sea, and in Turkestan. On all these journeys I have grown fond of the Russian peasants and all the simple, unpretentious, poor Russian people, these hospitable, sincere, honest and good-natured people who ask nothing but to be left alone to build their cabbages and plow their fields by the sweat of their brow. They do not even dare to speak freely when you talk to them in private. They know that even the walls have ears. They have been robbed of their cattle and their fields, and often enough they have seen their neighbors and comrades, their sons and brothers disappear without a trace.

With their executioner Ivan Ivanovich Vissarionovich or Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt made a covenant for the sole purpose of destroying Germany.

When Finland, after the invasion of the Soviets on 30. November 1939, Finland fought through its winter war with brilliant bravery for life and liberty, withstanding three months of crushing superior force, the American people lent Finland strong moral and material support and, like Britain, watched the course of the unequal struggle with admiration and enthusiasm.

In the winter of 1941/42, Britain, under pressure from Soviet Russia, declared war on Finland, and America wanted to force Finland to submit to the Soviet Union!

A historical memory suggests itself to me here. 700 years ago Europe was in a situation which in many respects was similar to today. Even earlier, wild hordes of horsemen had burst forth like destructive storms from the depths of the Asian steppes, killing, burning and pillaging. In 451 Attila, the king of the Huns, flooded the Western Roman Empire with his hordes, passed through Germany, which he forced into submission, advanced with 500000 horsemen across the Rhine into Gaul, and was devastatingly defeated by the Roman commander Aetius on the Catalaunian plains. In the years between 1287 and 1241 the grandson of Genghis Khan, Batu Khan, stormed with his mounted legions through Russia, from the Volga via Moscow to Novgorod the opposite way, which the German army masses take at present. The Mongol hordes passed through Podolia, Bessarabia, Transylvania, Wallachia, Dobruja, Bulgaria, Serbia, Slavonia, Hungary and northern Italy. Another group took the route through Poland to Wroclaw and Liegnitz, while a third stormed through Lithuania, Prussia and Pomerania. In the same way that Batu Khan was a scourge for Europe and Christendom 700 years ago, it would have become Stalin who, with his paladins, was preparing in the years that have now passed to completely destroy our part of the world - only with the difference that his war of extermination against the Western civilization and Christianity would have been seven times worse than that of the Mongols. He had already gained a firm foothold in Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Bukovina and Bessarabia, and was readying his armies of millions and his rolling armored monsters for the destructive hurricane over Europe, an enterprise which in its horror surpasses all human imagination, and with which the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon peoples unhesitatingly associated themselves.

The only one among the princes of the time who recognized the terrible danger with which a Mongol invasion threatened Europe like a spectre was, as now, the head of state of Germany, Frederick II, crowned German Emperor at Aachen in 1215. Twice he had been put under the spell of Gregory IX, he was a crusader, and was at the height of the learning of his time. He also possessed an unusual degree of intelligence and perspicacity, and had learned men at his court in Sicily inform him of the events of the day. All Russia was drowned in blood, the holy city of Kiev lay in ruins, Poland was shattered, Hungary devastated. At the German imperial borders, Europe's border guards succumbed to the immense swarms of horsemen coming from Asia. People and princes, priests and monks pleaded for God's help, fasting and crusades were preached.

On July 3, 1240, Emperor Frederick sent his brother-in-law, King Henry III of England, a letter that could just as easily have been written in the spring of 1941:

"Emperor Frederick wishes to call the attention of the English king to a matter which concerns the Roman Empire and all loyal Christian kingdoms, and which threatens all Christendom with general annihilation. A barbarian nation, called Talaren, is spreading like the crab. It is a judgment of the Lord for the correction and chastisement of his

Destruction, devastation of rich lands, sparing neither sex nor age nor dignity, by a people that wants to exterminate the rest of mankind, that wants to rule alone by its unheard-of number and power. The Tartars, children of hell.... suddenly burst forth like the wrath of God or lightning, proud kingdoms are completely devastated and the inhabitants killed....

The Hungarians with their priests and knights were all massacred in a bloodbath the like of which has never been heard."

Then the Emperor speaks of reports he has received from the King of Bohemia and the Dukes of Austria and Bavaria, and of the three columns of Mongols advancing through Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary: "Fear and trembling at their rush fills and shakes all; necessity dictates that they be resisted, since danger is at the door. Against the general destruction and desolation of the whole world, and in particular the destruction of Christendom, speedy aid and speedy relief are needed."

The Emperor ceaselessly exhorts the King of England and other princes by letters, warning, "Peace and

concord must prevail among the rulers, discord, which has often brought disaster to Christendom, must cease, a common agreement must be made to put a stop to the barbarians—for he who is warned of danger is also armed against it—so that the common enemy may not rejoice at the fact that so great a discord is shown among the Christian princes and paves the way for him."

The emperor complains about the pope who is plotting against his honor and reputation instead of using the weapons of the church against the Tatars. He exclaims in his letter: "Now, in the name of the common danger and in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, we cordially implore Your Majesty to take care of yourselves and of your kingdom – for which and with prudence and foresight and with all diligence soon to provide a detachment of strong knights and other armed men and weapons – we ask you for the sake of the shed blood of Christ and for the sake of the family ties that unite us. And let them prepare themselves to fight manfully and wisely with us for the liberation of Christendom, so that against the enemies who are now preparing to advance across Germany's border, which is, as it were, the gate of Christendom, victory may be won by united forces to the praise of the Lord of Hosts. And may you not pass by these things indifferently or put them aside by postponing them. For if, God forbid, the Tartars enter the German lands unhindered, then others must beware lest the storm come to their own door with the swiftness of lightning. And we believe that this has happened as a judgment of the Lord, because the world has become at odds with itself and the love of many who should proclaim and uphold the faith has become so lukewarm; and their dangerous example infects the world with usury and many other kinds of simony and avarice. May your lordship therefore take good care and, while the common enemies are racing among the neighboring nations, take wise counsel as to how to resist it; for they have come out of their country with the intention of ... to subdue the whole of the western lands – which may the Lord avert from us – and to destroy and exterminate the faith in Christ and his holy name.' Through a series of victories, their folly had risen to the point where they believed they could conquer the whole world and make kings and princes their slaves. The emperor expresses the hope that the barbarians, who have broken out of their "hellish dwellings," will be crushed by the united armies of the western lands and plunged back into Tartarus. the Tartarus. Their own blind fate, indeed Satan himself, would have to meet the victorious eagle of imperial Europe....

"Let Germany, willing and full of fury, take up the sword, France, mother and guardian of chivalry, warlike and bold Spain, rich England, mighty by her men and a well-equipped fleet, and every proud and glorious country in the West, send with joy its distinguished knighthood under the colors of the life-giving cross, which not only rebels but Satan's hosts themselves fear."

The German Emperor's appeal to the King of England went unheard. Then, as now after 700 years, England was indifferent to the fate that would have awaited the Christians on the European mainland if the Mongol hordes had succeeded in flooding the entire continent. The goal of these horsemen masses to devastate the entire Western lands and make slaves of the surviving Christians finds its counterpart in the world revolution of the Bolsheviks and in their thorough preparations to invade Germany and Western Europe.

Possibly King Henry III saw in the ravages of the barbarians on the European mainland an advantage for himself and for his empire on the island protected against all raids by the channel. In our days the English government goes further than he went, for in deed and word it cold-bloodedly promotes the victory of the Bolsheviks over Germany. England, as well as America, is supporting by all means this struggle, the victory of which would mean the annihilation of the European mainland and the Scandinavian north.

There are accounts from the year 1240 about the mass murders, which the wild Mongols committed on men, women and children in Hungary and in other Christian countries. One resists to think such bestial

cruelty of people 140

to be possible. But whoever reads in Swedish newspapers the descriptions of events which took place not far from our shores Anno Domini 1941 in the countries which were occupied by Soviet Russia one and a half years ago, realizes that the atrocities of the time of Emperor Frederick II are far surpassed. A Swedish reporter (O. B.) wrote in "Stockholms Tidningen" on July 20, 1941 about the old, noble city of Riga: "The old town of Riga no longer exists. There is no more Black Head House, no more Petrikirche/no more city hall. The library, where millions of documents from the history of the Baltic States were kept until now, has been razed to the ground. Riga's world-famous romantic silhouette with its pointed towers above the wide riverbed of the Duna is a thing of the past. And this devastation is not a work of war, but a document of the communist will to destroy, directed against everything that is called culture. Two hundred thousand Latvians have disappeared, from infants to octogenarians. Most of them were taken to the Russian steppes and Arctic Siberia. No one knows where they went, but it is known, for example, that an entire railroad train packed with Latvians was found by the German troops on the way east, with not a single one of the unfortunate occupants alive. All of them had been shot. A precise factual plan had been worked out for the extermination of the Latvian people. It will take several years to get an overview of what one year of Bolshevism meant for the Latvians."

From the instruction on the evacuation, which the rapporteur has studied, it is clear that the intention was to gradually and systematically transfer the entire Latvian people from Latvia to the endless steppes. The shipments were carried out secretly. Boys between the ages of 14 and 16

were lured to certain apprenticeship courses with the promise of 200 rubles a month – but they never returned from there. Workers' children were gathered in Young Communist camps to learn about "Father Stalin's social work" – they never returned to their parents. At a freight station in Riga, after the occupation, four sealed wagons full of children's corpses were found. So this was the "children's rest home". The rapporteur was present himself when they tried to identify the bodies of the little workers' children. He says he could not bring himself to describe the scenes he saw. Adults and old people were also abducted. Saleswomen and shop assistants disappeared. Political "criminals" were taken from their homes at night by GPU. executioners; they were never heard from again. Countless mass graves are now opened in Riga. They are silent witnesses against communism. The reporter met people everywhere who had lost their relatives, their brothers, sisters and children. One woman had six children, five had been taken to a Young Communist camp and remained missing. Thus the slaughter continued for a year. On June 15, 1941, seeing the war coming, all Latvian officers were shot. Three hundred officers had their hands tied with steel wire and were tortured for four days. Then they were shot in groups. "Many were buried alive." On June 27, they set fires to the old, valuable houses. Within a few hours Riga's most beautiful cultural monuments were in flames; terrified, the inhabitants fled but were cut down with machine guns. The burning city was then shelled with artillery. "The shells rode howling over the city's interior and exploded in the blazing hearth of fire that destroyed the historical monuments of Western culture. The 130 meter

high tower of St. Peter's Church collapsed, and its splinters fell into the old, picturesque streets around this venerable place of worship."

The most distinguished temple of the Greek Catholic Orthodox Church of Russia, Isaksky Sobor, the Isak Cathedral in St. Petersburg, was formerly adorned with magnificent icons in gold, silver and enamel behind its facade columns of Finnish granite, and the flickering flames of wax candles shone in front of the image of the Mother of God and the wall of images of the saints, the iconostasis. All this splendor, which symbolized the religiosity and piety of the Russians, was eradicated by the Bolsheviks. In the immense temple space under the golden dome – the first thing one sees of Tsar Peter's capital when approaching it from the Gulf of Finland – between the columns of malachite and lapis lazuli the



melodious voices of the choirboys, their vesper chants on the great feast days of the Russian Church, have fallen silent, and the cathedral is now used as a place of office, namely by the Besboshniki or godless. With this diabolical society, America's Christianity is now making common cause against Christian Europe. We Swedes, who gave to the United States by the emigration, so unfortunate for our people, about two million people – according to what Theodore Roosevelt and Henry

Ford told me, the best among the citizens of the United States – we, their countrymen and relatives in Sweden, are right to follow with fear and anxiety the policy, so dangerous for the whole Western culture, which is being pursued in their new homeland. We, at least most of us, ask whether it is possible that the people of America can really reconcile it with their dignity to make common cause with criminals who bring such guilt upon themselves. And in like alliance with the "company of the wicked" is united the people who, in the West

minster abbey crowns and buries its kings – among them Henry III, who passed over with silence Frederick II's call for common defense against the barbarians of the East – in this glorious pantheon, in the vault of whose tomb the composer of the English coronation march, the German George Frederick Handel, rests alongside the greatest sons of England, such as Newton, Darwin, Dickens, Livingstone, and other benefactors of all mankind. How false and discordant it does not sound in our ears when these names are mentioned in connection with Stalin. On one side the greats of science, statesmanship, poetry, Christian mission, on the other – Stalin! In a meeting of Eden and Stalin Europe was already divided and left to Bolshevism.

Shortly after the conclusion of the German-Soviet-Russian pact, in my book about Chiang Kai-shek published in New York, I warned about the people inhabiting the vast borderland between Asia and Europe. I reminded that this people, the Russian, "has placed its right claw close to our actual coasts on Dagö, Windau and Libau and thus has strengthened its power in the Baltic Sea again, while the left one reaches for Bessarabia and the supremacy over the Black Sea. Between these two bases the eagle sits staring westward, and the evening redness makes his eyes glow like fire."

By this I meant that the threatening Russian power, with its bridgeheads prepared on the Baltic and Black Seas, was only waiting for an opportunity, the biting moment, when the German armies would be so strongly bound by the Western powers that the Eastern Front would be open to a mass onslaught which Germany would not be able to withstand.

Developments took a different course after France's collapse. For the good of Germany, Finland, Switzerland

and all the rest of Europe, Hitler parried the planned invasion by throwing his victorious armies into the west of European Russia. Despite the British help and although the USA, by its open participation in the war opened the trial of strength between the continent and the Western Hemisphere, the Soviet Russians everywhere retreated.

The German successes in the first five months are reported by correspondent Fredborg in the "Svenska Dagbladet" of November 22, 1941. Between 380 and 390 Russian divisions have been destroyed; 3792000 prisoners have been taken; 15877 aircraft have been destroyed or taken; 27452 tanks and armored cars have been captured or destroyed; over 22000 guns have been destroyed. The Soviets lost ten million men in all. In the summer of 1942 the figures were much higher.

What was the role of the United States alongside Great Britain in this tremendous struggle? Here, too, they did not keep their promises, just as they did not keep their promises to other countries. Their help was not enough and came too late. Litvinov was still complaining about this in the summer of 1942.

Since America also formally entered the war, it has been arming with feverish haste. In the winter of 1941-42, we read in our newspapers that construction had begun at American shipyards on two giant icebreakers, strong enough to break a channel through the ice cover of the White Sea; but they are not

to be ready until next winter. So they are too late. For, apart from the question of whether the White Sea could be forced at all, the material that can be supplied to Russia via Arkhangelsk under otherwise favorable circumstances is hardly likely to be sufficient to replace what Russia has lost.

The route from Vladivostok is from the east to Russia via Sverdlovsk and Samara on the Volga, now called

Kuibichev, and the Murman route goes north via Arkhangelsk and Vologda. But there is a third possibility, namely the path or more correctly the paths which, coming from the Iranian and Turanian lands, meet in Caucasia, the land between the Black and Caspian Seas. The vast land mass in the Near East that is in question here is currently (summer 1942) dominated by the British in the south and by the Russians in the north. Syria, Iraq and Iran are occupied by force of arms. Baluchistan is anciently English, and Afghanistan, situated between British India and Russian Central Asia, has declared itself neutral.

Several of the major roads crossing this vast territory I encountered in my youth. For example, the classic road between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf from Resht via Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz to Bender Buzhir, and the road from Baghdad via Kermanshah, Hamadan and Tehran to Ashur Ade, now called Bender-i-shah, on the southeast corner of the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the caravan route from Tehran to Meshed and from there northward to Askabad on the Trans-Caspian Railway from Krasnovodsk to Tashkent. I covered all these distances on horseback. In a wagon I went from Trebisond via Erserum and Tabriz to Tehran in 1905. Erserum is situated on the high plateau, where in the course of an hour one can ride to the sources of three rivers flowing to three different seas: The Tyorok flows to the Black Sea, the Aras to the Caspian Sea and the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf. In 1906 I rode on camels through the desert areas of eastern Persia to Seistan and from there on eildromedaries through northern Baluchistan to Quetta. In 1916 I traveled through Asia Minor to Aleppo and Djerablus, from there I rode on a ferry down the Euphrates to Babylon and returned

returned by motor vehicle and horseback via Mosul to Syria, Palestine and the Sinai Peninsula. I crossed the mountain range of the Caucasus on the three main routes. In the east from Derbent to Baku, in the west from Batum to Novorossiysk and in the middle on the Grusinian Army Road between Vladikavkaz and Tbilisi. I have, therefore, a very clear picture of the extensive areas through which the British and American war material is to be sent to Russia via Caucasia.

The caravan roads from Baghdad and Mosul to Tabriz and the railroad from there to Tiflis are more arduous for military transport than the trans-Iranian railroad. This starts from Bender Shapur at the mouth of the Karun River in the Persian Gulf, follows this river to Hamadan, Kaswin, Tehran, and passes over the Elburs Mountains to Bender-i-shah, from where transportation may continue across the Caspian Sea to Baku, Derbent, or Astrakhan. According to information of Mr. Fredborg in

"Stockholms-Tidningen" this railroad is 1384 kilometers long. Of these, 84 kilometers are tunnels and 20 kilometers are bridges. The railroad has 109 locomotives of German manufacture. The rest of the rolling stock is insufficient. About the prospects of success in this part of Iran, the military contributor to "Dagens Nyheter", Colonel K. A. Bratt, wrote on November 10: "If the connections here are not sufficient, or if the transport possibilities north around the Caucasus are cut off by a German advance around the Black Sea, the only route left in the southeast as a connection between the British and the Russians is the one east around or across the Caspian Sea." The route that might be considered here is from Karachi at the mouth of the Indus into the Indian Ocean and up the aforementioned river to Shikarpur, from there on to Quetta and Seistan, where transhipment will take place for the first time. Now the transport of the caravan road to Herat and Meschhed and over the rocks of of Kelat-i-Nadir to Kaahka on the Trans-Caspian Railway, where it is reloaded for the second time. At Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea, the material is loaded onto ships. This route is almost twice as long as

the trans-Iranian one and is anything but convenient for truck traffic.

Going even further east and trying the rail line from Kaahka via Tashkent through the Kyrgyz steppe to Orenburg seems even more hopeless. It is 2000 kilometers long from Tashkent, and its efficiency cannot be great. Colonel Bratt is undoubtedly correct in concluding, "The difficulties of communications in the southeast, which may increase still further, suggest that the increased pressure on Finland to leave the Murman Railway area in peace reflects this situation, and perhaps also give a hint that the importance of the northern land areas to the British and their allies is again growing strongly."

As to routes through Iran to the Caucasus, we need not trouble our heads. A strategic problem of such unheard-of magnitude will not be dealt with within a few months. There has been talk of acquiring rails for the construction of new lines, thereby increasing transportation. Over this plan, too, hovers the fatal: Too late!

Help from England and America is of vital importance for the Soviet Union. England can count only on the help of the Soviets in Europe. It is difficult to decide which of the two countries - the great sea-enclosed world power of the Western Hemisphere or the formidable continental power of the Old World - has more reason to exclaim with Laocoon: "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." For England it is a matter of life that Soviet Russia endure. Soviet Russian aid in the form of earthbound armies is of far greater importance to England than aid on the

sea and air which the island nation may have through the entry of the United States into the war of the continents. If Anglo-Saxon help does not come at the right time, the Soviet Union will be lost. Rightly will the Russian leadership then complain that England's help has not

been sufficient, and that the British forces in North Africa have not been energetic enough in tying down German and Italian forces and forcing the German army command to disperse its forces.

Soviet Russia does nothing in vain. A Russia defeated in Europe will rise anew east of the Urals after ten or twenty years and, driven by its innate lust for expansion, will look for new conquests. Then the danger may revive which formerly threatened India from the Tsarist side, and the Federal brother, now an aid to England, may become, as before, a dangerous enemy of the Empire. How much better it would have been if the English had openly grasped the hand of the German Chancellor, extended for the last time on July 19, 1940, and then distributed the earth fairly for the benefit of all!

#### 10. FINLAND FOR EUROPE - AMERICA AGAINST FINLAND

Conscious of our people's attachment to the past and in view of Sweden's greatest historical task, every honest Swede follows Finland's glorious struggle for its freedom and future, and for a decision that will benefit the whole North, with feelings of pride and melancholy, admiration and gratitude.

As numerous prehistoric finds on the islands of the Aegean Sea show, there was lively intercourse between peoples and tribes on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia as early as the Iron Age. After 800 Viking colonies were established south of Ladoga. From the old Ladoga, bold and energetic Swedish chieftains together with capable men laid the foundation of the Russian Empire, a plant of gigantic dimensions, which grew up under Swedish leadership among Slavic and Finnish tribes. In our schoolbooks the following wonderful story is impressed upon the children: "Around the year 850 emissaries of the Slavs came over to Sweden and said to the Swedes: 'Our land is large and fertile, but there is no order there, come therefore and rule over us!'" Then a Swedish chieftain named Rurik gathered a great army and founded an empire in these lands, which was called Gårdarrike, because there were so many 'Gårdar' (in Russian gorod, town), that is, towns or castles. Out here the Swedes were called 'Rus', Russians (men from Roslagen = Uppland's coast north west of Stockholm). Later, the subjugated Slavs were also called Russians and the empire Russia."

The fact that the hosts of the "Rus", also called Varangians, who later moved in ever greater numbers across the sea to the east, were numerous and powerful, is evident, among other things, from the fact

that twenty-four rune stones have been found in Sweden, erected in memory of heroes who took part in "Ingvar's Train", one of the great Swedish military journeys. Thus, Swedes were the founders of the Slavic state formations, which in the course of time developed into the Russian people and Russia. Individual army commanders and men of the warrior caste carried out these large-scale undertakings on their own initiative, not by order of the king.

They sailed past Aland, along Nyland's coast up the Neva to Ladoga and Volkov, crossed the watershed and crossed the Dnieper. These bold Varangians went as far as the Caspian and Black Seas, built ships and sailed to Constantinople, where they took service with the emperor. In their footsteps, trade flourished. They were new settlers, pioneers and colonists who opened new trade routes and brought peoples closer together.

Finland was the closest and was the main attraction for the Swedes. Through the crusade of Erik the Saint, Finland was converted to Christianity around the year 1150. For the Swedish rule in Finland Novgorod became a dangerous enemy. In 1229 Gregory IX sent two letters to Linköping and letters to Wisby, Lübeck, and Riga warning them to break off all ties with Russia, which would not leave the recently converted Finns in peace. In 1232 the Pope also called on the Knights of the Sword to defend Finland against the Russians. In 1249 Birger Jarl undertook his

Crusade, giving the country greater security against Tawasts and Karelians. The brilliant deeds and victorious campaigns of Marshal Torgil Knutsson led to the peace with Novgorod, concluded in Gothenburg in 1323, which strengthened the Swedish rule in Finland. In Finland, as in Russia, the Swedes created order. The state order, laws, taxation, in a word, the cultural life that grew up in Finland was entirely Swedish. There sat Swedish noblemen with enormous fiefdoms, Bo Jonsson Grip, Erik Axelsson Tott and others. In Åbo resided bishop Tawast (1412-1450). In the Middle Ages, trade was in the hands of the Hanseatic League. Constant battles were fought with the Russians. Under Ivan III. Vasilyevich the power of Moscow grew, and after 1473 the peaceful years were not many. Finland's real reformer became the noble bishop Michael Agricola. In 1581 Finland became Grand Duchy under the crown of Sweden. By the Peace of Teusina Finland's border was extended to the Arctic Ocean. The year 1580 is associated with the name of the French adventurer and brave general Pontus de la Gardies. He conquered Kexholm and the whole of Ladogakarelia. In bloody battles he took Narva, and at New Year 1581 performed the bold deed of leading the Swedish army across the frozen Gulf of Finland, a feat which barely eighty years later would result in the march of King Charles X. Gustav across the Belt on an even larger scale.

But on the Russian throne, the dynasty of Rurik, the Swedish chieftain from Roslagen, had led the scepter for 700 years.

In the 17th and 18th centuries and in the beginning of the 19th, Sweden fought a series of wars against Russia, sometimes happily, sometimes unhappily. Our last Russian war, in 1808-09, ended with the loss of all of Finland, a

Third of the Swedish empire of the Great Power period. Therefore, when we and the Finns speak of Russia and the relationship with Russia, we know better than Messrs. Roosevelt, Hull and Sumner Welles. They may be masters in judging the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, but they are as alien to Europe and Russia as any other Americans.

Since June 22, 1941, German troops have marched and the heavy tanks and guns of the German Army have rolled daily over the ancient gravesites of countless Swedish soldiers. In these areas the Swedes have been in the field against the Russians for centuries, and in Russian forests and on Russian steppes the memory of great Swedish kings, especially Gustav Adolf and Charles XII, still lives. No doubt, when the German units occupied Poltava on their advance from Kiev to Kharkov, they saluted with military honors the "Swedish Stone" erected on June 28, 1909, the 200th anniversary, in memory of the 6000

Carolínians sleeping in Russian soil on the battlefield north of the city. Among the brave fallen there were also countless Finns, who for almost a thousand years have always taken part in our battles and like us remember with melancholy our last common war on Finnish soil – "our victories, our sorrows and our glory golden time".

Five countries belong to the Northern European, Scandinavian or, if you like, Fennoscandinavian group of countries due to their historical affiliation and geographical location. These countries have had different fates during the Second World War. Farthest west, Iceland is occupied by Britain and the United States. In Norway and in Denmark the German troops invaded. Sweden still maintains its unbreakable neutrality after three years of war.

Farthest east, Finland is fighting for its life and freedom.

Each of these five nations can record great deeds on the golden tablets of its history in the past. Iceland is the most recent. The island was discovered by the Norwegians in 860. From its coast, Erik the Red discovered Greenland in 985, which was more recently occupied by the United States. His son Leif Eriksson discovered North America in the year 1000. Denmark once conquered the island called England, from whose coast the declaration of war on the second world conflagration started. When the Norwegian settlers on Iceland discovered America 500 years before Columbus, and when Swedish Varangians founded the Russian Empire, these hardened northerners accomplished deeds that may well be counted among the greatest in the history of mankind – even if, in the glow of blazing torches and burning towns and villages, it may seem as if it would have been better for mankind if America had never been discovered and the Russian Empire had never been founded.

We Swedes, who lead a seemingly idle existence under the protection of neutrality, while the insurmountable German armies carry out the grandiose campaign plans which Charles XII's small army was too weak and exhausted to carry out – we can boast of having accomplished at least two great deeds of world-historical proportions. Perhaps it is due to the aristocratic, quiet and distinguished nature of the Swedish people that they do not boast and boast of having rendered two immortal services to mankind. The second was that Gustav Adolf, under Swedish and German flags, sealed the outcome of the Thirty Years' War. One historian says that the history of the world does not have many victories of greater significance than the Battle of Breitenfeld. For the first time, at least, we did Europe a service for which a service for which the peoples of the continent should be grateful, especially in these days. Its beginning lies five hundred years before the time of Gustav Adolf, but it continued to have an effect even then. The deed I am aiming at consisted in the fact that Swedish enterprise and energy in the northeast and east pushed the borders between Occident and Orient, between culture and barbarism far beyond the boundary marks between Europe and Asia. In this way they conquered for civilization a vast area whose districts would otherwise have retained their Asiatic character and over whose forests Siberian winds would have roared. About this a

Finnish historian, Eirik Hornborg, expresses himself as follows:

"... the Crusade period brought a lasting gain which may be called one of the two noblest engagements of the Swedish people in world history. The frontier of the Occident was pushed so far eastward that it cut through the Karelian forests.

"The protracted struggle which ensued was in its consequences far more than a quarrel for power and influence. For the Finnish tribes and tribal fragments which were incorporated into the Swedish empire were given a share in a legal and state order which raised them to an incomparably higher social level than their tribal kinsmen could attain under Russian rule. Sweden's possessions east of the sea, gained by the Crusade – formerly grouped under the name of Oesterlande, later called Finland after the most important landscape – became not a secondary or vassal country, but an inseparable part of the empire with exactly the same rights and duties as the old landscapes in Sweden proper. The ideas of the rule of

law and the freedom of the people were applied as naturally in the younger eastern part of the empire and took root there as firmly as in the old main country. It was this circumstance that gave the fight of the crusade against Novgorod its ideal, cultural-historical significance, which may certainly have been only darkly in the minds of the majority of those involved, but which is no less real for that."

After our own country, Finland is closest to the heart of the Swedish people. That is why I have devoted such a wide space to the section in this book, which is mainly about North America. During the last two years the attitude of the United States toward Finland has fluctuated in a striking way between sympathy and helpfulness on the one hand and antipathy and threats of coercive measures in the present and future on the other. In the winter of 1939/40, when the Soviets invaded Finland, the Americans treated the Finns in the most friendly and considerate manner. At that time all America understood what it would have meant for Western culture if the smallest outpost of Europe, which had advanced furthest to the northeast, had been swamped by the Asiatic hordes. The Finns who had not managed to cross over to Sweden in time would have been shot or taken to Siberia in cattle cars. And the next step of the Russians would have been to advance through Sweden and Norway to the Atlantic Ocean to complete what the Russian history textbooks called Tsar Peter's "Sovietnaya misl" secret thoughts: the Tsar's endeavor to conquer ice-free harbors on permanently open seas.

But after the German-Soviet war broke out on June 22, 1941, Finland, because it was fighting on the German side, became the enemy of the United States. For the U.S., as for England, the main thing was to help Soviet Russia in its war against Germany.

Foreign Commissar Molotov, on his visit to Berlin in November 1940, had put forward four demands: New

land acquisitions from Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria, also free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and certain bases on the European and Asiatic shores of the straits; concerning the demand against Finland, the Fuehrer's proclamation of June 22, 1941, states:

"Second question of Molotov: Russia again felt threatened by Finland. Russia was determined not to tolerate this. Was Germany prepared to give Finland no assistance whatsoever and, above all, to withdraw immediately the troops marching through to Kirkenes for relief? My answer: Germany still had no political interests in Finland. A new war by Russia against the small Finnish people, however, could no longer be regarded as acceptable by the German government, all the more so because we could never believe in a threat to Russia by Finland. But we did not at all want another war zone to arise in the Baltic Sea."

It is clear from this exchange that, on the one hand, Russia intended to restore the old Russian frontier to its pre-World War I state by conquering the whole of Finland, including the Aeland Islands, four hours by steamer from Stockholm, and that, on the other hand, Finland owes the prevention of a nameless disaster or the complete annihilation of the Finnish state and people exclusively to the firmness of Adolf Hitler. Sweden thanks him that at this moment we do not have the Russian power very close to our borders and coasts. If this had happened, Sweden would have been the next step of the Russian advance to the Atlantic Ocean, and it would have been unavoidable for us to fight for our lives with the hereditary enemy, as so often in our history.

It is a matter of deep regret that the leadership of the United States leadership has taken the fateful step of joining the sworn hereditary enemy of Finland and Sweden and thereby, albeit indirectly, at the expense of Finland and Scandinavia, aiding and abetting Russian claims to ice-free harbors. We know that America has no interest in wiping the Nordic states off the face of the earth. For the peoples of the North, a German defeat would mean not only loss of land and freedom, but complete extermination from the face of the earth, in that the intelligentsia would be shot according to well-known Russian methods, and the broad strata of the people would be partly made slaves, partly

"evacuated" to Siberia.

Through Swedish and Finnish newspapers, and presumably through the press of most Christian countries, went in the summer of 1941 a message which everywhere caused astonishment and regret. The Primate of the Anglican Church, the Archbishop of Canterbury, said in his collegiate newspaper, among other things: "We must wish the Russian people and the brave Russian armies full success in their struggle and be ready to give them every possible help. It may seem surprising how an alliance with Bolshevik Russia can be reconciled with our claim to fight for Christian culture, but there is really no need to worry about this. The point of this struggle is to defeat the threat posed by the German regime. A Nazi victory would make any tolerable form of government impossible, and the Russians are fighting as we are for their freedom and their national independence."

That England should enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union can be excused in so far as the political situation compelled her to do so. But it is not to be understood when the supreme leader of the English Church gives his blessing to this step!

In the name of the Christianity of the Nordic countries, the Finnish Archbishop Erkki Kaila in Åbo has answered the outrageous decree of his brother. He reminded the English archbishop of his prayer for Finland in St. Paul's Church on February 1. He reminds the English archbishop of his prayer for Finland in St. Paul's Church on February 1 and of his lament for the tragic fate of the Russian Church under the Bolshevik deniers. Now Canterbury speaks a very different language in this terrible appeal. Archbishop Kaila concludes his punitive sermon with the question, "Has the Christian Church of England really sunk so low as to deny the Gospel and Christianity in such a way?"

On January 5, 1942, Pastor Hjalmar Poehls published an open letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury in the newspaper "Dagsposten" in Stockholm, saying:

"Hundreds of thousands of people who feared for their lives, tens of thousands who were deprived of their loved ones by the Bolsheviks, had to hear with shock what the radio had to announce. The holder of the highest spiritual office of the Anglican state church prayed for the victory of Bolshevism! People could not comprehend it: The Archbishop of Canterbury prays for our executioners!

"The senior of the Protestant bishops of Estonia – as I know – personally known to you, H. B.

Rabanaegi, was arrested with his whole family in March 1941 and deported to an unknown fate in the interior of the Soviet Union. Bishop Varik Joehvi and Provost Vooremaa were murdered in the GPU. prison in Dorpat. They were martyred and then killed, their disfigured bodies showing no trace of bullet wounds. ... Nothing is known about the fate of the abducted men, but at least a thousand people out of a population of 1.1 million, preferably men of the educated classes, were involved. Of the thousand most famous

Estonian professors, politicians, priests, senior civil servants, businessmen, etc., hardly fifty managed to escape the Bolshevik terror.

"Archbishop! Without personally experiencing, as I and my confreres have, what Bolshevism is, we used to refer to it with full fidelity as a godless tyranny. It is known to you that Bolshevism is the enemy of all religion and idealism in every form, that its aim is to deprive mankind of its soul, and that it has already succeeded to a great extent in realizing this aim on one seventh of the earth's surface. ... For this Bolshevism and its victory, you have addressed your prayers to the Almighty."

Finland's valiant army contributed to the best of its ability to crush the Soviet Union's hopes of victory. It, in conjunction with Germany, blocked one of the three import routes by which arms and war material can be sent to support the Soviet Army. Therefore, it seeks to intimidate Finland into making peace with its old enemy and withdrawing its troops to the borders of the Mosaic peace. Business as usual – could not a billion dollars be made by supplying Bolshevism with the weapons necessary to devastate Germany and Finland? President Ryti's answer, in its calm dignity, was the only one that

could be given to a great power utterly indifferent to Finland's future fate.

Whether Sweden should side with Finland in the present war or remain strictly neutral is a question beyond the scope of this book. Personally, I have always cherished the same view as in 1918, which I treated and advocated at length in my book *Sweden's Fate*. It is closely linked to Sweden's historical task,

which is based on the experience of centuries.

hundreds. Nothing is acquired in vain. No empires are built and no states are secured in inaction.

Nevertheless, I hope that Sweden's untouched position will benefit us and our neighbors once the Second World War is over.

Like all other countries and empires in the world, Sweden has experienced changing times in its history. Sometimes calm and peaceful development, sometimes war and struggle, sometimes rise to power and world-historical importance, sometimes decline in times of slackness and inaction. But however our fate has turned out, there runs through the past of the Swedish people an unbroken, incorruptible desire for perfect freedom. The freedom we cherish forever as the dearest heritage of our fathers has ancient roots in the Swedish soil; they go back to times far before the fabled battle of Bravalla and the grim adventures of the Viking raids. It is not surprising that the sense of freedom has perhaps acquired a higher degree of home-rule than elsewhere in the land that is Europe's oldest kingdom, the only kingdom in our part of the world that has never been conquered by foreign armies. Our people have proved themselves equal to the most demanding warlike actions, and the four thousand flags captured in open field battles in our museums are a testimony with which no great power can even vie.

In the last two years it has often been said in public speeches that the aim in the contest of the various great powers is the creation of a long and secure period of peace. In the art of keeping the peace, too, Sweden is in the lead. We have long left behind us the goals to which other peoples aspire in bloody skirts, for 128 years we have succeeded in preserving the peace to which all peoples aspire.

Our people have thus won imperishable laurels in war and peace and in many respects can be an example to other peoples. In the course of time and under changing fates, our people have developed character traits and acquired a peculiarity, the essential features of which are loyalty, honesty, chivalry, courage and pride. The Swedes are extraordinarily sensitive to any damage to this characteristic. Their restlessness is rash. Not even the strongest power in Europe thinks of imposing on us a world outlook which is not our own and does not correspond to the character of our people. And just as little as we have the Anglo-Saxons anything to fear from the German *Weltanschauung*, whose extermination, as they say, is their noblest war aim, even if shrouded in mist and shadow.

The Finnish writer quoted above says of the Swedish Empire, whose presumed first emergence he places in the 7th century: "It may be argued that its emergence ushered in the founding period in Europe's history, when the system of states which, on the whole, has remained dominant for more than a thousand years in spite of some change, first began to take shape."

When Europe's leading men approach the gigantic work of reconstruction and reorganization of Europe after the end of the war, it is important to remember that there is a country in our far north which led the way when, almost a millennium and a half ago, the then prevailing disorderly conditions and the undisciplined tribes had to be transformed into incipient state systems. And to go forward a millennium in time: No one played a more significant role in the later course of the Thirty Years' War than Gustav II Adolf and his Imperial Chancellor Oxenstierna.

It must not be considered presumptuous to think highly of one's fatherland. For my part, I cherish the hot hope that in the reconstruction of Europe a great, responsible task will be entrusted to the old, proven Reich.

## 11. AMERICAN IMPERIALISM



## AND AMERICAN-ANGLO WAR AIMS

In August 1941 Churchill and Roosevelt met on the Atlantic to discuss their common war aims. They laid them down in eight points, reminiscent of Wilson's Fourteen Points, which also sounded seductive and later so bitterly disappointed.

The first of the eight points was, "Neither Great Britain nor the United States shall seek to enlarge their territory." Roosevelt's base policy already contradicts the substance of this point.

Point 2 reads, "Neither country desires territorial changes inconsistent with the freely expressed demands of the peoples themselves." What became of Wilson's right of self-determination of peoples, we know. We learned how the drafters of the second point of the Atlantic Declaration themselves dealt with it when, a few weeks after it, England occupied western Iran with its oil wells and the strip of land separating the northwestern coast of the Persian Gulf from the oil region of Baku. Since the days of Tyernyajeff, Kauffmann, Skobelev, and Komaroff - names denoting the steady advance of Russian power through Turanian and Iranian lands on the way to India - England has had a panic terror of Russia's desire for the southern access to the world's sea, the Indian Ocean. Now they have invited this dreaded Russia to cooperate in Iran! Enthusiastically, the Russians agreed. Whether Shah Riza Pehlevi and his people were asked to what extent the "territorial change", which was imposed on the country with weapons of war, was in accordance with their wishes.

is in accordance with the wishes and demands of the people?

The recently concluded three-power treaty between England, Russia and Iran is only a euphemistic mask. In fact, supremacy and force have overridden the will of the Iranian people.

European countries are also falling into the same disregard for their rights. At the end of January 1942, the "Washington Post" declared without regard to the Atlantic Declaration on Iceland: in the future world construction as envisioned by the U.S. and England, the sovereignty of small states will be impossible. The London "Daily Express" of January 28, 1942, reports that Roosevelt, when informed of the protest of the Irish President de Valera against the landing of American troops in Ulster, the British province of Northern Ireland, had only one word for it: "Really?"

In the third point, Roosevelt and Churchill assert that under all circumstances they would respect the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government. For two years, in England and later in the United States, the most important war objective has been to destroy Hitler and eradicate National Socialism. It seems that both statesmen forgot this when they agreed on the Atlantic to protect the right of all peoples to determine their own form of government. And what about the French who lived in French Somaliland as workers, engineers, settlers and merchants? They already had a famine in August 1941, at the time of the Atlantic Declaration, which increased mortality, namely from scurvy, to twelve times the usual rate. No French ship carrying food or medicines has been able to enter the port of Djibouti, which is blockaded by the English. There is, however, an English hospital ship lying there with all the means that could save the sick and the

Hungry could save, and other ships with provisions. The moment the unfortunate French abandon their allegiance to Marshal Pétain and Vichy and join General de Gaulle, all that is before their eyes and of which they are in such dire need is at the disposal of the shut-ins. Nor does the war justify such a measure, which goes far beyond the siege of a city. Least of all should it be applied by those who supposedly protect the right of all peoples to determine their own form of government.

In the fourth point, Roosevelt and Churchill promise to endeavor, in the discharge of their own obligations, to give all peoples, great and small, victors and vanquished, access on equal terms to the world's trade and to the earth's raw materials necessary for their economic prosperity. It is difficult to trust powers which in 1919 deprived Germany of her flourishing colonies. Free access to world trade and sources of raw materials was blocked by the Anglo-Saxons. Meanwhile, whole peoples starved, and

unemployment with all its sad consequences prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic.

The fifth point contains the desire for economic cooperation among peoples and the promise of better working conditions, general progress and social security. To this point the statesmen were driven, not by their own social consciences, but because a new social order was demanded by English circles thinking beyond the war to the coming peace.

The sixth point sounds beautifully like a siren's lullaby: "After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, we hope to be able to establish a peace which will enable all peoples to dwell in safety within their own borders, which will give them the assurance that they can live their lives free from fear and want."

What did the borders look like that were drawn in Central Europe in 1919 without regard to national and ethnic cohesion? They gave no security and no life free from fear and want; they led to hatred and hostility and brought hardship and misery to countless numbers. And the Germany of 1918, so shamefully deceived, was not a "Nazi" Germany.

After the First World War, one of Wilson's main demands was for freedom of the seas, which the British opposed. In his book on the World War, Churchill thanked Lloyd George for his steadfastness on this issue. The words "freedom of the seas" are also absent from the Treaty of Versailles. And now, in the seventh point, under Churchill's co-editing, "freedom of the seas" reappears from the Atlantic billows! And this at the time when the President is calling the British fleet the first line of defense of the United States, and England is abusing the blockade in the form of a total embargo on trade, affecting not only belligerents but neutrals as well, to extort its political ends.

Former American President Hoover, who earned merit before taking office by feeding children in Europe

after World War I, has repeatedly tried to bring American foodstuffs to Europe in the present war, but has failed because of British rigidity. Only to Poland did such reach in the first year of the war, and there are a number of American testimonies to the effect that the German occupation authorities, civilian and military, not only did not inhibit the American distribution agencies, but facilitated their task. The American testimonies explicitly demonstrate that all donated food reached only those for whom it was intended. Nevertheless, the British claimed that food donated for the civilian population in Europe would

would make warfare easier for the Germans, who would then be able to bring food produced on European soil into Germany. For the last time, Hoover proposed on Radio New York on October 21, 1941, that Americans help the occupied territories in Europe. Sending food for forty million starving women and children could not have a determining influence on military decisions, he said, because Germany could not be starved. This was also the view of the military experts. The majority in the House of Representatives, 37 Senators and more than 600 associations in the USA. spoke out in favor of this aid. Hoover proposed shipment to neutral Sweden and distribution of food under the supervision of the Swedish government.

On February 21, 1942, American ex-ambassador Hugh Gibson had an article appear in the "Saturday Evening Post" advocating a change in the food blockade. Gibson had supported Hoover in previous child feeding operations, so knows the issue well, blames England, but does not absolve the United States of responsibility. He emphasizes that the Germans were loyally fulfilling the obligation they had assumed to deliver food sent to prisoners of war in Germany. He says that it is a lack of logic to nevertheless not send food to foreign friends, that is, to the civilian population of European countries. Gibson correctly asks, "Are we not thereby unwittingly aiding our enemies in the establishment of a new Europe, united in distrust, bitterness, and antipathy as a result of our attitude toward us?"

The blame for the starvation of countries which, before the war, were dependent on food imports from above the sea because of their economic system and insufficient supplies of their own, thus falls first and

foremost on

see, thus falls primarily on Great Britain, but secondarily on Roosevelt. Unlike Hoover, who spoke only as a private citizen, he could have forced the English to change their regulations for the benefit of the needy, if he were serious about his desire to save mankind from the fear of want. Thus it came about that the European émigré governments in London, as well as their representatives in Washington and New York, led a good life, while the peoples for whose future they were supposedly working, and for whom they wanted to have taken upon themselves "the martyrdom of exile," fell into the bitterest misery if they were not taken care of by the German military and occupation authorities.

In February 1942, the Secretary of State in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare again claimed that Germany was responsible for Greece's inadequate food situation. The Germans had gone so far as to seize for themselves food sent to Greece by the Italians. In reality, the present food shortage in Greece has causes for which Britain alone, not Germany and Italy, is to blame:

Greece's food situation was first threatened by the British occupation. The 65,000 British and Empire troops brought there were fed largely from the country's supplies, since Britain even then did not have enough shipping space to ensure that these troops were fed by overseas supplies. When the British were defeated in Greece and Crete and left the country in flight, they destroyed all supplies in accordance with the principle of the "scorched earth" policy<sup>2</sup> already applied in France and Belgium.

For the evacuation of Greece, the British held themselves harmless against the Greek merchant fleet. The Greek merchant ships not already sailing under British charter were seized by the British government. Thus, the Greek people were not only deprived of all transportation space for food from outside, but also deprived of their most important source of income. For their escape from Greece and Crete, the British requisitioned all the vehicles of the Greek coastal shipping, the fishing fleets down to the cutter and rowing boat. This made it impossible to supply the population with fish, which play a major role in the Greek diet.

All attempts by expatriate Greeks to help their beleaguered homeland by sending food were prevented by the British government, especially by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Greece was declared a blockade area in its entirety. For example, Australian wheat stored in Alexandria, purchased for Greece and already paid for, could not be brought there, although expatriate Greeks had undertaken to provide shipping space.

The British government, after these facts became known, and apparently under pressure from the Greek government-in-exile in London, finally agreed to the transportation of love offerings by the Red Crescent, the Turkish Red Cross. However, a Turkish steamer chartered for these purposes ran aground under mysterious circumstances even before it had brought its cargo to Greece. Further efforts by the Turkish Crescent were systematically sabotaged by Raphael, the former Greek ambassador to Ankara, who was under British guard. On his orders, for example, the Greek consul general in Istanbul refused to release Greek shipping space lying there for Turkish use.

Greek shipping space for Turkish love shipments to Greece.

These are the real circumstances of the Greek hardships. The fact is that the food situation in Greece would be far worse if Germany and Italy had not repeatedly helped the Greek people out of their own stocks. This has been repeatedly acknowledged by the Greek side. The English claim that the troops of the Axis in Libya were supplied from Greece has already been dispelled because the English keep emphasizing that they are in complete control of at least the eastern Mediterranean. Starvation is not a means of the Germans, but the classic means of British policy and its warfare.

The last point of the Atlantic peace program is: the "aggressor" powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, are to be disarmed to the last pistol and subjected to a kind of police control of the "peace-loving" powers. The

latter will retain the right to remain armed on land, at sea and in the air, in order to be able to strike immediately if one of the other three shows the slightest intention to attack. A world peace built on the basis of two camps, one of completely disarmed powers, the other of states armed to the teeth, would not be peace. It would be a latent state of war, creating a situation of permanent tension. On the one side fear and insolence, on the other a humiliated force, suppressed by force, living and growing in longing for the day when the hour of justice will strike.

Neither in England nor in America did the return of the two leaders of the state evoke any feelings of gratitude or enthusiasm. In England, it had been hoped that Churchill would bring with him the promise of the U.S. to enter the

enter the war. But the Prime Minister came back empty-handed.

How well I remember the balmy April evening in Washington in 1923, when I went for a walk with my landlady, the amiable wife of the Swedish envoy. We passed the White House. Inside, the President, Warren Gamaliel Harding, was planning his upcoming trip to Alaska. His life was to last only four months, and after his death, secrets were discovered that would cast dark shadows over his time in office.

We continued on our way to the dark house where ex-President Woodrow Wilson lived. No people, no guards were to be seen. No light came out of the windows. Only one room was dimly lit. "This is Wilson's sick room," my companion said. Inside, the man was waiting to die. Only four years before he had held the weal and woe of the whole world in his hand; in the hour when he could save the world and prevent a new war, he had failed in his calling. The dull light that fell on the street made an oppressive impression. No room in the world was the site of deeper tragedy than this, where Wilson sat, morose and broken, sick in body and mind, listening to the voices of time, far from the course of events that ran on in ways he had not been able to block.

And again a President of the United States had left his country to consult with one of his allies. He, too, was presented with a single opportunity to save a world that had gone astray as a result of Wilson's inadequacy. But he went further than his predecessor. Wilson had called for general disarmament.

Roosevelt and Churchill had from the outset

from the outset that only the powers which they determined had to disarm.

When Churchill and Roosevelt next met, the die was cast, the United States was at war, and Churchill came to American territory this time to spur the finally all-won confederate to greater exertion and to haste.

Whatever was stated as the war aims of the Allies, 1914 to 1918, could be reduced to the short formula: Destruction of Germany. The French government's note to Secretary of State Lansing of November 28, 1918, put it brutally, for there was no need to worry about whitewashing after Germany and her allies had laid down their arms: "To impose peace preliminaries on Germany without discussion in order to promote the disintegration of the countries of which she is composed." Another war aim was the overthrow of the German form of government.

The same demand was made as a wartime objective immediately after the British declaration of war on Germany in 1914 and was maintained even after the Führer's declaration, which included a peace offer to the Western powers after the campaign in Poland had ended. Only three men known beyond the island have had the courage to disagree. Lloyd George is dissatisfied with the British government's rejection of the German move and advocates a conference involving the United States. Adolf Hitler had already raised some points for discussion, he said, such as disarmament, the colonies, the Polish state. England was free to propose other points for discussion. Nothing would be lost with such a conference, but much could be gained. The Irish poet Bernard Shaw declared the so-called English war aim of partitioning Germany to be nonsense, adding,

that if England should win, it would mean a new Versailles, but a worse one, and moreover a new war in twenty years. The English writer and historian Arthur Bryant, an advisory member of the British Council, declared that it was fundamentally wrong to say categorically that war was being waged to establish a different system of government in Germany. A few months later, the British military writer Captain B. H. Liddell Hart took up the same theme, writing in February 1940, "To say nothing more to the Germans than that the war will go on until the Nazis are destroyed would certainly be ineffective. We must create in Britain a new order suitable for adoption by foreign countries and superior in kind and appeal to the Nazi order."

A year later, in April 1941, the monthly Nineteenth Century comes up with a proposal that goes beyond the Versailles plans: "The obligation to restore Polish independence must be honored, although it does not follow that Poland's future frontiers must coincide with its frontiers until the outbreak of war." But independence alone will not suffice. Poland must become strong enough to defend its independence. This it can do only if it possesses East Prussia and Danzig, so that it has a sufficient sea coast and naval and air bases from which it can strike blows against Germany with immediate effect. It must also obtain Upper Silesia so that it has a sufficient war industry and can establish a solid industrial base for the planned political and economic union with Czecho-Slovakia now under discussion. It has proved its aptitude for naval warfare (!) and must be enabled to dominate the Baltic. A lasting peace will leave Britain in unchallengeable

domination of the North Sea and will give her permanent unimpeded access to the Baltic. ... This must be achieved at any cost to spare mankind a third world war."

The decisive factor in the attitude of the British government was what the then Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain again proclaimed: "What stands in the way of a peace settlement is the German government."

This negative assertion was not enough for the English people, and the great questioning about the aims for which the war was being carried on began anew. Lord Halifax, then Foreign Secretary and now Ambassador to Washington, tried to give it ig3g in a radio speech on November 7, in which he said that the new world England was seeking to realize would involve the cooperation of all peoples on the basis of equality, self-respect, and compatibility of mankind. England would have to find means of combining necessary revisions in a continually changing world with safeguarding against disturbances of the general peace by the use of force. Had England realized these aims before ig3g, this war would never have occurred.

A few days after the Halifax speech, the English reply note to the mediation proposals of King Leopold of Belgium and Queen Wilhelmina of Holland went off, and it was followed by Winston Churchill's broadcast speech as an explanation to the English people. The official reply was tortuous and consisted of general formulas. The radio speech, however, was short and hard: "This war is an English war, and its object is the destruction of Germany." The Daily Mail punctuated it by saying, "Discussion of war aims is useless; the only thing we have to do is to destroy Germany."

It would be well if those who lay all the blame for the war

on Germany, would remember that German orators and statesmen never set up England's destruction as a war aim or desire, but that the Führer himself emphasized that the fall of the British Empire would be a calamity for all mankind.

After the fall of Norway, Holland and Belgium, the demand for the fulfillment of war aims intensified. After the fall of France, however, it remained silent about them, because England had enough to do with the defense of the island and the mobilization of American help.

Quietly, however, there was a growing realization outside government circles that England was not

likely to emerge from the new war in the status quo ante. Some began to shake the old institutions. H.G. Wells, in "The New World Order," sets out a series of universal human rights to be included in future peace treaties, concluding her enumeration with the question, "And if we, the virtuous democracies, do not fight for these ordinary human rights – what, in the name of the Nobility and Gentry, the Crown, the High Church, the City, the Times, and the Army-and-Navy Club, are we ordinary British mortals fighting for?"

The "High Church" and the Free Churches are also beginning to concern themselves with the war aims. Fortunately, they are not concerned with the usually often proclaimed reorganization at the enemy, but with that of their own institutions. They condemn the profit system, demand a new social order in which the nation's natural resources and other great sources of help can no longer be the private property of a few, demand greater participation of the broad masses in public life, in parliament, local councils, trade unions and other institutions for public welfare. These goals were made very clear at the meeting of British and some

The results of this conference should not be forgotten when the longed-for day comes when the guns are silent.

Writers, scientists, educators, all with illustrious names even abroad, form committees to study and proclaim the reorganization of England and its effects on the rest of the world. Thus one appeal says: "Today the only possible course is to throw the old system overboard. We must replace the ideal of the 'economic man' with that of the 'social man,' that of an 'individualistic competitive society' with that of an 'organized and united community.' We must think of the state as a positive instrument of service in all those fields where individual direction is insufficient or leads to chaos."

On the important question of discussing war aims, it is interesting to note that voices are being raised from Great Britain which sound much less imperialistic than those from the United States. In addition to the oft-repeated British battle cry, "Destroy Hitler and Germany," there are also voices which state clearly that at the end of this war a new England must arise which will give to the small and poor rights of life which they have not hitherto possessed. "The men, the working women, the boys and girls who are making such great sacrifices, have a right to ask the Government, 'What is your policy for the future of our country, and what do you guarantee us in compensation for our sufferings?'" It is the government's duty to answer: 'We guarantee you certain living conditions that you did not know before.' ... It will raise the morale of the people if they know that they are fighting for things that really mean something to them and that will give them the enthusiasm with which they achieve success in war." This

said the Scottish member of the House of Commons, J. J. Davidson. "The New Statesman and Nation," one of the oldest and most influential of British periodicals, summed up the question as follows: "There is a section of public opinion to which the war aims are very near – the masses in London and the other cities who have bitter things to endure without any definite prospect that the end of the war will mean at the same time the end of the system which has condemned them to slums, poverty and war. The most urgent war objective is social change at home during the war. We doubt the possibility of purely military conquest. The hope in this war—the only hope from our point of view—lies in the discontent and eventual revolt of the oppressed peoples throughout the world. If that is to occur and work favorably for us—the sooner we make it clear that we are leading this revolt, the sooner our task will be possible."

Another liberal English weekly, Time and Tide, echoes the elder sister's call by saying, "If the foundation stones of the new world we want to build are not properly laid now, it is only too likely that they will not be laid at all."

Comparing these voices with statements of Churchill, one sees that among the English people there is a far deeper, more reasonable and humane conception of the world situation, and a clearer view of the

social requirements of the future than is shown by the man who has promised his people only blood, sweat and tears.

In the United States the discussion of American war aims was already in full swing when the war itself was still opposed by 80 to 90 percent of the population. That the American war aim, although one does not want to admit it, is so strongly imperialistically determined is not surprising outside the United States. My compatriot

mann Rudolf Kjellen wrote in the second edition of his book "The Great Powers and the World Crisis" as early as 1921: "In heart and in reality, the great Union today no longer recognizes any limit to its 'responsibility' - as the catchword for imperialism is here - whatever abstemious words its statesmen may wear on their lips. Indeed, the contrast between words and deeds is stronger in America than anywhere else. Nowhere do we hear more resounding assurances of love for peace and for the freedom of others, nowhere such self-denial that we are not like the 'publicans' across the sea with their mendacious diplomacy and militarism. But if we combine the individual traits of this great empire into a unified picture, we can hardly make any other distinction between the great power of the New World and the great powers of the Old than that of the stage of development. With Hawaii, Portoriko, Guam, Philippines, Tutuila as dinghies behind its great ship and with Cuba, Panama, San Domingo, Nicaragua behind it in the fairway, the Union before the world war showed itself in the same shape as England, although the latter's dinghies are so incomparably much more numerous and in part so tremendously much larger. Here, then, in spite of all declarations to the contrary, we are confronted with a quite pure revelation of the will to great power which underlies every genuine great power life. The fate of nations is in fact shaped with even less consciousness than that of individuals. With averted or blindfolded eyes, as it were, America's great Union has now also embarked on the path of imperialism. Thus also the Monroe Doctrine, which still flutters as a flag over foreign policy, should appear in its real value for the popular conception. It is a mirror in which a nation of 100 million sees its own greatness and its world-historical tasks. It is not the doctrine that creates

growth, but growth transforms the doctrine. Thus, a formula for America's unique position could be transformed into a cover for its overseas expansion of power. But to the same extent that the light falls more clearly on the path, the people also become willing to take upon themselves the practical consequences of such doctrine - be they even militarism and anti-democracy." Kjellen captured very well the basic attitude of the two English-speaking countries since the First World War.

The President of the United States, at the beginning of his third term on January 6, 1961, set forth American wishes for the making of peace in the now famous "Four Freedoms": Freedom of Speech, of Religion, from Fear, and from Want. After all, there are other influential representatives of American public opinion whose realism is greater through experience than faith in these beautiful promises. Thus the "Saturday Evening Post" wrote on March 22, 1941: "The world we now take upon ourselves to save is one we have imagined."

Otherwise, however, American desires contain a great deal of unconcern, selfishness, and what Americans themselves call the "save-the-world complex"-just imperialism. Just take Henry R. Luce, the editor of the great magazines "Life," "Time," "Fortune," who says in his much commented essay "The American Century": "Even if Britain should from time to time proclaim war aims, Americans are free to advocate them effectively or not. On the other hand, if America were to proclaim war aims, Britain would almost certainly adopt them, and the whole world, including Adolf Hitler, would take them up as the battle cry of that struggle." Luce continues, "In 1919 we had a golden opportunity, unprecedented in world history, to assume the leadership of the world. ... We did not grasp it; Wilson started it wrong. In any case, we did not take advantage of it. But the opportunity remained, preserved. In the twenties we bungled it, and in the confusion of the thirties we killed it. ...

With all our help, we must succeed under Roosevelt in what Wilson failed. ... It is up to America to determine whether the system of 'free play of forces' - an economic order compatible with freedom and progress - shall prevail in this century or not. The vision of America as the chief guarantor of freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the powerful leader of world trade, carries with it the possibility of such enormous human progress as to make one dizzy. ... Each and every one of us, to the fullest extent of our vision, is called upon to create the first American century."

Anyone who reads American newspapers and magazines regularly knows that people other than Henry R. Luce are obsessed with this "vision" of an "American Century" and the role of the American President as "President of the World." Only a few years ago, no one in the States believed that the time might one day come when the possibility of a shift of world hegemony from British to American shoulders would occur. There was still a sense of revolt against British world domination in the words, written not long ago, of an American newspaper veteran, William Hard: "We were to be stokers and machinists

in the boiler room of the British ship of state, while all the deck officers and steersmen were British, plus a British captain to guide the ship to a purely British destination." The transition of hegemony from the Eastern to the Western Hemisphere began with the exchange of fifty old American Navy destroyers for valuable British possessions in the Western Hemisphere that the British fleet no longer felt it could no longer protect. From this step, which was followed by many similar ones that are in everyone's memory, certain spokesmen of the United States began to feel that they had paved the way for the American Century. This hyper-imperialist war aim no longer has much to do with the war in Europe and the reasons that led to it.

It would be tempting at this point to say more about the first goal of the American imperialists, of which the president himself is the spokesman. This objective is called: inheritance of the British Empire, or in sober words: the establishment of American world domination. A large group has rallied around Clarence Streit, author of the books "Union Now" and "Union Now With Britain," for the preparation of this goal. The publicist Henry R. Luce, quoted earlier, his wife, Clare Boothe, and Dorothy Thompson are among the pioneers of this American world domination, which understandably has few supporters in Britain. Miss Thompson has summed up the imperialistic aims of the United States in such a union in the brief formula: "We don't want to join the British Empire, Britain must join us."

The course of history will show what will become of the self-conscious and imperialistic war aims of the United States. Perhaps later they will be found only in the casualty lists in which already, a few months since President Roosevelt has been waging the war he conjured up, there are so many names of once proud American ships, squadrons of aircraft, tanks and tankers, sources of raw materials, banks and trading houses, to say nothing of the names of American sons sent to fight an overseas war.

The influence on South America also characterizes the imperialism of the United States and its President. Earlier I mentioned the pressure exerted by the North Americans on the states of the southern half of the continent at Panama City and Havana. This was but a prelude to the Rio de Janeiro conference in January 19/12, its course reminiscent of the telegram President Wilson sent to the neutral states after America's entry into the war in the spring of 1917 to induce them to break off their relations with the Central Powers. The manly rejection of this request by the neutrals, chief among them Sweden, is well known. Roosevelt did exactly the same thing not by telegram but through his agent, Sumner Welles. The South American states, with few exceptions, have succumbed to the pressure exerted at Rio, as they did before to American inflammatory propaganda against the Axis powers. One day they will realize that they fell into the very real one of total dependence on their North American neighbors for fear of alleged dangers. Then it will be of little comfort to them that President Roosevelt assured the representatives of the Pan-American Union in Washington on April 10, 1942,



that they would have a decisive say in the shaping of peace after the war was over, "when the Axis is defeated."

## 12. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE TWELFTH HOUR

In November 1941, "The New Yorker" magazine made a somewhat bitter joke about current events: "The Government has just circulated a notebook designed to give information on how the \$56 billion initially earmarked for rearmament will be spent. At least no one can say that we are getting into the war on a free ticket."

No, no one can say that. The United States has poured endless sums into the war and its preparation. In February 1942, the figure of \$143 billion was announced. The American press calculated that this sum was only one billion dollars less than the total American national income for 1939 and 1940 combined. New amounts have since been appropriated, and the figures are too high for their significance to be understood, especially in countries with modest national budgets. It is like the stars, whose distance in light years is of interest only to astronomers, but means nothing to the ordinary citizen of the earth. The amount of armament expenditures, however, does mean something to the ordinary American citizen, for he must pay for them out of his income in the form of taxes or by a substantial reduction in his standard of living as a result of the increased prices.

The Under Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. indicated in his press conference of January 30, 1941, that the total of distribution expenditures authorized up to June 30, 1942, would exceed the paying power of the

digungsausgaben exceeded the country's ability to pay. In January 1942 an English newspaper from New York reported that the President himself had given intimations that the deficit for the fiscal year 1942-43 would result in some \$33 billion as against a recent (that is, probably before the outbreak of war) estimate of less than \$13 billion through June 30, 1943.

The Administrator of the Federal Bonds, Jesse H. Jones, wrote as early as February 28, 1941: "As an inevitable consequence of the tremendous program before us, the national debt will assume staggering proportions, implying a heavy interest burden for years to come. Interest on a \$65 billion debt would be nearly \$1.7 billion at current low rates."

The concern of Mr. Jesse H. Jones sounds strange when one hears from America that voices are being raised there to summon those hitherto responsible for war production before a committee of inquiry. That would be William S. Knudsen and Jesse H. Jones, who, it is reported, out of a hunger for power suppressed more capable people, slowed down production and made it more expensive. In doing so, they imposed great costs and taxes on the people and also damaged the national defense. Knudsen and especially Jones are also said to have granted unreasonably high prices to friendly factories and corporations. In the weekly New Republic, Michael Straight wrote, "When people like Jesse H. Jones" (from Roosevelt's inner circle of confidence) "remain in power, the tragic loss of Hawaii will shrink to insignificance in comparison with the manufacturing disaster. The great task of material procurement must be placed immediately in the hands of a responsible production authority, otherwise victory is unthinkable."

This was also done by the appointment of Mr. Donald Nelson. But already one hears that he did not prevail against Mr. Knudsen with his procedure of giving orders especially to small and medium-sized plants which would otherwise have to be shut down in large numbers. The latter again awarded giant contracts to a few firms in February 1942. For example, General Motors are to undertake the construction of 40 percent of all aircraft engines for the Army supply, 25 percent of all tanks, half of all trucks, half of all machine guns, and half of all diesel engines for the war fleet.

One would remind President Roosevelt of his speech at Chautauqua on August 14, 1936, barely three months before his second election, in which he said, "Industrial and agricultural production for a war market may make a few people rich quick; to the nation as a whole it brings misfortune. Now, if war should break out again on another continent, let us face openly the fact that thousands of Americans would be found at home, who, in addition to get rich quick – fool's gold – would try to break or circumvent our neutrality. To resist the clamor of this greed when war comes, we will need the unwavering support of all Americans who love peace."

Mr. Donald Nelson has been a director of a corporation whose chairman of the board is General Robert C. Wood, once chairman of the now defunct American First Committee. Wood's knowledge of economics is therefore particularly good, and the interview which the "San Francisco Examiner" carried of him on January 12, 1941, is worthy of note: "Already the national debt is \$50 billion. At the tremendous cost of warfare today, they would skyrocket to from 100 to 150 billion at the conclusion of a war. Victorious or defeated – at the

At the end of such a war we would have to reckon with great economic shifts: the rich would face a levy of wealth, the middle classes impoverishment, and the masses loss of all their social gains. In other words, complete collapse and dictatorship."

That the difficulties so far are only the beginning of a much more serious situation after the war, Democratic Senator Robert E. Reynolds said in a speech early in 1961: "When the war is over, whether we go along or not, we will pay the price for our own indulgence, for the lifting of the arms embargo. Thousands of factories now producing war materials will shut down overnight, and millions of American workers will be thrown out on the streets jobless."

This gloomy picture of the future is not too blackly painted when one remembers that even before the war Roosevelt failed to eliminate unemployment. For the time being it is diminished by the huge expansion of the armaments industry. There is even a counter-problem as a result, namely the shortage of skilled workers. As early as December 1940, three to thirty times the number of available workers was wanted for a whole range of specialized work. This, too, is an issue unknown in European countries, at least the Nordic ones, with their training methods.

Those who now have work in the United States, in view of the armament fever, are in some cases already earning higher wages than before. But higher wages bring with them the danger of inflation and shortages of necessities.

The "Saturday Evening Post" wrote on April 12, 1941: "There will be more money in people's hands to buy than

ever before. But at the same time there will be less to buy. And the result? Prices must rise if they are not controlled. The rising prices can of course

of any commodity. The high and middle income people can still meet their needs by paying more, but for the poor it is hard."

How prices had risen even before the outbreak of war was disclosed by Mrs. Roosevelt herself, on the basis of her own investigations, in the "New York World Telegram." From the end of 1940 to the end of 1961 the prices of white bread increased by 5, potatoes by 14, butter by 27, eggs by 26, milk by 13, coffee by 2.4, ham by 35, sugar and flour by 18 each, cheese by 27, fat by 57 percent. Meat was up as much as 100 percent, according to a report from Meat Central Chicago. Price increases were also reported for all articles of clothing, shoes, furniture, woolen bedspreads, dishes, and almost all other articles of daily use. Since the onset of the war, prices have continued to rise.

The rise in prices is even more palpable to the consumer because it is accompanied by an increase in taxes, which must cover Rüstungsausgaben.

In March 1942, Chancellor Morgenthau drafted a new tax program that dwarfs anything that has gone

before. It provided for an increase in tax revenue for 1942 of \$8145000000 to \$20 billion.

In addition, excise taxes on automobiles, radios, iceboxes were added for the first time already in the fall of 1941. The middle class will thus bear the brunt.

In the meantime, the manufacture of private automobiles has been completely banned, since all car factories produce war material. Likewise, gasoline, except for army vehicles, is available only for doctors and for trips important to the general public. This truly represents a revolution in American life! It was also necessary because the United States lost all its rubber supplies from the Dutch Indies and British Malaya.

One of the most serious consequences of economic disruption

by a war will always be inflation. Morgenthau said at the beginning of the American war that the country had two wars to fight, one against the external enemy, one against inflation. Attempts are being made to counter inflation by strict price controls, initially on farm products. Bernard M. Baruch, Wilson's and Roosevelt's financial advisor, wants to combine it with a wage freeze and further increase taxes. In a speech a few months before entering the war, he said, among other things: "Price control means regimentation, but there is no other way. As long as wages are rapidly goods become scarcer, more money is offered for fewer goods, the danger of inflationary prices is just around the corner. Purchasing power must be curtailed by increased taxes, and the government must borrow from individuals rather than from banks to accomplish the same purpose and at least protect fixed salaries. If at the end of the war the low prices are not held, we may win the war, but we shall lose the peace."

The Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau warns especially the farmers against price increases of their products, and "New York Herald Tribune" of September 21, 1941 writes to this that if an inflation falls upon a country as rich as the U.S.A., the name of the man who had been Secretary of the Treasury at that time would go down in history with the same condemnation sentence that had hit Necker and the others responsible for the assignats during the French Revolution. Unfortunately, he said, there was no unity in the Cabinet because the Secretary of Agriculture, Wickard, in order to endear himself to the farmers, was pursuing a contrary policy.

In March 1942, President Roosevelt himself addressed the farmers, imploring them to take up the fight against the impending danger of inflation, whose horrors he detailed, without being able to give a remedy against them. When he exclaims: "I wish someone would find a better word for the term 'inflation,'" he himself knows that the danger will not be averted. But he feels that the word alone is a looming specter.

The financial writer Leslie Gould wrote the warning as early as January 1941: "Upswing, inflation, decline, another upswing and a final decline. Defense will cost billions of dollars. War material is much more expensive today than in 1917. It will mean hard work, sacrifice, and heavy tax burdens for all the people."

"Friday" magazine carried an essay on May 24- 1940, even before the England Aid Act, which contains thoughts that apply today. It is entitled "Whom Does War Benefit?" and reads, "In the last war there were more than 8 million dead and over 21 million wounded and crippled, but in return - in the United States alone and in the one year 1917 - 18000 new millionaires. In the same year, the profits of almost 70 American companies increased by 300 percent. At the same time, real wages fell considerably as food prices rose 50 to 100 percent during the war period. It has often been said (there is, in fact, almost unanimity on this point) that the main reason for America's entry into the World War was that American industry had acquired such a claim to Allied victory, such a vested interest in a British-French victory, that it could not afford Allied defeat. Largely for this reason 126000 Americans have fallen and 234300 have been wounded in the short span of our participation in this war which was to put an end to

the war which was to secure the world for democracy. ... Already in 1917 we had so great a financial interest in the war that Walter Hines Page, the American ambassador to England, telegraphed President Wilson on March 5: 'The pressure of the approaching financial crisis now exceeds the capacity of the commitment of the House of Morgan to the British and French governments. ... It is not improbable that the only way to maintain our excellent trading position and avoid a panic is to declare war on Germany.' And just before that, Wilson had been elected under the slogan 'he kept us out of the war.'

"While a few are raking in fat profits and thereby mortgaging the future of the entire American people, two-thirds of all American families, according to official statistics, have an annual income of \$825, although the minimum income of a family of four, at least in the cities, must be \$1216 if it is to remain healthy. In New York, the richest state, the average monthly wage last year was \$92, although a family of five needs \$215 a month to live healthily and decently (according to the United States Department of Labor). The average annual income in 1937 in the Southern states was only \$314.

"In a sense, the question is: What do the American people want to spend their money on - life or death? A battleship, for example, costs \$80 million. For a single such ship, some 125785 people could receive the annual benefit of \$636. 700000 workers have been laid off from the job creation program this spring, and 1250000 eligible people are desperately waiting to be accepted because they cannot find free work. Instead, 51 warships are planned, at a total cost of \$1082 million. With this money, 1707257 unemployed could be paid a year's support."

That all these figures are not exaggerated was confirmed by Roosevelt, though in different words, when he declared that one third of the population of the U.S.A., the richest country in the world, is poorly housed, poorly clothed and poorly fed. These words of Roosevelt are confirmed by Senator Paul V. McNutt, director of the Federal Security Board, the great social security system created by Roosevelt. He expressed in May 1941: "Forty-five million men, women, and children in the United States are deprived of the food which we know is most essential to the maintenance of health."

The pronouncements of the two men called in the first place to pass judgment on the social conditions of the American people are underscored by reports of American officials called upon to assess the health of young Americans being drafted into the Army. Even the New York newspaper "P. M.," for all its enthusiasm for the entry into the war, cannot conceal its concern, writing on April 28, 1941, about the examinations at Lower Manhattan Hospital: "It was a sad spectacle. ... We saw young people of 25 who looked like forty-year-olds, and others with such an undeveloped figure that they seemed to have barely outgrown infancy. The flower of American youth! ... About 40 per cent of those examined had to be rejected, and another 30 per cent were of limited fitness on account of physical defects. ... There can be little doubt that the slums, that decades of depression, the adverse consequences of too long compulsory unemployment, poor nutrition, inadequate medical and other health care, or even the impossibility of obtaining

to avail themselves of such services from their own resources, have their share in it."

Despite these conditions, at the beginning of November 1941 the head of the food department of the Federal Social Office declared that food aid for the needy would have to be discontinued during the winter because the surpluses from which it was provided had disappeared, with the exception of wheat. In May, the distribution of discounted butter for the less fortunate had already been discontinued because the surplus had been sent to England.

The picture presented by the economy of the richest country in the world before the official entry into the war was thus thoroughly unpleasant. However, the situation was much more serious after America's entry into the war, because now the dependence of the United States on raw materials from the rest of the world, especially from the Far East, began to make itself felt. Many efforts are being made to find

substitutes elsewhere and at home, but this will take time, if it can be done at all.

Nor will the gold policy that the United States has pursued for years replace the raw materials it has lost. In the hills of Kentucky,

guarded by American soldiers, lies Fort Knox, and in its underground cellars three-fourths of the gold of the entire world, removed there from Europe. We all know the legend of King Midas from ancient times, to whom everything he touched turned to gold and who finally choked on it. Roosevelt's America is now in the same position, indeed in a worse one, for it conjured up the economic revolution of the world by its hoarding of gold. The widely read American writer Carleton Beals says about it in his book "Pan-America", New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940: "Gold buying did not even save us from the Depression, now it threatens us with the wildest inflation in our history," and "countries that did not own gold found that trade with the United States was made increasingly impossible for them. Gold buying proved to be a weapon against the gold-poor countries of Germany and Italy and, to a lesser extent, Japan long before the outbreak of hostilities on other continents. With it we dealt Germany the hardest blow since Versailles. ... It became necessary for us to attempt to save our two former allies from the revolutionary fate of Russia and Germany. Our gold policy had the effect of a permanent subsidy for them. But in so doing we made the new war only the more inevitable. ... Nothing else in international affairs caused the war so directly as the American policy of buying up gold. ... The golden International of England, as well as that of her former friends, France and the Netherlands, can never be resurrected. Whatever the end of the war, England and France will be forced to remake their economy as a total one, and thus ruthlessly to fight the American economy." It is said that in the United States much emphasis is placed on public opinion. Why has this warning voice been overheard?

Interesting is an article in the American magazine "Time" of January 19, 1942 "If you say it in numbers". The content is in short words: Roosevelt had said that the United States was determined to pay any price for the preservation of the American way of life. The price, he said, was not small, for the latest tax increases amounted to \$7 billion, to which must be added \$2 billion for Social Security. In none of the 1172 pages of the budget did the hard-pressed minds of U.S. taxpayers find a ray of hope - unless they were pleased that \$16,141,525 had been raised.

rejoiced that \$161425 could be saved for the High Commissioner of the Philippines and \$39450 for the leper camps on the island of Guam! The article then makes an equally sharp criticism of Mr. Knudsen's War Production Office, as we heard from elsewhere earlier. It says that he has delayed the conversion of the automobile industry for months, that now it must come suddenly because there is a shortage of rubber, but that in the meantime 400000 workers, for whom no other work has yet been provided, have become breadless; and that there is a strong and understandable tension between workers and employers. Even Mrs. Roosevelt had publicly asked if Mr. Knudsen knew what hunger was, adding verbatim: "The slowness of our leading men, their little foresight, their inability to see what must necessarily come, is to blame for the conditions."

This report dates from January 1942, the first weeks of the war. It will not raise the spirits of those who commented on inquiries published by Fortune magazine in December 1941, that is, at the eleventh hour. The survey included executive and petty clerks, students, farm and factory workers, housewives, unemployed, Negroes. I can report only a few of the results: 69.9 percent of the respondents thought that after the war - and after a victorious war, mind you - people in the United States would have to work more than they have been working up to now; 18 percent hoped that the present working hours would be maintained; only 5 percent hoped for easier times. Among the first group, people from the higher income groups formed the majority. Only 10 percent believed that wages would be higher after the war, but 60.5 percent believed they would be lower. The first group consisted mostly of Negroes

and the unemployed, who could not imagine even lower wages than before. For this one must know that Negroes have to work for starvation wages, especially in the Southern States, although it is contrary to the principles of democracy. Theoretically, they have the same rights as Americans of all ancestries. But only theoretically. They are equal in only one thing, they are also allowed to shed their blood in war. A division consisting only of Negroes has just been raised, and two squadrons of planes with colored crews. The higher officers, however, are white.

Another interesting question in the "Fortune" poll was, "Do you think your son's job prospects will be better or worse than the ones you had?" The magazine had asked the same question once before, in February 1940, and published both results with the addition that only fathers and mothers were asked, no unmarried people. It is distressing to see how much more hopeless parents are now about the future compared with the muted optimism they possessed nearly two years ago, when there was still the prospect that the President would keep them out of the war. Better prospects for the future were still hoped for by 60 percent in 1940 and by only 37 percent at the end of 1941. In 1940 15, in 1941 over 30 per cent of parents thought that their children would have it less good than they. Only 19 per cent, as against 10 per cent two years ago, expected at least the same opportunities for their children as had been offered them. How little does this pessimism fit with the freedoms from fear and want proclaimed by Roosevelt.

The next question is about the duration of the war, and those answering are specifically admonished to think realistically and leave aside empty hopes. As might be expected, 22 percent answered "I don't know." Only 5.9 percent put the influence of the U.S. and only 1.4 percent that of Russia on the duration of the war in the balance.

the scales. Only 5.5 percent foresaw a war lasting less than a year, 14.5 percent a war lasting 1 to 2 years, and more than half of all respondents a much longer one, 37.8 percent of whom were convinced that the war would last 2 to 5 years, and still 9.7 percent that it would last even 5 to 10 years. The "Fortune" editors rightly remarked that the pessimistic views about the postwar period for the U.S. previously reported were influenced by the equally pessimistic ones about the supposed duration of the war, because everyone realized that the longer the war dragged on, the harder it would be to return to a peacetime economy. This, then, was the mood of an average of Americans of various estates in all parts of the country just before the entry into the war, and in contrast to this it does not mean much that a very large majority were hopeful on the question about the prospects of victory for the Allies.

Still important is the question about the mood in the army. Those who were drafted in the summer of 1940 were anything but cheerful when they went into the recruit camps. At that time there was still a provision that married men would be exempt from service, and an unimaginable wave of marriages swept the country. At fast-track weddings before the civil officer, young men and girls were "tying the knot" who had met only a few hours before. When Roosevelt had the term of service increased from 12 to 18 months, still in the peace he claimed to want to preserve, there was serious revolt in the camps, for peacetime conscription was hitherto unknown in the U.S., and the draftees lamented the "lost time."

The means by which the Democratic president achieved his goal was unusual. Shortly before introducing the bill, he sent 58 congressmen, and the very ones whose consent he could not hope to obtain, on a study

to South America, where they could not exercise their right to vote.

Morale, disciplinary as well as moral, in the recruit camps and neighboring institutions was complained of by many serious observers in a number of American journals. Now, in an emergency, American soldiers will certainly prove themselves as well. But they can never fight with the conviction and enthusiasm as the Germans, who sacrifice themselves for the life and liberty of their people. For all the money in the world, Roosevelt cannot create in a few years an army comparable to the German one,

whose training and spirit are based on the tradition of centuries. In spite of all the production figures and money appropriations, the American army was equipped for the maneuvers in the fall of 1918 with machine guns and cannons made of wood, tanks made of cardboard dummies – like the German Reichswehr after the disarmament of 1919. General L. J. McNair declared after the maneuvers that only two divisions were fully ready for war.

The whole army still consisted of 250,000 men in 1940. Now the American "Victory Program" envisages an army strength of 6,745,658 men in 215 divisions for the attack on Germany from the middle of the year. How will Roosevelt train and arm, exercise and drill these so that they can defeat the war-tested armies of Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Finland?

In the present war Germany and her allies have so far always won victories in a surprisingly short time which no one thought possible. The main enemies, Great Britain and Russia, are still resisting bravely and tenaciously. The other enemies have been overrun, even if they were strongly armed.

The people of the United States have often

The people of the United States have often boasted that they are far better informed about what is happening in Europe than the inhabitants of the belligerent countries of Europe, who learn only what their governments permit. But they, the Americans, could hear the unadulterated and unabridged truth from all over the world every hour through their reporters for the press and radio and draw their own conclusions from it. If it were so, they would have had to absorb not only the news pleasant to them, but to hear in equal measure the bitter truths. Among these is an essay by Huss, the longtime correspondent of the International News Service in Berlin, who reported in the February 1942 "Cosmopolitan" on what he had seen in the European theaters of war. According to this report, one thing was certain for the USA: if they wanted to win the war, they would have to get the most out of the American people, both externally and internally. One should not believe that one could lightly fight a "small war" or dream that Germany would be knocked out quickly. Nor would increased bombing bring the Germans to their knees or make revolution themselves. The total war of the 20th century, he said, required equal armies, experience, discipline, sacrifice, and the best leadership. The German soldier "does not tremble in his shoes and throw away his weapons when a khaki-clad soldier Uncle Sam shows himself to him from afar." He also judged of the threatened landing attempts by American troops in Europe, after having had an opportunity to see the German fortifications on the coasts of the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, "that any attempt by the allied nations to land there at any point would end in astronomical loss figures for the aggressor."

Suppose, however, that the battle ends in a draw. Even then, the consequences for America will be incalculable.

be. America must come to terms with the fact that, as Lindbergh once said, she is "strong enough to maintain our own way of life, but not strong enough to impose it on Europe and Asia."

America has failed to recognize that something entirely new is in the making in the Old World, a development that cannot be halted by rigid adherence to the old, and which has also attracted many young minds in America. In the New World, on the other hand, there seems to have been a standstill, a clinging to old concepts, outdated forms and traditional ways of thinking that no longer mean anything to the young generation. What is missing, as one young student put it, is something worth working for, something to long for, for the life of the individual as well as for that of the country.

If the war leads to America's defeat, or only to a drawn outcome, then what concerned voices of the American people are saying would come to pass, representatives in Congress and the Senate, labor leaders and big businessmen, Christian church leaders, World War veterans and youth educators, the youth themselves – and especially their mothers. Then the apocalyptic horsemen will also race across the continent between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, leaving behind the dead, the wounded, the grieving

and the impoverished as victims of the dictatorship of a small power-hungry minority. How many will then be forced to think how differently everything would have turned out if President Roosevelt, from the moment he took office in January 1933, had pursued an opposite policy, the policy of true peace. I have already spoken once of the reconciliation which began to take place between Germany and the United States after the First World War. Respect and friendship were growing. Many Americans had come to realize that the war had done them no good, that the Treaty of Versailles with all its consequences had

with all its consequences had done Germany an injustice that was avenging itself on the whole world. Now a leader seized the helm in Germany who wanted to free his country from these consequences. What could have been more natural than that America, itself deeply disappointed by this treaty, should have offered him its hand, that above all the President, who wanted to save his country from the chaotic economic conditions of the postwar period, should have put his trust in the man who wanted to save his people. The tasks of both statesmen were similar in many ways. Together, these two countries, each in its part of the world, could create much that was fruitful and beneficial, which would have convinced and carried away other young and old states. The leader of Germany declared his readiness to do so. Roosevelt might have been willing to do so if he had followed the tradition of the first American President of abstaining from all interference in non-American affairs, and if he had listened to the untold voices of his own countrymen urging peace. But he listened only to the voices of a powerful minority and unleashed war.

Roosevelt talked about democracy and betrayed it without ceasing. He reviled as undemocratic and un-American those who, for the sake of peace and the maintenance of the American way of life, urged him to repent. He made democracy a distorted image instead of a model. He spoke of freedom of speech and muzzled those who disagreed with him. He spoke of freedom of faith and made an alliance with Bolshevism, sent a commissioner to the Vatican to capture his Catholic constituents, and did not himself allow a Papal Nuncio in Washington. He spoke of freedom from bodily want and could not create work for more than ten million, no bread, no shelter. He spoke of freedom from fear of future wars and prepared the

war not only for his own people, but for the world, inciting those who might have been willing to agree with the Axis powers without his help to resist them, and thus driving millions to their deaths.

This war will go down in history as President Roosevelt's war.

#### FINAL WORD

As soldiers of the New World fly to Europe, perhaps one or the other whose lineage has its roots in German soil will recall the words of Bismarck spoken in 1890 when he received a deputation of German-Americans:

"The friendly relationship between Germany and the United States, like a legacy of Frederick the Great, has ever since that time been upheld by Prussian policy. Germany and North America are among those states so fortunate as not to need to envy each other anything in their mutual relations."

Since the days of Frederick the Great and the American War of Independence, Germany has held steadfastly to this principle. In the war between Germany and Bolshevism, America, having defeated Bolshevism, intends to take over the legacy of crushing Germany.

It would be a mistake to believe that the Germany of today is the same as in November 1918 or in the days of the Versailles peace. Already Treitschke, the great historian, quotes from a speech to the throne by King William of Prussia:

"If Germany has silently endured rapes of her right and honor in earlier centuries, it was only because in her brokenness she did not know how strong she was."

Now Germany knows that! It will endure in spite of superhuman efforts. Its fields cannot be destroyed



from the

from the air. Its industry is on the way to the East. If even Malta, which is, however, a rock fortress, could not be conquered with two thousand air raids in two years, Germany will hold out until the American people tire of such a futile enterprise. That cities destroyed from the ground up can be rebuilt in the course of a few years and rise again more beautiful and better than before, we learned in the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and in the terrible earthquake that destroyed Yokohama and Tokyo on September 1, 1923.

I did not write this book as an enemy of America. The two years I have been in the United States have been among the happiest of my life. With pain and sorrow I have observed America's policy in this war and have spoken clearly and frankly my thoughts about it. To the last I had hoped that the greatest confederation of nations in the Western Hemisphere would become the power that would save the Old World from the nameless calamity now tearing and rending all nations. What a consolation it would have been for our poor earth if America had entered the struggle of the continents not with new hecatombs of weapons, but with palms of peace in her hands!